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Gelotophobes have a negative attribution bias skewing appraisal of laughter meaning 
expressions of joy negatively affect interpersonal interactions and could be a barrier to 
positive outcomes in therapy. This study investigated participants’ perceptions of 
gelotophobes and non-gelotophobes responding to expressions of joy and examined whether 
the empathic underpinnings of counselling psychology afforded greater empathy and was a 
predictive factor in correctly identifying facial affect. This study was a quasi-experimental 
design employing a quantitative method. Participants (N = 144) consisted of counselling 
psychologists (CP) (n = 44), non-psychologists (NP) (n = 54), and psychology other (PO) (n 
= 46). Participants were shown emotional stimuli, pre-coded using Facial Action Coding 
System (FACS), depicting gelotophobes and non-gelotophobes responding to expressions of 
joy and asked to identify the emotion from a choice of seven basic emotions. Participants also 
completed the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI) and the Empathy Quotient (EQ) 
questionnaires to discern affective and cognitive empathy levels. Results found significant 
differences in the correct identification, and perception, of non-gelotophobes’ and 
gelotophobes’ facial affect. CP had significantly higher levels of cognitive empathy and 
identified significantly more gelotophobe emotional states than NP, but differences with the 
PO were non-significant. There was also a positive correlation between cognitive empathy 
and number of emotions correctly identified. Cognitive empathy, however, did not mediate 
between participant group and correctly identifying gelotophobes’ facial affect; as such, 
further research is needed to understand these findings. There were also no significant 
differences in affective empathy. Research highlights factors contributing to gelotophobes’ 
interpersonal difficulties, a factor in the development of gelotophobia, as well as factors that 




Abstract ...................................................................................................................................... 2 
Chapter 1 Introduction ............................................................................................................. 10 
1.1 Development of Research .............................................................................................. 11 
1.2 Relevance to Counselling Psychology ........................................................................... 11 
1.3 A Note on Terminology ................................................................................................. 12 
1.4 Structure of Thesis ......................................................................................................... 12 
1.5 Introduction to Research ................................................................................................ 13 
Chapter 2 Literature Review Part 1: Gelotophobia.................................................................. 16 
2.1 Literature Review Search Strategy ................................................................................. 17 
2.2 Gelotophobia the Concept .............................................................................................. 18 
2.3 The Development of Gelotophobia ................................................................................ 19 
2.3.1 Gelotophobia, Internal Working Models and Attachment .................................. 21 
2.3.2 Gelotophobia and Bullying ................................................................................. 25 
2.3.3 The Role of Personality and Character ............................................................... 27 
2.4 The Measurement of Gelotophobia ................................................................................ 29 
2.5 To Diagnose or Not to Diagnose? .................................................................................. 31 
2.6 Is It a Phobia? ................................................................................................................. 35 
2.6.1 Gelotophobia and Social Anxiety Disorder (SAD) ............................................ 36 
2.6.2 Gelotophobia and Emotionally Unstable Personality Disorder (EUPD) ............ 39 
2.6.3 Gelotophobia and Autistic Spectrum Disorder (ASD) ....................................... 40 
2.6.4 Gelotophobia, Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) and Shame ..................... 41 
Chapter 3 Literature Review Part 2: Counselling Psychology and Gelotophobia ................... 48 
3.1 Counselling Psychology ................................................................................................. 49 
3.2 Gelotophobia and Challenge for Therapeutic Practice .................................................. 51 
3.3 Empathy and Its Development ....................................................................................... 53 
3.4 Relationship Between Empathy Development and Counselling Skills ......................... 58 
3.5 The Therapeutic Relationship, Metacommunication and Gelotophobia ........................ 61 
3.6 Facial Expressions and the Communication of Emotion ............................................... 64 
3.6.1 Cultural Differences Within Facial Recognition of Emotion ............................. 65 
3.6.2 Autonomy of Facial Expressions ........................................................................ 67 
3.6.3 Facial Expressions of Emotion and Therapists ................................................... 67 
3.7 Summary of the Literature Review ................................................................................ 69 
3.8 Research Aims................................................................................................................ 71 
3.9 Hypotheses ..................................................................................................................... 73 
4 
 
3.9.1 Part 1 ................................................................................................................... 73 
3.9.2 Part 2 ................................................................................................................... 75 
Chapter 4 Method .................................................................................................................... 77 
4.1 Methodological Rationale .............................................................................................. 78 
4.2 Design............................................................................................................................. 80 
4.3 Participants ..................................................................................................................... 80 
4.3.1 Sample Size ......................................................................................................... 82 
4.4 Materials ......................................................................................................................... 84 
4.4.1 Preparation of Materials ...................................................................................... 84 
4.4.2 Measures ............................................................................................................. 91 
4.5 Procedure ........................................................................................................................ 92 
4.6 Ethical Considerations.................................................................................................... 93 
Chapter 5 Results ..................................................................................................................... 94 
5.1 Data Cleaning ................................................................................................................. 95 
5.2 Analysis .......................................................................................................................... 95 
5.2.1.............................................................................................................................. 95 
H1a Participants Will Perceive Non-gelotophobes to Have Significantly Higher 
Frequency of Happiness Compared to Gelotophobes .................................................. 95 
H1b Participants Will Perceive Gelotophobes to Have Significantly Higher Frequency 
of Contempt Compared to Non-gelotophobes ............................................................. 95 
5.2.2 H2 Participants Will identify More Non-gelotophobe Emotional States Being 
Displayed Correctly than Gelotophobe Emotional States When Reacting to 
Expressions of Joy ....................................................................................................... 96 
5.2.3 H3 There Will be Significantly More Incorrect Responses for Gelotophobes 
Compared to Non-gelotophobes, When Asked if the Individual in the Emotional 
Stimulus Had Gelotophobia ......................................................................................... 97 
5.2.4 H4 Counselling Psychology (CP) Participants Will Identify More Correct 
Emotional States Being Displayed by Gelotophobes than Non-psychology (NP) and 
Psychology Other (PO) Participants ............................................................................ 98 
5.2.5 H5a CP Participants Will Have a Higher Level of Affective Empathy Than NP 
and PO Participants .................................................................................................... 100 
5.2.6 H5b CP Participants Will Have a Higher Level of Cognitive Empathy Than NP 
and PO Participants .................................................................................................... 100 
5.2.7 H6a: Participants’ Affective Empathy Score Will Positively Correlate with The 
Correct Number of Emotions Identified .................................................................... 102 
5.2.8 H6b Participants’ Cognitive Empathy Will Positively Correlate with the Correct 
Number of Emotions Identified ................................................................................. 102 
5 
 
5.2.9 H6c: Affective Empathy Will Mediate The Relationship Between Participant 
Group and The Correct Number of Emotions Identified. .......................................... 103 
5.2.10 H6d: Cognitive Empathy Will Mediate The Relationship Between Participant 
Group and The Correct Number of Emotions Identified. .......................................... 104 
5.3 Summary of Key Findings ........................................................................................... 105 
Chapter 6 Discussion ............................................................................................................. 107 
6.1 Summary and Integration of Findings .......................................................................... 108 
6.2 Limitations of the Present Study and Future Research ................................................ 131 
6.3 Conclusion .................................................................................................................... 133 
Chapter 7 Critical Appraisal .................................................................................................. 136 
7.1 Development of research project.................................................................................. 137 
7.2 FACS Training ............................................................................................................. 139 
7.3 Researching Gelotophobia Heightened Fear of Being Laughed at .............................. 141 
7.4 Developing Online Platform ........................................................................................ 144 
7.5 Development as a Researcher ...................................................................................... 145 
Chapter 8 Example of Journal Paper ..................................................................................... 147 
References .............................................................................................................................. 167 


















List of Figures and Tables 
 
Figures  
Figure 1 Model of Gelotophobia Incorporating Causes, Moderating Factors And 
Consequences ......................................................................................................................... 200 
Figure 2 Mediated Relationship Between CP and NP Group And The Number of Correct 
Emotions Identified With Cognitive Empathy As Mediator ............................................... 1055 
 
Tables 
Table 1 The DSM-5 Diagnosis Guidance For Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder ................... 422 
Table 2 The Count and Percentage of the Profession of the Participants in the Psychology 
Other Group ............................................................................................................................. 81 
Table 3 Participant Age Range across Groups ........................................................................ 82 
Table 4 G*Power Analysis Used to Determine Sample Size.................................................. 82 
Table 5 GELOPH <15> Score and Coded Action Units For Each Emotional Stimulus As 
Well As The Reliability Ratio Score Between Coders ............................................................ 86 
Table 6 The Recoded Action Units For Each Emotional Stimulus, The Reliability Ratio 
Score Between Coders And The Emotion Pertaining To The Configuration of Action Units 88 
Table 7 Summary of Participants’ Frequency of Perceived Counts of Happiness and 
Contempt For Gelotophobes And Non-gelotophobes Responding to Expressions of Joy ...... 96 
Table 8 Displays Binary Logistic Regression Analysis for the Relationship Between 
GELOPH <15> Score and the Number of Correct Emotions Identified ................................. 97 
Table 9 Chi Square Test of Independence Across Incorrect and Correct Answers For 
Gelotophobe And Non-gelotophobe Emotional Stimuli .......................................................... 98 
Table 10 Displays Linear Regression Analysis for Affective Empathy and the Number of 
Correct Emotions Identified……………………………………………………………….. 102 
Table 11 Displays Linear Regression Analysis for Cognitive Empathy and the Number of 















Over the past few years and the years leading up to my doctorate training, there have 
been many people who have helped me along the way, for which I am truly grateful. Some, I 
would like to mention in particular: Firstly, I would like to mention my supervisors, Dr 
Tracey Platt and Dr Danny Hinton and thank them for all their wise words, patience, and 
encouragement. I would also like to thank all my course tutors and placement supervisors for 
their guidance across the last few years. I would also like to extend my thanks to my work 
managers, supervisor, and colleagues for all your support whilst completing my research. 
Moreover, I would also like to thank my parents for all their support since starting this 
journey and all my friends who have patiently listened to me in stressful times. Finally, I 














Glossary of Acronyms 
Term                                                                                                      Acronyms 
Action Unit……………………………………………………………….. (AU) 
Autistic Spectrum Disorder……………………………………………… (ASD) 
Autism Spectrum Quotient……………………………………………….. (AQ) 
Avoidant Personality Disorder…………………………………………… (APD) 
Beta Values………………………………………………………………… (B) 
British Psychological Society…………………………………………….. (BPS) 
Affective Behaviour Therapy…………………………………………….. (ABT) 
Compact Disc……………………………………………………………..  (CD) 
Cognitive Behaviour Therapy …………………………………………….  (CBT) 
Confidence Intervals……………………………………………………….  (CI) 
Counselling Psychologist………………………………………………….. (CP) 
Degrees of Freedom……………………………………………………….   (df) 
Division of Counselling Psychology…………………………………….. (DCoP) 
Emotionally Unstable Personality Disorder……………………………… (EUPD) 
Empathic Concern…………………………………………………………. (EC) 
Eye Movement Desensitization and Reprocessing……………………… (EMDR) 
Facial Action Coding System…………………………………………… (FACS) 
Fantasy Scale……………………………………………………………… (FS) 
Fear of Negative Evaluation scale…………………………………………. (FNE) 
Five Factor Model…………………………………………………………. (FFM) 
Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging………………………………… (fMRI) 
High Functioning Autistic Spectrum Disorder…………………………… (hfASD) 
Interpersonal Reactivity Scale……………………………………………… (IRS) 
Japanese and Caucasian Facial Expressions of Emotion………………… (JACFEE) 
Mean……………………………………………………………………….. (Mn) 
Medium…………………………………………………………………… (Mdn) 
Multi-Disciplinary Team………………………………………………….. (MDT) 
Non Psychologist…………………………………………………………    (NP) 
Personal Distress Scale……………………………………………………   (PD) 
9 
 
Perspective-taking Scale……………………………………………………  (PT) 
Psychologist Other………………………………………………………….  (PO) 
Social Anxiety Disorder…………………………………………………… (SAD) 
Standard Deviation…………………………………………………………. (SD) 
Standard Error………………………………………………………………. (SE) 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 5th edition…………………….  (DSM-5) 
Statistical Package for the Social Sciences……………………………….   (SPSS) 
Test of Self-Conscious Affect………………………………………… (TOSCA-3) 
The Empathy Quotient…………………………………………………….   (EQ) 
University of Wolverhampton……………………………………………  (UOW) 
























































1.1 Development of Research 
Initial interest in gelotophobia was generated by a conversation with Dr Tracey Platt 
regarding this area of research. Following this, I undertook reading around the area and I 
became aware gelotophobia was still a relatively new concept which was exciting.  Speaking 
to a clinical psychologist regarding their experience and difficulties of working with a client 
with the fear of being laughed at, helped to cement that this would be an interesting area of 
research. Moreover, the suggested use of the Facial Action Coding System (FACS) was of 
great interest as I was aware of Dr Paul Ekman’s work from my MSc.   
1.2 Relevance to Counselling Psychology 
In counselling psychology, the role of the therapeutic relationship is considered 
salient to change (Orlans & Van Scoyoc, 2008). The core conditions of therapy necessary for 
positive change were postulated by Rogers (1951) to be empathy, congruence, and 
unconditional positive regard. Psychologists are required to be able to communicate empathic 
understanding and unconditional positive regard to their client. As such, the presence of 
gelotophobia has the potential to precipitate a fracturing of the therapeutic relationship by 
misinterpretations of the psychologist’s metacommunication, i.e., a friendly smile or laugh 
from a psychologist could be perceived as ridicule or scorn. Gelotophobes have been shown 
to have a negative interpretation bias relating to laughter and smiling and tend to respond to 
expressions of joy with less joy and greater incidence of contempt facial configurations 
(Hofmann et al., 2015). For a counselling psychologist then, to be able to recognise 
incongruent metacommunication gives an opportunity to explore any misinterpretation, 






1.3 A Note on Terminology  
The terms gelotophobia and gelotophobe are used as a matter of course in this area of 
research. The present study has also used these terms rather than the more humanistic 
expression of ‘an individual that experiences a heightened fear of being laughed at’ to 
enhance readability and to align with previous research. It is acknowledged, however, that 
labels of this ilk can cause tensions and challenges for counselling psychologists, and 
potential difficulties for clients, and as such the use of these terms is explored further in the 
literature review, along with the actions that have been taken to inhibit potential difficulties 
arising.  
1.4 Structure of Thesis 
This thesis comprises of four main sections: literature review, method, results, and 
discussion. The literature review consists of two chapters relating to gelotophobia and 
counselling psychology. Literature review part 1 (Chapter 2) focuses on the concept, 
development, and measurement of gelotophobia, as well as understanding where 
gelotophobia sits within current diagnoses and considers the use of a specific label for the 
heightened fear of being laughed at. Literature review part 2 (Chapter 3) explores how the 
empathic foundations of counselling psychology may contribute to recognising facial affect 
and its subsequent impact on working with gelotophobes. In doing this, the second part of the 
literature review brings together counselling psychology, metacommunication, facial affect 
recognition, and empathy and its development. Method (Chapter 4) outlines the methodology 
rationale before providing the details of how this study was conducted. Results (Chapter 5) 
outlines the data analysis and findings of the study. Discussion (Chapter 6) provides a 
discussion of the research findings, highlighting where they sit within, and elaborates on 




1.5 Introduction to Research 
In a typical population, it tends to be assumed that the expression of a smile or the 
vocalisation of laughter will be positively inferred (Ruch et al., 2013). The dualistic nature of 
laughter, however, whereby it can be incorporated in ridicule and shame, has a long history of 
being observed (e.g., Hobbes, 1651). It is postulated that repeated traumatic experiences of 
being ridiculed via laughter, in conjunction with complex intersubjective factors 
incorporating systemic feedback loops, leads to the heightened fear of being the object of 
laughter (Ruch & Proyer, 2008). This phenomenon, known as gelotophobia, the fear of being 
the laughed at (Titze, 2009), exists on a continuum between no to extreme gelotophobia 
(Ruch & Proyer, 2008). Gelotophobes have a negative attribution bias skewing appraisal of 
laughter; thus the dichotomous nature of laughter becomes problematic (Platt, 2008; Ruch, 
Altfreder et al., 2009). This negatively affects interpersonal interactions for gelotophobes, 
hindering them from forming and maintaining relationships (Platt & Forabosco, 2014). 
Metacommunication within interpersonal interactions incorporates encoding and 
decoding of facial expressions (Zuckerman et al., 1975; Zuckerman et al., 1976) and, as such, 
the ability to interpret signals of communication is advantageous in social interactions. Facial 
expressions communicate an emotional state to others via an encoding face and decoding 
brain which affords individuals the ability to infer emotional states and respond accordingly 
(Smith et al., 2005). Typically, this can be arranged into seven universal expressions of 
emotion: fear, joy, contempt, sadness, disgust, anger, and surprise (Ekman, 1992; Ekman & 
Friesen, 1975). Individuals have autonomy over facial expressions, however, allowing 
emotions to be masked or faked; thus, facial expressions cannot merely be considered innate 
expressions of emotion (Ekman, et al., 1981). 
It is postulated that facial expressions of emotion have specific facial configurations 
related to different emotions. For example, the emotion of joy tends to be accompanied by a 
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facial configuration called the Duchenne display (Ekman et al., 1990) which incorporates the 
joint and symmetric contraction of the zygomatic major and orbicularis oculi muscles: pulling 
the lip corners back and upwards; raising the cheeks and compressing the eyelids resulting in 
eye wrinkles (Ekman et al., 1987). Non-Duchenne smiles do not activate the orbicularis oculi 
muscles and tend to serve a social function such as the concealment of a negative emotion 
(Surakka & Hietanen, 1998). A contempt smile, however, incorporates unilateral action of the 
buccinators muscle (Ruch et al., 2013). This is of relevance to gelotophobes as they tend to 
have higher incidents of contempt displays and express less joy when responding to 
expressions of joy (Hofmann et al., 2015). 
Gelotophobia is still not incorporated into psychological formulations or psychiatric 
diagnoses despite evidence of its existence found across 73 countries, in clinical and non-
clinical populations (Proyer et al., 2009). This can lead to individuals being misdiagnosed 
(Platt et al., 2016). The role of empathy may be salient to positive outcomes in therapy. Besel 
and Yuille (2013) found an association between cognitive and affective empathy in relation 
to the ability to recognise facial expression, i.e., greater empathy positively correlated with 
identifying facial affect. Given that gelotophobes tend to respond to expressions of joy with 
greater incidents of incongruent facial configurations, the empathic values of counselling 
psychology could be beneficial in identifying this facial affect.  
The therapeutic relationship is considered salient to change in counselling psychology 
as its foundations are built upon humanistic values, particularly the person-centred approach 
(Orlans & Van Scoyoc, 2008). Rogers (1961) believed we all have an actualising tendency 
towards health and postulated there are three core conditions necessary to facilitate change: 
empathy, congruence, and unconditional positive regard. Rogers demonstrated that for 
therapy to be successful, psychologists need to be able to communicate empathic 
understanding and unconditional positive regard to their client. Metacommunication issues 
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can therefore fracture therapeutic relationships (Safran et al., 1990) and, as such, the 
unwitting presence of gelotophobia could result in unsuccessful outcomes following a client 











































2.1 Literature Review Search Strategy  
For this literature review, the University of Wolverhampton’s library collection 
online, British Psychological Society’s (BPS) Journals via PsychSource, EBSCO 
Psychology, Behavioural Sciences Collection, Evidence-Based Mental Health, BJEP 
Monographs, Wiley Journals, Google, and Google Scholar were searched. A plugin for 
Google Chrome ‘Unpaywall’ was used to harvest open access repositories of journal articles. 
In doing this, ResearchGate, PubMed Central, Sci-Hub, and up to 50,000 further online 
content hosts were searched.  
Relevant literature areas of interest were identified for a narrative literature review 
relating to gelotophobia, in psychotherapeutic practice, facial coding and empathy. All 
literature relating to these areas was searched. Searches were undertaken between May 2016 
and May 2019 and no date parameters were set for searches. No language parameters were 
set on searches; two German language papers were automatically translated by Google. 
All paper titles were visually inspected to assess their suitability, which established a 
list of papers that appeared relevant to the present research aims. Following the primary 
examination, a secondary review was undertaken of titles and abstracts to establish a list of 
full texts to be examined. Bibliographic snowballing was used throughout: Bibliographic 
details from articles that matched the search criteria were examined for assigned indexed 
terms and further relevant references.  
The following key terms were used in searches: gelotophobia, fear of being laughed 
at, gelotophobia DSM, gelotophobia autism, gelotophobia ASD, gelotophobia personality 
disorder, gelotophobia social anxiety disorder, gelotophobia a specific phobia, social anxiety, 
social phobia ridicule, fear of ridicule, laughter, gelotophobia and attachment, attachment, 
facial recognition, internal working models, internal working models and gelotophobia, 
internal working models and trauma, trauma, PTSD, trauma and gelotophobia, PTSD 
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gelotophobia, empathy, development of empathy, empathy and facial recognition, 
counselling skills and empathy, empathy training, empathy and facial affect, Facial 
Activation Coding System and FACS, as well as combinations of the aforementioned terms.  
On establishing relevant journal papers, Scimago Journal Check was used to help 
inform weight given to existing research. Journals with a Quartile 1 and 2 ranking were 
considered gold standard. This research was mindful however that gelotophobia is a 
relatively new and niche area of research and, as such, some of the area-specific journals can 
have a lower ranking. As such, any research in journals with a Quartile 3 ranking was not 
dismissed but assessed for scientific accuracy. 
2.2 Gelotophobia the Concept 
The concept of gelotophobia derives from Paul Hartenberg’s (1901) publication on 
‘timid’ individuals which highlighted individuals with a sensitivity to being laughed at. This 
concept was developed further by Michael Titze (1995, 1996, 1997) following clinical 
observations. Titze coined the term gelotophobia relating to the heightened fear of being 
laughed at and suggested a causal chain of prolonged mockery and ridicule, early in life, in 
conjunction with having been treated in a facetious manner.  
Gelotophobia is often misleadingly referred to as ‘the fear of been laughed at’, as 
fearing being the object of laughter seems a reasonable concern. Gelotophobes, however, 
tend to believe others are constantly observing them for evidence of ridiculousness which 
would induce laughter at their expense. Extreme gelotophobia induces a specific paranoid 
tendency towards being the object of laughter and incorporates a marked sensitivity to 
offence and social withdrawal (Titze 1996). Gelotophobia, ‘gelos’ the Greek for laughter, can 
therefore be defined as a heightened fear of being the object of ridicule via laughter by social 
partners (Ruch & Proyer, 2008).  
19 
 
2.3 The Development of Gelotophobia  
In understanding the precipitating factors of gelotophobia, originally a theoretical 
causal chain model of putative causes and consequences was developed whereby 
gelotophobia operates as a shame-bound anxiety, originating through early experience in 
infancy, which leads to a fixated heightened self-awareness and self-control. In infancy, a 
gelotophobe’s caregiver reflects a blank face, never a smiling face, leaving the child with an 
‘interpersonal bridge’; thus, the child fails to connect to the caregiver and, later in life, others. 
Herein, the caregivers of gelotophobes impose an idiosyncratic perception of the world onto 
their offspring and should the child deviate from the ‘parental script’, the child is punished 
with ridicule and scorn. This is also reinforced by being the object of laughter and scorn 
whilst at school, during adolescence, and latterly at work. As such, these young people tend 
not to encounter laughter in a positive, prosocial, and bonding manner; rather they tend to 
experience it only in the form of hostility. Prolonged malicious treatment of an individual in 
this manner can have the pernicious effect of leaving an individual with a pervasive fear of 
being the object of ridicule and scorn and in a state of ‘agelotic’, i.e., unable to appreciate the 
benefits of laughter (Ruch & Proyer, 2005, 2008; Titze, 1997, 2009). 
The original linear model proposed by Titze of punitive causes and consequences has 
been developed into a more systemic model of feedback loops operating across many levels 









Displays a model of gelotophobia incorporating causes, moderating factors, and 
consequences 
 
Note. Redrawn with permission from “The state-of-the art in gelotophobia research: A review 
and some theoretical extensions,” by W. Ruch, J. Hofmann, T. Platt, and R. Proyer, 2014, 
Humor, 27, p. 9.  
 
A salient addition to the developmental model of gelotophobia was systemic feedback 
loops (Ruch, Hofmann et al., 2014). Henri Bergson (1900) first suggested individuals who 
are the object of ridicule and scorn via laughter take on the appearance of wooden puppets or 
marionettes. Individuals in these situations tend to emit nonverbal clues that indicate their 
affective state of feeling uneasy. In these situations, it is suggested that emotional panic leads 
to muscular tension and stiffness and presents as individuals appearing not to move in a 
typical manner as they try deliberately to control their body movements. This ‘wooden 
appearance’ has been referred to as the ‘Pinocchio-Complex’ (Titze, 1995, 1996, 1998, 2007, 
2009, 2013). As such, individuals expecting to be the recipient of ridicule adjust their 
mannerisms accordingly in a maladaptive effort to cope. However, this manner is perceived 
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as atypical by others, leading to further ridicule; thus, consequences and elicitors become 
looped (Ruch, Hofmann et al., 2014). Moreover, in perceiving others as ridiculing them, 
gelotophobes tend to react to expressions of joy, displaying greater incidence of 
contemptuous facial configurations and showing less joy (Hofmann et al., 2015), which 
seemingly compounds and maintains their interpersonal difficulties. It should be noted, 
however, that some of these atypical metacommunication presentations are in keeping with 
individuals who have had traumatic experiences.  
The early model of gelotophobia was revised to also include a mix of internal and 
external factors. Internal factors incorporating parental influences, personality, genetics, 
emotional predisposition, and interpersonal skills factors were added. External moderating 
factors such as peer group dynamics, culture, and social structure were also included. These 
new factors, however, can act not only as risk factors but also as protective factors. This 
helped to account for some variance in individual experience, as not all individuals who 
experienced the original punitive factors went on to develop gelotophobia (Ruch, Hofmann et 
al., 2014). The evidence regarding internal factors is examined further in the following 
sections and it should also be noted that, at the present time, external factors still require 
further investigation.  
2.3.1 Gelotophobia, Internal Working Models and Attachment 
The heightened fear of being laughed at and family interaction are closely related 
(Proyer, Estoppey et al., 2012). Moreover, individuals that fail to feel loved or appreciated by 
their caregiver in infancy are more likely to lack a sense of belonging and in turn have an 
increased probability of experiencing the heightened fear of being the object of laughter 
(Proyer & Neukom, 2013). A salient factor in an infant’s development is their attachment to 
their caregiver and the ability of their caregiver to provide a secure base. Infants have an 
innate instinct to seek safety and comfort from their parents. A child will signal with 
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heightened arousal to elicit contact or proximity to the caregiver by crying, smiling and 
locomotion (Bowlby, 1988). How the caregiver responds to a child’s needs forms mental 
representations known as an internal working model (IWM). These consist of expectations 
about the self, significant others, and the interaction between the two. Internal working 
models mediate perception of one’s own and others’ behaviour: whether you believe you are 
loveable and worthy of love and whether you believe others are available and interested in 
helping support you (Ainsworth, 1989; Bowlby, 1979). As such, a caregiver–child attachment 
style would be expected to be involved within the development of gelotophobia, especially as 
there is a correlation between individuals that fail to establish a bond with caregivers in 
infancy and an increased probability of bullying in adolescence (Ruch, 2014). It has been 
found that as ‘good attachment’ increases, the sense of bond intensity and gelotophobia 
decreases (Chen et al., 2011; Wu et al., 2015). Moreover, attachment has also been examined 
as a mediating factor within parenting style and it has been found that caregiver–child 
attachment has a direct and indirect influence on perceived parental care, protection, and 
children’s heightened fear of being laughed at (Wu et al., 2018). Further research found a 
relationship between attachment anxiety, aggressive humour, and gelotophobia where 
attachment anxiety correlated with greater aggressive humour and gelotophobia. Attachment 
avoidance, however, was negatively correlated with humour orientation (i.e., humour that is 
prosocial and has a positive attribution) and positively related to gelotophobia. Gelotophobia 
was unsurprisingly negatively related to humour production; however, more interestingly, 
gelotophobia appeared to mediate the relationships between attachment anxiety, humour 
aggressive scale, attachment avoidance and humour orientation scale. This research suggested 
insecurity is an important factor in respect of individual differences in the encoding of 
humour, where insecurity invokes the heightened awareness of being the object of laughter 
(Miczro, 2017).  
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Parenting style, however, also affects parent–child attachment (Lau et al., 2012). 
Parenting style refers to the caregiver’s attitude and beliefs regarding childrearing, 
incorporating care and protection, whereby care relates to affection between caregiver and 
child and protection is more concerned with curtailing the child’s behaviour; should a child 
feel a parenting style is too demanding, however, it is then considered negative discipline 
(Carlo et al., 2007). Caregivers of gelotophobes are linked to being overprotective and 
controlling in their parenting style, and gelotophobes tend to report more punitive events and 
less warmth than a typical population, though at present other family factors could not be 
ruled out (Proyer, Estoppey et al., 2012; Wu et al., 2018).   
The research regarding attachment and parenting style lends weight to its involvement 
in the formation of gelotophobia. Further support of the role of attachment and gelotophobia 
comes from research examining gelotophobia in relation to internal working models (IWM) 
of attachment and romantic relationships later in life. According to Bowlby’s (1988) concept 
of the IWM, early experiences with the attachment figure lead a child to develop expectations 
regarding relationships with others. IWMs therefore form the lens through which an 
individual interprets their experiences and interactions with others, as well as predicts 
experiences in future relationships. It would be expected therefore, that should an individual’s 
IWM be affected by gelotophobia, then it would also be present within romantic relationships 
within adulthood.  
Research has found that there is a higher probability of gelotophobes being single 
than non-gelotophobes and this was consistent across all ages (Platt & Forabosco, 2012; Ruch 
& Proyer, 2008). This pattern has been attributed to gelotophobes disengaging from romantic 
relationships when they encounter a smile, or laughter, following misattributing its meaning 
(Platt et al., 2016), which is in keeping with attachment theory of internalising negative 
expectations of self and others (Bowlby, 1982). Support for this has been found with a study 
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which examined gelotophobia, gelotophilia, and katagelasticism association with romantic 
attachment styles and romantic outcomes in adults. Gelotophilia is a term that describes 
individuals that take excessive enjoyment from being the object of laughter and 
katagelasticism describes individuals that take, and actively seek, excessive enjoyment from 
laughing at others.  The study found that gelotophobia had a positive correlation with anxiety 
and avoidant attachment styles, and gelotophobes were less likely to enter romantic 
relationships. Gelotophilia was related to lower avoidance and katagelasticism was not 
related to any specific attachment style; it has also been found that attachment style mediated 
laughter disposition and romantic satisfaction (Brauer et al., 2019).  
Further evidence for the role of attachment with gelotophobes was found by 
Canestrari et al. (2019) and went beyond romantic attachment. They expanded on previous 
research by examining whether the social life satisfaction of individuals with gelotophobia, 
gelotophilia and katagelasticism is modulated by parental attachment. They found that a 
highly satisfactory social life is related with low levels of gelotophobia and high levels of 
parental attachment, as well as differences in coping strategies, i.e., gelotophiles tended to use 
control strategies to cope with difficulties, whereas gelotophobes tended to withdraw socially 
in perceived difficult situations.  
The research on gelotophobia, attachment, and romantic relationships partly supports 
the view that the heightened fear of being laughed at relates to attachment style and the 
success of future relationships. There is still a need, however for further research in this area, 
particularly around IWMs and attachment. Also, there is a need to rule out comorbidities and 
confounds being responsible for the findings, i.e., gelotophobia has been found to overlap 
with autistic spectrum disorder (ASD), emotionally unstable personality disorder (EUPD) and 
social anxiety, and all these difficulties have also been found to relate to insecure attachment 
styles (Agrawal et al., 2004; Beurkens et al., 2012; Eng et al., 2001). There is already a well-
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established link between attachment style and the probability of a successful relationship 
(Butzer & Campbell, 2008), as well as links between insecure attachment and aversion 
towards romantic relationships (Feeney & Noller, 1990). As such, until the comorbidities are 
controlled it is not possible to fully gauge the impact of gelotophobia on attachment. 
Moreover, meta-analysis has found a similar pattern between trauma symptoms and 
attachment styles, where insecure attachment positively correlates with trauma symptoms 
(Woodhouse et al., 2015). As such, were it to be that gelotophobia was merely trauma 
symptoms precipitated by a specific trigger of people laughing, the same patterns would be 
expected to be found. At present there has been no research focusing on gelotophobia and 
trauma, so it is not possible to exclude this possibility. The present understanding of trauma 
and where gelotophobia sits within it will be explored further later in the paper.  
2.3.2 Gelotophobia and Bullying  
Titze (1996) originally postulated that individuals with a heightened fear of being 
laughed at would tend to appraise laughter incorrectly due to experiencing bullying, i.e., 
gelotophobes tend to have a faulty alarm in detecting when they are being ridiculed. Support 
for this was originally found by Platt (2008) who found gelotophobes experience negative 
emotional affect in relation to good-natured teasing, which was in keeping with the emotional 
profile of bullying-related ridicule. This relationship was further explored by Platt et al. 
(2009); they reported a correlation between the emotions experienced in teasing and ridicule-
type scenarios and the self-reported status of being a victim of bullying. Participants who 
indicated having been bullied reported that they would be less likely to experience joy in 
good-natured teasing situations, in conjunction with experiencing greater levels of fear and 
shame. Further to this, participants who had been bullied displayed higher scores in fear and 
lower ones in happiness. As such, experiencing bullying is related to generally lower scores 
in happiness and higher fear scores. Platt and Ruch (2009) also found a positive correlation 
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between the experience of being bullied and gelotophobia, and Samson et al. (2011) 
confirmed a relationship between gelotophobia and the experience of being the object of 
ridicule. The research to date indicates that the heighted fear of being laughed at is persistent 
after being tormented at a younger age (Liu et al., 2014). 
A critical factor in gelotophobia incorporates gelotophobes’ appraisal of interpersonal 
interactions and their subsequent emotional topography (Platt & Ruch, 2009). In exploring 
this, Platt (2008) examined the emotional responses of gelotophobes and non-gelotophobes in 
relation to playful teasing and found gelotophobes tended to respond emotionally as if they 
were the object of ridicule. Further research utilised positively motivated laughter which was 
presented to participants acoustically and found gelotophobes experienced the laughter as 
more unpleasant than non-gelotophobes. Moreover, those without the heightened fear of 
being laughed at, experienced an increase in mood. In a further test that was semi-projective 
in nature, the gelotophobe participants tended to perceive ambiguous laughter in a more 
pejorative manner; thus, they were more likely to perceive themselves as being the object of 
the laughter (Ruch, Beermann et al., 2009). This therefore appears to support the belief that 
gelotophobes have a heightened suspicion of being the object of ridicule regardless of context 
(Ruch & Proyer, 2009). 
The research on gelotophobia with children and adolescents is limited at present, with 
many questions remaining regarding gelotophobia in childhood and adolescence, including 
its causes and consequences (Führ et al., 2015). Moreover, it is noticeable there is no research 
to date that is qualitative in nature relating to gelotophobia and, as such, the voice of 





2.3.3 The Role of Personality and Character  
Being an object of laughter leads to inhibition of behaviour, inducing strong negative 
emotions and giving an individual the impression they have done something wrong. 
Understandably, therefore, repeated experiences of pejorative behaviour could impact 
personality traits, with innate dispositions interacting with the environment (Ruch et al., 
2008). In the punitive model of gelotophobia, a factor within its development has partly been 
attributed to personality. Using the Five Factor Model (FFM) and Eysenckian PEN-model of 
personality, gelotophobia has been examined numerous times and across different 
nationalities. Consistent findings indicate gelotophobes tend to be introverted neurotics in 
nature and correlated with low agreeableness and openness (Ďurka & Ruch, 2015; Proyer & 
Ruch, 2010; Ruch et al., 2013; Ruch et al, 2008). Global personality aspects, however, do not 
fully account for gelotophobia and there are differences with lower order concepts (Ruch et 
al, 2013). It appears, therefore, that personality is a factor in the development of 
gelotophobia. It is not possible, however, from any of these studies to differentiate how much 
gelotophobia has contributed to personality traits and, as in many cases, no effort was made 
to explore comorbid difficulties, which may account for the differences in lower order 
concepts.    
In respect of character, a number of studies have found a relationship between 
strength of character and reaction to ridicule and being laughed at. In gelotophobes, modesty 
appears to be a core strength, but there is a negative correlation with humour, curiosity, zest, 
love, hope, and bravery, which is in keeping with gelotophobes’ presentation (Proyer, 
Wellenzohn et al., 2013). Proyer & Ruch (2009) examined 346 adults with GELOPH <15> 
and the Values in Action Inventory of Strengths questionnaire. They found that self-report 
ratings of virtuousness were lower compared to peer-report ratings, indicating gelotophobes 
underestimate their own level of virtuousness in comparison to peers’ perceptions. In fact, 
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there was a positive correlation between gelotophobia and peer ratings in numerous factors: 
prudence, open-mindedness, modesty, appreciation of beauty, excellence, and spirituality, 
i.e., as the level of gelotophobia increased, as measured by the GELOPH <15>, so did peer 
ratings of the aforementioned factors. These findings indicate that gelotophobes’ perceptions 
of themselves are different from their peers’, which may contribute to some of their 
interpersonal difficulties, such as withdrawing from social situations due to negatively 
skewed perceptions of their interactions. Understanding further these discrepancies in 
perception between gelotophobes and their peers may help inform therapeutic interventions 
for gelotophobes.    
Measures of character have also been explored across gelotophilia and 
katagelasticism. Gelotophilic individuals take pleasure from others laughing at them and 
actively seek situations to be laughed at. Research has found that gelotophilic individuals 
overestimate their levels of virtuousness in comparison to peers’ perceptions (Proyer, 
Wellenzohn et al., 2013). It may be that their misperception is driven from the positive 
feedback of others laughing at/with them (Renner & Heydasch, 2010). Gelotophilia does, 
however, positively correlate with strengths in love, bravery, zest, gratitude, creativity, 
kindness, and social intelligence. Strengths of character, therefore, largely negatively 
correlate with gelotophobia but overall, positively correlate with gelotophilia. 
Katagelasticism, which is the heightened experience of enjoying laughing at others, appears 
to have no relationship with strengths of character. Katagelasticism correlates with cold-
heartedness and being perceived to be cold and rude, which is in keeping with 
katagelasticism’s propensity to perceive laughing at others as part of everyday life and 
actively seeking situations to action this belief. Katagelasticists’ perceptions of themselves 
correlate with peers’ perceptions, indicating a realistic view of themselves. When it comes to 
character, therefore, gelotophobes appear to see themselves as low in character strengths, but 
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those high in gelotophilia perceive themselves as high in character strengths, and those high 
in katagelasticism are unconcerned with strengths of character (Proyer, Wellenzohn et al., 
2013). 
2.4 The Measurement of Gelotophobia 
In moving on from examining the development of gelotophobia, the next section 
focuses on how it can be assessed and measured. It is postulated gelotophobia exists on a 
continuum from no gelotophobia to extreme gelotophobia (Ruch & Proyer, 2008). Cross-
cultural research has found the presence of gelotophobia in 73 countries. This substantial 
research involved a total of 95 researchers and 22,610 participants in 93 samples across 73 
countries (Proyer et al., 2009). The prevalence of gelotophobia has also been found in both 
clinical and non-clinical populations across many different countries (Platt & Forabosco, 
2012). 
Original investigations into gelotophobia were derived from clinical case studies, with 
the presence of gelotophobia established via clinical judgement within a clinical interview-
based assessment (Ruch & Proyer, 2007). Gelotophobia was originally explored empirically 
to validate the concept via GELOPH <46> (Ruch & Titze, 1998): a subjective assessment 
measure using 46 statements relating typical behaviours and attitudes of gelotophobes. 
Discriminant function analysis found a group of diagnosed gelotophobes could be 
significantly separated from a group of shame-based neurotics and normal control groups. 
The findings were further supported by factor analysis, as well as self-reports correlating 
affectively with clinical judgements of gelotophobia and as such the GELOPH <46> was 
considered a valid indicator of gelotophobia (Ruch & Proyer, 2007). 
Ruch and Proyer (2008) further developed GELOPH <46> and made a more concise 
15-item questionnaire (GELOPH <15>) featuring core items of gelotophobia and 
incorporating a comparative cut-off scale which indicates if an individual has slight, 
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pronounced or extreme gelotophobia. The cut-offs for this self-report instrument are no 
gelotophobia, borderline, slight, marked, and extreme gelotophobia. In non-clinical samples 
across the world, typically the rate of slight gelotophobia is low (between 1.2 and 10%) and 
tends not to exceed 1% of the population (Platt & Forabosco, 2012). In clinical samples, 
however, rates of 40% for slight gelotophobia and 10% for extreme gelotophobia have been 
reported (Forabosco et al., 2009; Samson et al., 2011). This efficient measure has been found 
to have robust psychometric values and has been translated into over 40 different languages 
and found to be reliable as a unidimensional instrument in assessing gelotophobia (Forabosco 
et al., 2009; Ruch, Altfreder et al., 2009; Ruch & Proyer, 2008b; Samson et al., 2011). The 
English version was translated by Platt et al. (2009) and once again found to have good 
psychometric properties (high reliability; α = .90).  
Further measures have also been developed such as the PhoPhiKat which has a 45-, 
30- and 9-item version as well as a child version. This measure examines not only 
gelotophobia but also other aspects of humour-related issues such as gelotophilia and 
katagelasticism. The PhoPhiKat affords an examination of the relationships of gelotophobia, 
gelotophilia and katagelasticism. Gelotophobia and gelotophilia unsurprisingly have been 
found to be negatively correlated; as an individual’s level of gelotophobia increases, their 
gelotophilia decreases. Katagelasticism is positively correlated with gelotophilia; however, 
no relationship between katagelasticism and gelotophobia has been found. As such, this 
indicates that some gelotophobes also engage with laughing at others and some might not. 
Numerous studies of the PhoPhiKat have been undertaken which have shown it to have good 
test-retest reliability and validity (Hofmann et al., 2017; Ruch & Proyer, 2009; Ruch, 
Hofmann et al., 2014).  
In addition to the multi-humour dispositional approach of the PhoPhiKat, a multi-
method approach for assessing gelotophobia has been developed. This is a picture-based 
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measure (Picture-Gelpog <9>) which uses cartoons depicting social situations incorporating 
the potential for laughter situations. This measure has also been found to have good test-retest 
reliability and validity; in addition, it has been shown to correlate well with the GELOPH 
<15> (Ruch, Altfreder et al., 2009; Ruch et al., 2017).  
The last section outlined the different measures developed to assess gelotophobia, 
which have been used in 73 countries. As such, the term or label ‘gelotophobia’ has been 
propagated across many nations and cultures. The next section examines: the negatives and 
benefits of using such labels, the alternative approach of psychological formulation, and how 
labels, and diagnoses, sit within the philosophical stance of counselling psychology. 
2.5 To Diagnose or Not to Diagnose? 
Gelotophobia is not present in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders, 5th edition (DSM-5) (American Psychiatric Association, 2013), and not present in 
the 11th Revision of the International Classification of Diseases (ICD 11) (World Health 
Organisation, 2019). Although gelotophobia is not considered a specific pathology (Ruch et 
al., 2014), at its extreme end it is a maladaptive belief relating to being a figure of ridicule 
(Ruch & Proyer, 2008). A criticism of the psychiatric taxonomy approach is the diagnostic 
labels locate any difficulty within the individual and ignore the societal context and 
interpersonal relations as the precipitating factors of the unhappiness (Hare-Mustin & 
Marecek, 1997). This is of particular relevance to gelotophobia given it is believed to arise 
from repeated experiences of being ridiculed via laughter. As such, the individual’s social 
interactions within their environment and subsequent feedback loops give rise to their 
difficulties. This diagnostic approach therefore raises ethical debate as it could leave an 
individual feeling like they are not ‘normal’, whereas the focus should be on the system that 
has given rise to the difficulties and where the problem was located. In this sense, the 
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heightened fear of being laughed at was merely a way of protecting oneself, albeit an 
unhelpful one, from a hostile environment.  
A possible disadvantage of using a term such as gelotophobia, therefore, is it has the 
potential to become a label, or even a diagnosis, that imbibes stigma within an individual. 
Attribution theory suggests that labels in mental health precipitate stigma following the 
formation of stereotypes and in turn discrimination (Corrigan, 2006), and these stereotypes 
are not just upheld within the general public but also found within mental health professions 
(Keane, 1990; Lyons & Ziviani, 1995). The use of a label, or diagnosis, can also imply that 
all individuals within that group are homogeneous, and therefore once more initiate 
stereotypes (Corrigan, 2006). In avoiding precipitating further discrimination, it has been 
suggested new diagnoses or labels should avoid being categorical; rather, any difficulty 
should be seen on a continuum (Widiger, 2001). Moreover, in combating the formation of 
stereotypes, and stigma, a large body of evidence has found the role of education is salient 
(Corrigan & Penn, 1999).  
The challenges of using labels and a diagnostic approach are of pertinence for 
counselling psychology as its philosophical stance is founded upon humanistic values where 
there is “respect for the personal, subjective experience of the client over and above notions 
of diagnosis, assessment and treatment” (Lane & Corrie, 2006, p. 17). Counselling 
psychology’s position has moved slightly since its inception, however, following pressure 
from economic contextual factors of working within organisations such as the NHS (Douglas, 
2010). Working in environments such as the NHS highlighted a need for shared language 
with other professionals, as well as a need to manage a professional identity within a medical 
topography, which has provided a tension for counselling psychologists by requiring them to 
traverse humanistic and scientific-practitioner values (Larsson et al., 2012).  
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The conflict between counselling psychology values and working alongside the 
medical model, however, has been posited to leave individual practitioners in a state of 
conflict. In managing these tensions, the pluralistic approach has been used in modern 
counselling psychology training to help traverse conflicting positions by the practitioner 
holding multiple epistemological positions (Frost, 2012). The pluralistic approach suggests 
that individuals benefit from different therapeutic approaches at different points in time. 
Pluralism, therefore, affords a fluid response in keeping with an individual’s needs (Cooper 
& McLeod, 2012). Some psychological models sit comfortably within a medicalised 
approach, but others have a more uncomfortable ontological and epistemological relationship. 
It has been postulated, however, that any ontological and epistemological conflicts occurring 
can be managed within the pluralistic approach by engaging in critical thinking in 
conjunction with the ability, and willingness, to reflect on assumptions and values to avoid 
biases (Cosgrove, 2005). 
An alternative to the diagnostic approach is that of psychological formulation, which 
has been defined as a holistic narrative that synthesises individuals’ experiences with clinical 
theory and research (Friedberg, 2010). Formulation can help practitioners understand salient 
difficulties, predisposing and perpetuating factors, and identify interventions as well as 
anticipate challenges for the course of the therapy. A strength of formulation is it can go 
beyond diagnosis and help elucidate idiosyncratic presentations and experiential etiological 
factors of difficulties, thus avoiding the homogeneous nature of diagnosis regardless of the 
psychological model used (Macneil et al., 2012). In this sense, individuals could receive 
therapy for the heightened fear of being laughed at without the need for any label or 
diagnosis. Many psychologists, however, despite not taking a diagnostic approach, have still 
reported to doubt the existence of gelotophobia based on having not encountered the 
difficulty (Ventis & Platt, 2014). In exploring this, preliminary research found gelotophobes 
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often do not attend therapy with the heightened fear of being laughed at as their presenting 
difficulty due to feeling it is frivolous and will not be taken seriously. Moreover, burgeoning 
therapeutic relationships can fracture within initial meetings by misinterpretation of 
metacommunication when a reassuring smile is decoded as scorn or contempt (Platt et al., 
2016) and, as such, therapy is discontinued prior to a full formulation taking place.   
It should be noted there are also benefits of incorporating diagnoses into mental 
health: For instance, diagnostic categories can help clients understand their difficulties, feel 
like they are not alone with their difficulties, and it can help an individual feel their 
difficulties are validated and contained. From a professional stance, it affords the organisation 
of client information and moreover the diagnosis facilitates understanding. This is of great 
importance for individuals being supported by multi-disciplinary teams (MDT) as it gives a 
shared understanding when describing patterns of experience and behaviour across the 
different professions and training (Perkins et al., 2018), as well as highlighting and 
facilitating further areas of research (Freeth, 2007).  
At present, research into the heightened fear of being laughed at uses the terms 
‘gelotophobia’ and ‘gelotophobe’ as a matter of course. The present research has also used 
these terms rather than the more humanistic expression of ‘an individual that experiences a 
heightened fear of being laughed at’. This has been undertaken to enhance readability, to be 
in keeping with previous research, and with the belief the term ‘gelotophobia’ sparks interest 
and facilitates greater awareness of the difficulty. In the next section, this research also looks 
at gelotophobia research in relation to other diagnoses; this is because gelotophobia is a 
relatively new area of research and a frequent criticism is that it can be better explained by 
pre-existing difficulties. That being said, to counter the formation of any new stereotypes, this 
research will highlight that gelotophobia occurs on a continuum and holds the stance that 
gelotophobia does not just occur within an individual but within a system; and it will seek to 
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reflect on, and highlight, the role of the system in its conclusions in a further effort to combat 
possible stigma associated with a ‘label’. Furthermore, it will highlight that gelotophobia in 
the future would be best dealt with by prevention within the system rather than placing the 
responsibility within the individual.     
2.6 Is It a Phobia? 
An experimental validation was undertaken to examine the heightened fear of being 
laughed at. The study consisted of three groups: The first group was made up of participants 
with no fear of being laughed at, the second group consisted of participants that were 
borderline, and the third group had a heightened fear of being laughed at (gelotophobic). The 
participants listened to tape recordings of laughter which reflected an array of emotions; 
herein participants scored the recordings and assessed the emotional motivation of the 
laughter. The study found gelotophobes perceived positively motivated laughter as more 
unpleasant than non-gelotophobes, and gelotophobes tended to perceive the person laughing 
as experiencing a negative emotional state. Borderline gelotophobes as well as non-
gelotophobes were more likely to perceive the individual laughing as experiencing negative 
affect. Interestingly, however, participants without gelotophobia were more likely to 
experience an increase in mood following listening to the laughter. The second part of this 
study used 20 cartoons of social situations which incorporated laughter or possibly someone 
being the object of the laughter and asked participants what the individual in the cartoon 
would think. Gelotophobes’ answers incorporated more thoughts of mockery and fears of 
being laughed at than the other participants (Ruch, Altfreder et al., 2009).     
The DSM-5 defines a specific phobia as arising when an individual experiences an 
intense fear or anxiety relating to specific objects or situations. Phobias are defined as 
extreme or irrational fears, often persistent, that result in individuals avoiding the object or 
situation. A specific phobia relates to a particular stimulus that invokes fear, anxiety, or 
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avoidance of the object. The DSM-5 criteria for a specific phobia are detailed below 
(American Psychiatric Association, 2013). 
1. A persistent fear that is excessive or unreasonable, that occurs by the presence or 
anticipation of a specific object or situation (e.g., flying, heights, animals, receiving 
an injection, seeing blood). 
2. Exposure to the feared item or situation almost always leads to an immediate anxiety 
response which may take the form of a panic attack. In children, the anxiety may be 
expressed by crying, tantrums, freezing or clinging. 
3. The person recognises that the fear is excessive or out of proportion to the actual 
threat posed. In children, this feature may be absent. 
4. The phobic situation(s) is avoided or else is endured with intense anxiety or distress. 
5. The avoidance, anxious anticipation or distress during the feared situation(s) 
interferes significantly with the person’s normal routine, work (or school) functioning, 
or social activities or relationships, or there is marked distress about having the 
phobia. 
6. The fear is persistent, typically lasting for at least six months. 
7. The anxiety, panic attacks or avoidance associated with the specific object or situation 
are not better accounted for by another mental disorder, such as Obsessive-
Compulsive Disorder, Posttraumatic Stress Disorder, Separation Anxiety Disorder 
(e.g., avoidance of school), Social Phobia, Panic Disorder, etc. 
 
In respect of point seven of the specific phobia diagnostic, gelotophobia has been 
related to established diagnoses such as a social anxiety disorder (SAD), emotionally unstable 
personality disorder (EUPD) and autistic spectrum disorder (ASD). The following sections 
will explore the research to date related to these diagnoses and what indication this gives as to 
where gelotophobia presently sits within the DSM-5.  
2.6.1 Gelotophobia and Social Anxiety Disorder (SAD) 
The predominant, established diagnosis that gelotophobia is often attributed to, is 
social anxiety disorder (SAD), also known as social phobia or avoidant personality disorder 
(APD) (Havranek et al., 2017). In fact, it has been suggested at times that gelotophobia is just 
social phobia repackaged (Platt et al., 2016). According to the DSM-5 (American Psychiatric 
Association, 2013), SAD is a ‘marked and persistent fear of social or performance situations 
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in which embarrassment may occur’ (p. 456). DSM-5 also denotes APD as a cluster C 
personality disorder characterised by a pervasive pattern of social inhibition, feelings of 
inadequacy, extreme sensitivity to negative evaluation, and avoidance of social interactions.  
Havranek et al. (2017) examined a clinical sample of 133 participants (64 psychiatric 
patients and 69 healthy controls matched for age and sex) in relation to SAD, APD, and 
gelotophobia using the Structured Clinical Interview for the Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders (4th edition) and an established rating instrument for 
gelotophobia (GELOPH <15>). They also compared numerous other mental health 
conditions too, such as schizophrenia, depression, panic disorder, cluster A personality 
disorder, and other specific phobias, and found gelotophobia related greater to SAD and 
APD, though their sample size across the different psychiatric disorders was relatively small. 
They found, however, that gelotophobia scores and the number of gelotophobic individuals 
were higher in patients compared to control participants, and higher in patients with SAD and 
APD compared to patients with other psychiatric disorders. They did also, however, find the 
presence of gelotophobia without the presence of SAD or APD; thus, it would seem unlikely 
gelotophobia is a subtype of SAD or APD. Rather, they suggested the fear of being laughed 
at could be a characteristic for SAD and APD (Clark et al., 2017).   
Several other studies have examined whether there is a link between SAD and 
gelotophobia as gelotophobes are marked by characteristics similar to SAD individuals, such 
as a fear of negative evaluation, humiliation, and embarrassment resulting in social 
withdrawal (Titze, 2009). Carretero-Dios et al. (2010) compared social phobia psychometric 
answers to gelotophobia. Their sample consisted of 211 Colombian adults who filled in 
Spanish versions of the Social Anxiety and Distress Scale (SADS) and the Fear of Negative 
Evaluation (FNE) scale, as well as the gelotophobia measure GELOPH <15>. They found 
that, although the SADS and FNE scale correlated highly with GELOPH <15>, there were 
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differences as not all high scorers on the SADS and FNE scale stated a fear of being laughed 
at and, as such, social phobia did not fully account for the fear of being laughed at. This was 
further explored by Platt et al. (2012) who found that gelotophobia and social phobia share 
three factors in coping with anticipated ridicule: control, withdrawal, and internalising; 
however, there was divergence from social phobia with a paranoid anticipation to ridicule via 
laughter and disproportionate reaction to being laughed at, factors which were more unique to 
gelotophobia. 
Edwards et al. (2010) explored relations between gelotophobia and memories of being 
the target of teasing during childhood and adolescence, and associations between 
gelotophobia and social and specific fears and anxieties. Their sample consisted of 207 
undergraduate students; they found higher gelotophobia scores were associated with greater 
predisposing levels of being teased about social behaviour and academic excellence but not 
about family background, appearance, or performance. Overall, their findings indicated 
gelotophobia was related to distress but not frequency of childhood teasing. They also found 
gelotophobia was strongly related to three measures of social anxiety and a significant 
association between gelotophobia and a history of being teased remained, even after 
controlling for social anxiety. Interestingly, however, gelotophobia only related to experience 
of specific types of teasing and ridicule in respect of unconventional interpersonal behaviour 
and academic excellence. A note of caution should be used in interpreting these findings as 
their sample was university students and, as such, the sample would be more likely to include 
individuals of academic excellence. It would be interesting to explore whether this would be 
replicated with a general population sample. They postulated that their findings support 
Titze’s (2009) view of gelotophobia as a syndrome related to but distinct from social phobia, 
emerging from being the object of ridicule and particularly correlated to anxiety-based social 
skills deficits and interpersonal awkwardness. Gelotophobia, therefore, appears to be a 
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specific variant of shame-bound anxiety where an individual perceives themselves as 
intolerably ridiculous (Titze, 1996). This maladaptive belief that others will perceive them as 
unusual, ridiculous, or strange in conjunction with the expectation of being ridiculed 
specifically via laughter distinguishes gelotophobia from social anxiety/social phobia (Ruch 
& Proyer, 2008). In future, gelotophobia may also prove to be an additional diagnostic 
criterion for SAD and APD. At present it would seem, however, that more research is needed 
as it could be that both conditions just share comorbid characteristics of gelotophobia, 
especially as rampant comorbidity across the DSM-5 and ICD-11 is already a criticism and 
perceived as an indication of imperfect classification that needs reducing (Clark et al., 2017).    
2.6.2 Gelotophobia and Emotionally Unstable Personality Disorder (EUPD) 
A recent small study looked to explore a link between biases in social information 
processing frequently associated with emotionally unstable personality disorder (EUPD), 
formerly known as borderline personality disorder, and the occurrence of gelotophobia. 
Although this study based their exploration on what appears to be an assumption, it did return 
some interesting findings. Results indicated a high prevalence of gelotophobia among EUPD 
participants with 87% of EUPD participants fulfilling the GELOPH <15> gelotophobic 
criteria when compared to other clinical and non-clinical reference groups. They found 30% 
of EUPD participants met the extreme gelotophobe criteria, 37% were pronounced, and 20% 
had slight gelotophobia. The authors suggested a specific cognitive-affective predisposition 
in processing of social information, relates to the overreaching expectation of rejection, and 
offers a causal link to the presence of gelotophobia in EUPD patients. Indeed, the rate of 
gelotophobia among the reported EUPD patients was far higher than any other previous 
clinical group (Brück et al., 2018). The study, however, does have some limitations: the 
sample was small in nature and only consisted of 30 EUPD individuals; 17 of the 30 had 
other comorbid difficulties which could also offer plausible explanations for a fear of 
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ridicule, e.g., nine of the 30 had a diagnosis of an eating disorder, thus the role of bodily 
shame could be a confounding variable (Troop & Redshaw, 2012).   
2.6.3 Gelotophobia and Autistic Spectrum Disorder (ASD) 
A lack of appreciation for the fundamental social phenomenon of humour has been 
linked previously to ASD. An initial study examining gelotophobia and higher functioning 
autistic spectrum disorder (hfASD) found gelotophobia was present at a significantly higher 
rate (45%) compared to neuro-typical participants (6%) (Samson et al., 2011). Silva et al. 
(2017) examined both implicit and explicit humour; they found that, at an explicit level, ASD 
participants were able to appreciate and enjoy humour as much as neuro-typical participants; 
however, at an implicit level, ASD participants were found to have humour that is content 
dependent and affected by social content but not for non-social humour. That is, ASD 
participants were able to process humour as well as the neuro-typical participants when the 
stimuli processed did not include social cues. The study used animal versus human stimuli to 
rule out cognitive impairment as a hypothesis. There was no dissociation between implicit 
and explicit stimuli for animal stimuli, indicating the role of social clues in ASD participants. 
They suggested a causal chain, whereby early failures of social reciprocity in childhood 
development for individuals with ASD can lead them to displace their attention, leading to a 
greater interest in objects or animals which becomes more pronounced and develops atypical 
reward cues; thus, motivation to attend to social reward cues is affected. This may account 
for why there is a higher-than-average number of gelotophobes that also have ASD, as their 
perceived lack of humour could impact on their social interactions and the quality of their 
social relationships.       
As individuals with ASD tend to be perceived to have more atypical mannerisms and 
difficulties with interpersonal interactions and social norms, and children with ASD are four 
times more likely to experience bullying, it is unsurprising there is such a high prevalence of 
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gelotophobia amongst individuals with ASD. At the present time, however, more research 
into the link between gelotophobia and ASD is needed (Grennan et al., 2018). For example, 
as the prevalence of comorbid issues tends to be greater in individuals with ASD compared to 
the neuro-typical population (Lugnegard et al., 2011), yet the interaction between ASD, 
comorbid issues, and gelotophobia has not been examined and, thus, at present we cannot 
discern whether any other difficulties are mediating ASD and gelotophobia. For instance, 
there is a relationship between dyspraxia and ASD (Cassidy et al., 2016). Dyspraxia is 
associated with motor, social, and communicative deficits and as such body language can be 
atypical, such as arm movements being more angular in nature. It would be interesting to 
explore whether this relates to ‘Pinocchio syndrome’ associated with gelotophobia and 
originally reported by Titze (1996).  
2.6.4 Gelotophobia, Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) and Shame  
As gelotophobia is postulated to develop through repeated traumatic experiences of 
being bullied via laughter, the next section will examine where it currently sits within DSM-5 
trauma diagnoses with the salient aspects of the relevant diagnosis presented. It is important 
to further iterate that the DSM-5 is merely a diagnostic guide for psychiatrists and, although 
from a counselling psychology perspective it is not necessary to work with a diagnosis, the 
DSM-5 does afford a useful comparison of how gelotophobia relates to already established 
difficulties.      
DSM-5 diagnosis guidance for posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) (which does not 
include children under six years old) is stipulated below in Table 1. To meet the diagnosis for 
PTSD, an individual would need to meet Criterion A, as well as one or more symptoms from 
Criterion B, one or more symptoms from Criterion C, two or more symptoms from Criterion 
D, and two or more symptoms from Criterion E. Also, their difficulties would need to have 
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been present for a month, bring considerable distress, and not be due to any other medical 
condition or substance misuse (American Psychiatric Association, 2013).  
Table 1 
The DSM-5 Diagnosis Guidance for Posttraumatic Stress Disorder 
Criteria    
A Necessitates an individual 
experiencing exposure to 
actual or threatened death, 
serious injury, or sexual 
violence in either one, or 
more, of the following ways: 
 
 Direct experience of 
traumatic event. 
 Witnessing a traumatic 
event. 
 Learning of a traumatic 
event to a close family 
member or friend; should the 
traumatic event be one of 
actual or threatened death 
the event must have been 
violent in nature.  
 Experiencing repeated 
exposure to details of 
traumatic events (this does 
not include media or social 
media) but rather relates to 
front-line workers working 
with trauma patients, e.g., 
police, nurses and 
psychologists.   
 
   
B Relates to experiencing at 
least one of the following 
symptoms related to the 
traumatic event: 
 Reoccurring, involuntary, 
and intrusive upsetting 
memories of the event. 
 Repeated upsetting dreams 
related to the traumatic 
event. 
 Dissociative reactions such 
as a flashback where the 
individual re-experiences the 
traumatic event.  
 Strong and persistent distress 
upon exposure to cues that 
are either inside or outside of 
the body that are connected 
to the traumatic event.  
 Strong bodily reactions such 
as increased heart rate in 
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relation to triggers, internal 
and external, of the traumatic 
event.  
 
C Involves avoidance of 
reminders related with the 
traumatic event, including 
one of the following: 
 
 Avoidance of thoughts, 
feelings, or physical 
sensations that trigger 
memories of the traumatic 
event. 
 Avoidance of people, places, 
conversations, activities, 
objects, or situations that 
trigger memories of the 
event.  
 
D Needs two of the following 
negative changes to thoughts 
and mood related to the 
traumatic event: 
 Diminished ability to 
remember aspects of the 
traumatic event (not related 
to alcohol, drugs, or head 
injury).  
 Persistent, and 
disproportionate, negative 
evaluations of yourself, 
others, and the world.   
 Elevated self-blame or blame 
of others regarding the cause 
or consequence of a 
traumatic event. 
 Negative affect that is 
pervasive.  
 No longer enjoying 
activities.  
 Feeling detached from 
others. 
 The inability to experience 
positive emotions.  
 
E Requires two of the 
following changes in arousal: 
 
 Irritable or aggressive 
behaviour. 
 Impulsive or self-destructive 
behaviour. 
 Hypervigilance.  
 Heightened startle response. 
 Difficulty concentrating. 





Gelotophobia initially, therefore, does not appear to relate to DSM-5 criteria for 
PTSD as presented above, as it does not relate to any actual, or threat of, death or sexual 
violence, and the same reasoning also rules out an acute stress disorder (American Psychiatric 
Association, 2013). One of the salient factors believed to be involved in the development of 
gelotophobia, however, is the experience of being bullied, specifically relating to being 
humiliated via laughing. Bullying is deemed a subtype of aggressive behaviour where an 
individual has repeated pejorative interpersonal experiences with a perceived imbalance of 
power (Salmivalli, 2010). As with gelotophobia, bullying also does not fulfil Criterion A of 
the DSM-5 for PTSD. A plethora of other diagnoses have been suggested for difficulties 
resulting from bullying, such as adjustment disorder, depressive disorder, anxiety, or just 
distress not related to any specific psychiatric disorder. This has been disputed, however, and 
it has been argued that a diagnosis of PTSD is warranted for bullying despite it not involving 
actual, or threat of, death or sexual violence (Rosen et al., 2008). This position postulates that 
repeated and systematic experiences of being bullied are equivalent to the distress associated 
with PTSD (Matthiesen & Einarsen, 2004; Mikkelsen & Einarsen, 2002; Tehrani, 2004). This 
is in keeping with the position taken by some therapeutic-based treatments for trauma such as 
eye movement desensitisation and reprocessing (EMDR). In this model, repeated adverse life 
experiences such as non-life-threatening injuries, emotional abuse, death of a loved one, 
bullying or harassment, and loss of significant relationships are referred to as ‘small t’ 
traumas; repeated experiences leading to the same symptomology are referred to as ‘Big T’ 
traumas, and Big T traumas are in keeping with current PTSD definitions (Shapiro, 1995; 
Shapiro & Forrest, 1997). Moreover, qualitative explorations of bullying have suggested the 
long-term impact of bullying is in keeping with individuals that have experience of sexual 
abuse in childhood (Carlisle & Rofes, 2007). Meta-analysis of research examining PTSD 
resulting from bullying at school, and work, found bullying cross-sectionally associated with 
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PTSD, and most victims of bullying within the research reported PTSD-like symptomology. 
Researchers gave a caveat to their findings, however, due to limited longitudinal findings and 
research lacking clinical interviews, meaning they could not categorically establish a causal 
link between PTSD and bullying (Nielsen et al., 2015).  
The links between bullying and PTSD have great significance for gelotophobia given 
its links to bullying; as such, trauma offers another possible explanation for gelotophobes’ 
presentation. To date there has been no research relating to gelotophobia and trauma and, 
therefore, it cannot be ruled out that what individuals are experiencing is trauma-based 
difficulty, with laughter and smiling acting as triggers. At present the fact gelotophobia is 
found amongst individuals with ASD, EUPD and social anxiety, but also that it is found 
separately, is used as an indication of gelotophobia being a separate difficulty. It could be that 
trauma is mediating gelotophobia and other diagnoses, and what is being witnessed is the 
presence of trauma across these populations with a specific trigger of laughter. If this were 
the case it would lend weight to gelotophobia being a specific trauma-related trait of other 
difficulties rather than a separate difficulty of its own. 
Trauma has also been related to shame and guilt with individuals feeling shame and 
guilt following traumatic experiences (Gilbert, 2003). This is pertinent to gelotophobia as it 
has been referred to as a shame-based anxiety, and research has found a strong positive 
correlation between gelotophobia and shame (Boda-Ujlaky & Séra, 2016). A study that 
incorporated participants from the UK and Germany used the GELOPH <46> to establish the 
presence of gelotophobia and a measure that examined five parameters during a typical week 
of emotions: latency, maximal intensity, duration, expression, and intensity. They found that 
shame was experienced more intensely by gelotophobes when compared to non-
gelotophobes, and when shame was elicited no other negative emotion was identified (Platt & 
Ruch, 2010). Proyer et al. (2010), using Test of Self-Conscious Affect (TOSCA-3) and 
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PhoPhiKat-45, showed that gelotophobia was related to shame-proneness and externalised 
shameful situations, and gelotophobes had a more pronounced sense of guilt compared to 
gelotophiles or katagelasticists. Boda-Ujlaky & Séra (2016) further investigated shame and 
gelotophobia, citing Scheff (2003) when stating that shame can be ambiguous, overlapping 
with other emotions and occurring on a spectrum consisting of embarrassment on one side 
and humiliation adjacent. They examined the relationship between gelotophobia, shame, and 
humiliation by using the self-report measures of PhoPhiKat-45, TOSCA-3, and Humiliation 
Inventory. Their results indicated that gelotophobia is related to humiliation, however only if 
humiliation incorporates derision.   
Shame is postulated to be a self-focused social threat system which has an 
evolutionary basis (Gilbert, 2003), whereby an individual being accepted into a social group 
was a protective factor for survival and affected their evolutionary fitness within a social 
hierarchy. A social threat in contemporary complex interpersonal relationships is socially 
constructed and refers to the possibility of being rejected by family, caregivers, partners, 
friends, or colleagues. These social threats can precipitate shame from either external or 
internal threats. External threats refer to concerns about what other people think about an 
individual and about the perception other people have of the individual; thus, an external 
threat relates to concerns of others looking to distance themselves from an individual or not 
valuing them. Internal threats are driven by self-judgements, which can lead to individuals 
being highly self-critical and causing an array of emotions to be experienced such as 
contempt, disgust, anger, and humiliation. Individuals who have experienced trauma can 
experience the fear of other people incorporating shame-related external and internal threats 
(Gilbert & Procter, 2006). In dealing with these perceived threats resulting from trauma, it is 
suggested there are three salient defences: attack – where an individual makes themselves 
rude, aggressive, or unlikeable/unfriendly; submit – to always submit to others’ demands 
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even when unreasonable; hide – individuals’ distance themselves from others to the point of 
not having any friends and keep a persona of being aloof (Lee & James, 2013). Two of the 
defences suggested for shame-related threats experienced after trauma are in keeping with 
behaviours observed with gelotophobes in terms of being socially isolated and presenting in 
an aloof manner. Thus, given the link between gelotophobia and shame, trauma is once more 
indicated as a possible parsimonious explanation for gelotophobes’ difficulties and therefore 
needs further examination.  
In summary, at the present time the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders, 5th edition (American Psychiatric Association, 2013) is used as a guide for 
psychiatrists to diagnose mental health difficulties. Research has indicated gelotophobia is 
found amongst ASD, SAD, and EUPD individuals but also exists separately. The fact 
gelotophobia is also found outside of these diagnoses gives support to it being a specific 
difficulty. However, given there seems to be a high prevalence of gelotophobia across 
different difficulties, it may be gelotophobia is a previously unrecognised trait across 
difficulties rather than a separate, new difficulty. There is a real paucity of research on 
gelotophobia in relation to trauma; given gelotophobia is ascertained to be a trauma-based 
difficulty, this seems a much-needed area of research to understand fully how gelotophobia 




















Chapter 3 Literature Review Part 2: Counselling 




3.1 Counselling Psychology  
The foundations of counselling psychology in the United Kingdom are built upon 
American humanistic values (Orlans & Van Scoyoc, 2008) of the client-centred approach 
outlined by Carl Rogers (1951). Rogers, building upon Abraham Maslow’s hierarchy of 
needs model (1943), postulated that there are three core conditions necessary for therapeutic 
change: 1) empathy – gaining a sense of the client’s perspective whilst bracketing off one’s 
own experiences and perceptions and, as such, a psychologist should endeavour to understand 
the client’s feelings and meanings and mirror the client’s mood and terminology; 2) 
congruence – the psychologist should be transparent and genuine and strive to be their self in 
the here and now; 3) unconditional positive regard – the psychologist should act in a 
consistent, non-judgemental fashion with warmth.   
The Division of Counselling Psychology (DCoP) of the British Psychological Society 
(BPS) standards for counselling psychology state its goal is to reduce psychological distress 
and encourage well-being by addressing an individual’s subjective experience and 
interactions with physical, social, cultural, and spiritual factors. Although counselling 
psychology incorporates and advocates for a pluralistic approach to therapy, it considers the 
salient vehicle to change to be the therapeutic relationship (Nielsen & Nicholas, 2016) and 
puts emphasis on the here and now rather than addressing medical model diagnostic criteria 
(Orlans & Van Scoyoc, 2008). As said, contemporary counselling psychology operates from 
a pluralistic stance (Cooper & McLeod, 2012), incorporating an array of psychological 
models. There has been much discourse regarding where the person-centred approach sits 
within contemporary counselling psychology; however, a set of salient principles emerged 
from Sanders (2000) to guide its use within integrative practice: 1) trust in the client’s ability 
to maximise their own potential; 2) incorporate Rogers’ (1961) core conditions of therapy, 
regardless of model being used; 3) hold a non-directive stance towards client content, i.e., the 
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client must be free to determine what topics to work on (Gillion, 2007). As such, even when 
taking a pluralistic approach to therapy with clients, Rogers’ core conditions of therapy 
should be ever present in the therapeutic relationship.  
The therapeutic relationship is considered salient to the success of psychotherapy, and 
counselling psychology, regardless of what psychological model is used (e.g., Hafkenscheid, 
2009; Klerman et al., 1984; Luborsky, 1994; Martin, 2010; Strawbridge et al., 2009). Recent 
meta-analysis undertaken by Flückiger et al. (2018) examined 295 independent studies 
spanning 30,000 patients (published between 1978 and 2017) for face-to-face and Internet-
based psychotherapy. They found a robust positive correlation between the therapeutic 
relationship and outcome. Their findings support previous research that the therapeutic 
relationship best predicts outcome, across assessor perspectives, treatment approaches, 
patient characteristics, and countries. There has been some criticism of the research 
supporting the therapeutic relationship in relation to outcome; however, the research tends to 
rely on correlations and, as such, the therapeutic relationship may be merely reflecting the 
positive trend of the therapeutic outcome rather than being the instigating factor (Norcross, 
2011).  
The therapeutic relationship can be defined as the bidirectional feelings and attitudes 
that the therapist and client share and the method of how these are expressed (Gelso & Carter, 
1994; Norcross & Lambert, 2018). The fundamental factors necessary for a successful 
therapeutic relationship are Rogers’ (1961) core conditions of therapy incorporating warmth, 
empathy, and respect. The salient factor related to a positive engagement in therapy is that of 
empathy, which necessitates the therapist’s ability to enter the client’s cognitive world 
(Bohart et al., 2002; Gilbert & Leahy, 2007). The presence of gelotophobia, therefore, could 
have a significant impact on the success of therapy, as metacommunication issues can 
fracture the therapeutic relationship. 
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3.2 Gelotophobia and Challenge for Therapeutic Practice 
Gelotophobia is still overlooked in clinical practice despite evidence of its existence 
found across 73 countries, in clinical and non-clinical populations (Proyer et al., 2009). As 
such, this can lead not only to miscommunication within the therapeutic relationship but also 
to individuals being misdiagnosed (Platt et al., 2016). Misgivings regarding the presence of 
gelotophobic traits within clinical populations largely seem to be based on clinician-
subjective experience (Platt, 2013). In the psychiatric discipline, an individual’s conditions 
are often seen through the lens of the DSM and, as gelotophobia is not accounted for within 
the DSM, it is neither incorporated into diagnoses nor attributed to other conditions (Platt et 
al., 2016).   
The presence of gelotophobia not only has implications for an individual’s medical 
diagnosis and treatment but also for the success of therapy. It is acknowledged that, should a 
full psychological formulation take place, it could/should highlight the heightened fear of 
being laughed at; however, should a psychologist offer a reassuring smile in an initial session, 
it could be alienating, and anxiety provoking, and lead to the patient disengaging from 
therapy, which is one of reasons suspected as to why so many therapists report not 
encountering gelotophobia (Platt et al., 2016). There is a high dropout rate in the first session 
in psychotherapies: A study of 2,551 cases drawn from 17 community mental health facilities 
found 40.8% of clients did not return after the first session (Sue et al., 1976) and meta-
analysis of psychotherapy dropouts found a mean dropout rate of 46.86% (Wierzbicki & 
Pekarik, 1993). Multilevel investigation of the antecedents of psychotherapeutic dropout 
found that a change in client self-esteem allied with therapeutic relationship issues were 
salient factors. In conjunction with this, a shared characteristic of first session dropouts was 
that the therapist undertook fewer clarifying experiences (Kegel & Flückiger, 2014). This is 
in keeping then with the assertion by Platt et al. (2016) that gelotophobes drop out of therapy 
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early due to the therapeutic relationship being fractured by metacommunication issues. In 
respect of gelotophobia, therefore, the ability of a therapist to recognise the impact of smiles 
and laughter on a client would be intrinsic to the client feeling respected, not judged, and to 
the formation of a genuine, warm therapeutic relationship (Gilbert & Leahy, 2007).    
Although counselling psychology training focuses upon the emotional process and 
encourages therapists to be reflective in respect of their emotional experiences, courses have 
limited training on metacommunication. What training there is focuses on identifying, and 
exploring, incongruent presentations; however, there is no training on recognising facial 
affect (Hutchison & Gerstein, 2017). Despite counselling psychology training not explicitly 
attending to facial expressions, Rogers’ ever present core condition of therapy, empathy, may 
afford greater detection of facial affect. An association between the ability to recognise facial 
affect and empathy has been found across numerous studies, whereby higher levels of 
empathy correlated with greater facial affect recognition ability (Carr & Lutjemeier, 2005). 
Besel & Yuille (2010) investigated individual differences in empathy and emotion 
recognition. They operationalised emotional recognition accuracy via Ekman & Friesen’s 
(1976) Pictures of Facial Affect, depicting six emotions of anger, disgust, fear, happiness, 
sadness, and surprise, and measured empathy with the Empathy Quotient (EQ) and the 
empathic concern factor of the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI). They found an 
association between aspects of empathy and empathic concern, in relation to the ability to 
recognise facial expressions. These findings are in keeping with other research which has 
found an inverse relationship between empathy and facial recognition in violent offenders 
(Quintero et al., 2017).  
The second part of the literature review has seen so far, the importance of the core 
conditions of therapy and the therapeutic relationship and outlined the potential for 
gelotophobia to fracture the therapeutic relationship via metacommunication difficulties. It 
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has also highlighted the relationship between empathy levels and the ability to identify facial 
affect. The next part of the literature review will explore the development of empathy and 
whether training in counselling skills can impact on empathy levels.      
3.3 Empathy and Its Development    
A plethora of research regarding the concept of empathy has been undertaken across 
psychology, medicine, neuroscience, and ethology, amongst others, with conflicting 
definitions and discord regarding its components (Gery et al., 2009). There is consensus 
within empathy research, however, relating to empathy being multifaceted in nature, 
encompassing subjective experience, perspective taking and affective cues invoking 
emotional states, be it for others or self-orientated (Davis, 1983; Decety & Jackson, 2004; 
Gery et al., 2009; Hoffman, 1984). The two aspects of empathy this study will concern itself 
with are that of affective and cognitive empathy. Affective empathy is associated with feeling 
the emotion of another, but with compassion (Besel & Yuille, 2010); this is postulated to be 
an automated process where someone catches feelings from another, in this sense emotions 
can be seen as contagious. Cognitive empathy relates to the ability to imaginatively 
understand another’s feelings, thoughts, and actions but without having to feel the emotion of 
the other; in this sense understanding another’s emotions is likened to mindreading. In this 
situation, for instance, an individual can see that someone else is feeling sad, but it does not 
affect their own emotion, i.e., it does not make them feel sad too (Heyes, 2018). These factors 
can operate independently (Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright, 2004) and differentially relate to 
facial expression recognition (Besel & Yuille, 2010), although they can also operate together 
as posited in the dual action model of empathy (Heyes, 2018). It is noted, however, that this 
dualistic approach has been criticised, positing that affective and cognitive aspects of trait 
empathy are interactional to the point that one aspect invokes another and, as such, cannot be 
measured separately (Clark, 2007). 
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It is suggested that we are born with affective empathy which affords the ability to 
‘feel’ others’ distress, but this empathy then develops in complexity in infancy through a 
process of reciprocity with its caregiver via crying, facial recognition, and vocalisations. As 
such, there is a complex interplay between genetics and environment in the development of 
empathy (Bazelgette, 2017). Newborn babies exposed to the sound of another infant crying 
have been found to display distress. In examining this phenomenon, studies compared an 
infant crying to several loud synthetic noises, and silence, yet the newborn babies continued 
to respond more intensely to other newborns’ cries (Martin & Clark, 1982; Sagi & Hoffman, 
1976; Simner, 1971). The emotional contagion displayed in these studies is believed to be an 
early form of affective empathy (Zahn-Waxler & Radke-Yarrow, 1990).  
In examining the genetic and environmental roles in the development of empathy, 
there have been a number of twin studies undertaken. Zahn-Waxler et al. (1992) examined 
the responses of young monozygotic and dizygotic twins to simulated distress with an 
expectancy to find a stronger relationship in empathy within the monozygotic group from 
which researchers inferred the level of heredity in empathy. At 14-months-old, there were 
significant heritability factors relating to empathic responses, including prosocial behaviour 
and empathic concern. A further twin study was undertaken with a larger sample examining 
the roles of genetics and shared environment on the development of empathy. They found 
that, by the age of 24 and 36 months, heritability correlated up to a half of the variation in 
children’s empathy (Knafo et al., 2008). These studies attempted to demonstrate the 
importance of genetic influences interacting with environmental factors. There has been some 
criticism of these studies, however, in respect of the behavioural measures used as they 
conflate emotional understanding. As such, it is possible that genetically inherited empathy is 
not just a matching mechanism but rather a process involved in social motivation, emotion 
identification, and emotion regulation (Coll et al., 2017; Decety et al., 2017). Although some 
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concerns have been raised regarding some of the methods examining the genetic aspect of 
empathy, there is a body of evidence supporting the role of genetics in developing individual 
differences in empathy, albeit with the caveat of the salient interplay with the environment 
(Flom & Saudino, 2016; Uzefovsky et al., 2015; Warrier et al., 2018). 
Empathy, however, is not merely acquired through genetics; rather, it is also learnt 
through early life experience. In respect of affective empathy, the learned matching 
hypothesis suggests that its development occurs from an emotion felt inwardly being 
associated with an observed emotion and, as such, this requires interpersonal interaction, i.e., 
affective empathy development cannot just occur through individual self-stimulation as we 
tend not to see our own facial expressions or body language (Heyes, 2017; Heyes & Ray, 
2000; Ray & Heyes, 2011).  
It is believed that mirror neurons facilitate empathy and affect mirroring (Rizzolatti & 
Caruana, 2017). Mirror neurons fire when an action is observed and imposes the observed 
action onto the observer’s motor system, affording shared experience and insight to 
intentions, motivations, and emotional experience (Kaplan & Iacoboni, 2006). This process 
has been supported by numerous functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies 
(Grezes et al., 2003; Iacoboni et al., 1999; Molnar-Szakacs et al., 2005). As such, the same 
neural structures and emotions can become active within you when detected in others 
(Iacoboni, 2009). The process of identifying others’ emotions, known as social cognition, is 
largely attributed to recognising and understanding specific facial configurations (Adolphs, 
2002). This is believed to be operationalised, however, via mirror neurons (Enticott et al., 
2008).  
An fMRI study focusing on disgust observed the same emotion expressed by the 
facial expression of someone else activated the same neural structure and anterior insula at 
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the same location, indicating that witnessing third person expressions can invoke a perceived 
affective state (Wicker et al., 2003). This is the concept of ‘mirroring’ defined by activation 
of the sensorimotor network precipitated by an observed action (Ricciardi et al., 2017). 
Mirroring, in general, is suggested to occur via the sensorimotor network incorporating 
activation of the premotor face area, the pars opercularis of the inferior frontal gyrus, the 
superior temporal sulcus, the insula, and the amygdala (Carr et al., 2003), although it is also 
suggested that there are different areas of the brain involved in different emotions. Meta-
analysis found that basic emotions operate by different neural systems, albeit with some 
overlap. Happy and fearful faces relate to the amygdala bilaterally, sad faces relate to the 
right amygdala only, disgust seems to activate the anterior insula and fear seems to activate 
the amygdala (Ricciardi et al., 2017). It should be noted that there are still some issues with 
research in this field as the evidence is largely reliant on correlations of activation of the brain 
in overlapping areas, thus not ruling out other factors or regions (Fusar-Poli et al., 2009; 
Ricciardi et al., 2017). It does, however, lend support to the notion of individuals being able 
to discern the affective state of another via facial expressions. 
Learned matching theory is postulated to be consistent in this approach, albeit with 
the acknowledgement of interplay of innate characteristics. Learned matching theory suggests 
early life experience and learning have an entwined interplay between genetic and 
environmental factors in developing empathy (Heyes, 2018). Moreover, as yet there is no 
definitive evidence that individual differences in the matching aspects of empathy are innate 
(Flom & Saudino, 2017); rather, there is evidence for a genetic role in elucidating 
mechanisms favouring the development of emotional matching mechanisms (Coll et al., 
2017).    
The animal model has provided evidence for learned matching theory with evidence 
of associated learning and emotional contagion found across all animal species (Heyes, 2012) 
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and interspecies learning too, for example when a dog picks up on human emotions (Heyes, 
2017). The role of affect mirroring in humans, highlighted by an individual’s deficit in 
emotional identification, correlates with being raised by a caregiver experiencing depression, 
as caregivers with depression tend to have a paucity of affect mirroring (Laurent & Ablow, 
2017). Learned matching theory then suggests that empathy develops through associative 
learning, which develops mirror properties, both motoric and somatic, within the brain 
through relating direct experience of emotion, self-stimulation, and synchronous emotion 
(Heyes and Bird, 2007). 
Previous research has found early life experience is a salient factor in the 
development of empathy. However, research in adults examining the role of ageing on 
empathy is mixed, with evidence indicating: no change in cognitive empathy across age in 
adults (Keightley et al., 2006; MacPherson et al., 2002; Phillips et al., 2002); older adults 
displaying greater cognitive empathy than younger (Bailey et al., 2008; Isaacowitz & Stanley, 
2011); and the reverse has also been reported, younger adults displaying greater cognitive 
empathy than older (Keightley et al., 2006). Hühnel et al. (2014) found no depreciation of 
affective empathy in older age, although they did find a decrease in cognitive empathy 
responding to facial expressions portraying happiness, anger, sadness, and disgust, but there 
was a decrease in cognitive empathy measured by accuracy for happiness and sadness. 
Empathy has also been suggested to be multidirectional and context dependent. Wieck & 
Kunzmann (2015) found older adult participants reported greater affective empathy than 
younger participants, but younger adults had higher cognitive empathy when assessing the 
emotions. Other researchers have suggested there is no reason to believe cognitive and 
affective empathy may be differentially affected by ageing (Khanjani et al., 2017). This area 
appears to need more research to gain a clearer understanding of the complex nuances of 
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ageing and empathy. At present, however, it appears getting older is not enough on its own to 
develop greater empathy in adult individuals.     
3.4 Relationship Between Empathy Development and Counselling Skills  
Paying close attention to another individual and listening are precursors to cognitive 
and affective empathy (Anme et al., 2013). Empathy in counselling psychology has been 
defined as the ability to experience and understand the feelings of a client and is related to 
unconditional positive regard, acceptance, being non-judgmental and active listening 
(Horvath & Bedi, 2002). Similarly, empathy in a wider therapeutic setting has been defined 
as being motivated to empathise with another, being able to identify others’ emotional 
difficulties, understanding their perspective, and being able to reflect this understanding back 
to the patient (Ferri et al., 2019). A basic counselling skill that facilitates this is active 
listening, which is listening with purpose and attending to the patient’s communication, so 
they know they have been heard. In doing this, counsellors also incorporate reflecting, which 
is the action of trying to understand how the patient perceives their world by taking their 
frame of reference, repeating their experience back to them, and paraphrasing a spoken action 
that conveys clients’ salient thoughts and feelings (Culley & Bond, 2011). 
Several studies have examined the development of empathy and found a link between 
counselling skills and empathy development. It has been suggested that the process of 
counselling not only changes the brain of the client but also the therapist (Ivey et al., 2010). 
Neuroscience research investigating empathy using fMRI scans showed evidence of 
correlations between learning counselling skills and increased empathy. It is suggested that 
listening from an empathic stance impacts on affective and cognitive areas of the brain (Ivey 
& Daniels, 2016). When active listening is viewed through an fMRI scan, it lights up the 
brain, with evidence of it impacting on the brain to the point it increases grey matter (Eres et 
al., 2015). Kawamichi et al. (2014) undertook an fMRI study that found neural activation in 
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the ventral striatum was enhanced by undertaking active listening, which suggested a reward 
process reinforcing its actions. It is thought that there is a physiological linkage between 
client and counsellor via mirror neurons which is responsible for the changes in the brain; 
however, the methods of these studies have been questioned with ecological validity 
difficulties (Coutinho et al., 2014).   
DePue and Lambie (2014) examined student counsellors’ levels of affective empathy 
before and after practicum experience, a minimum of 100 hours, and found an increase in 
empathy scores. They suggested accurate reflection of a client’s frame of reference and 
feelings is related to the ability to be empathic, and the increase in affective empathy related 
to learning to be emotionally present with the client. This, they suggested, has implications 
for empathy development through training as it develops through using counselling skills in 
clinical practice. Lyons & Hazier (2002) also found an increase in affective and cognitive 
empathy when examining counselling students’ empathy levels in the first and second year of 
training. They believed originally that empathy development would correlate to students’ 
cognitive development; however, they found no evidence of a relationship between increased 
empathy and cognitive development and, as such, suggested the increase in empathy was 
precipitated by counselling training. A criticism of this interpretation, however, is that they 
did not define specifically what counselling skills they believed to be increasing empathy.      
In medicine, the need for training to increase empathy was precipitated by research 
that found empathy levels decreased in medical students as they transverse the years in 
medical school (Hojat et al., 2009; Wolf et al., 1989). Following this, there have been 
numerous studies undertaken looking at developing medical students’ empathy levels by 
incorporating Rogerian person-centred counselling skills (Batt-Rawden et al., 2013). 
Cutcliffe and Cassedy (1999) undertook a small study which examined nurses’ empathy 
levels before and after a counselling skills course and found empathy levels increased 
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following learning counselling skills and the ability to convey empathy. This study suffered 
from a small sample size and, as such, caution should be taken in interpreting its findings. 
Moreno-Poyato et al. (2017) also investigated an intervention with nurses that consisted of 
providing them with the evidence of best practice related to building therapeutic relationships 
and introducing reflective practice groups, which led to an increase in empathy.  
The process of empathy training has incorporated several factors such as focusing on 
teaching medical students to understand patients’ concerns and feelings by not just focusing 
on verbal presentation of communication but also incorporating metacommunication and 
Rogerian counselling skills, such as empathic responses and being present in the moment, 
into their practice (Ruiz-Moral et al., 2017) and treating patients on an individual level, in a 
person-centred way (Archer & Meyer, 2018). Cognitive empathy appears to be more 
susceptible to development (Platt & Keller, 1994), whereas affective empathy shows more 
limited development (Epstein & Street, 2011). Despite the impact on affective empathy being 
more limited, overall, the findings for cognitive and affective empathy training indicate that 
empathy levels can be taught by paying attention to nonverbal cues and having interpersonal 
interactions in a relational, person-centred manner (Ruiz-Moral et al., 2017; Thompson et al., 
2010). Meta-analysis examining the efficacy of empathy training incorporating counselling 
skills across professions examined 18 randomised controlled trials incorporating 1800 
participants and found that, overall, empathy training tends to be effective (Teding van 
Berkhout & Malouff, 2016). It should be noted, however, that this study did not distinguish 
between cognitive and affective empathy and, as such, it is not possible to differentiate 
whether either of these aspects had a greater effect than the other. 
Interestingly, when relating to another individual over something that is difficult or 
distressing, empathy can breakdown. Schumann et al. (2014) found that when participants 
believed they had control over their empathy and were motivated to develop their empathy, 
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they displayed greater levels of empathy in challenging contexts. This has implications for 
counselling psychology as in its foundation is an implicit assumption that empathy is a 
personal construct. Moreover, counselling psychologists are motivated to keep an empathic 
stance, even in difficult circumstances, due to empathy being a core condition of therapy and 
the therapeutic relationship being the greatest predictor of a positive outcome. Thus, this 
becomes self-fulfilling, where counselling psychologists who are motivated to uphold 
counselling psychology’s core conditions, which incorporate empathy, and working from a 
person-centred stance, are more likely to have increased empathy.  
A further factor which may impact on counselling psychologists developing empathy 
further was investigated by Daw and Joseph (2009). They examined the relationship between 
psychological mindedness and desirable therapist attributes. They found psychological 
mindedness is related to therapist self-understanding, clinician empathy, and therapeutic 
alliance. Psychological mindedness was also negatively related with self-understanding 
recognition scores, which indicates positive therapist attributes are related to psychological 
mindedness. As such, reflective practice and personal development could increase cognitive 
empathy. In counselling psychology training, a salient focus is put on personal development. 
In the process of training, individuals undertake a personal development module spanning 
three academic years and are also expected to undertake 40 hours of personal therapy, as well 
as operating as reflective practitioners which includes keeping ongoing process notes to 
reflect on one’s own feelings and actions. It should be noted, however, that clinical 
psychology also operates from a reflective practice stance but does not require the same level 
of personal development via therapy (Fisher et al., 2015),  
3.5 The Therapeutic Relationship, Metacommunication and Gelotophobia   
In the therapeutic setting, the accurate recognition of a person’s facial expressions is 
advantageous as emotional recognition is incorporated in emotional regulation and 
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interpersonal communication. Hutchison and Gerstein (2017) stated that ‘accurately inferring 
a person’s internal feelings through external facial expressions may change the nature of 
counsellors’ interpretations, evaluations of client behaviours or how they respond to clients’ 
outbursts (p. 2)’. In counselling psychology, and other forms of therapeutic practice, this 
aspect of communication falls under the term metacommunication.  
The concept of metacommunication, defined as communication about 
communication, was originally introduced by Bateson (1951), who suggested communication 
is facilitated across different levels of abstraction. The concept derived from the animal 
model, within ecology, via observations of play amongst animals, which led to the theory that 
there was constant motive regarding metacommunication which constrained the frame of how 
other animals perceived behaviour and, as such, restricted their responses appropriately, e.g., 
when animals play fight metacommunication relates ‘we are playing now’ (Bateson, 1976). 
Panksepp and Burgdorf (2003) studied laughter in rats, suggesting it had an evolutionary 
function to encourage play amongst young animals with the adage of reassuring others their 
actions were not hostile. This is also seen in humans, where playful behaviour bracketed by 
laughter encourages social bonding and social skills.   
The concept of metacommunication in humans was developed further by Rossiter 
(1974) who divided it into two levels. One level is anything that contextualises 
communication which incorporates salient aspects of nonverbal communication such as voice 
intensity, facial expression, and body gestures. The dual nature of communication means 
these aspects can support or contradict the verbal dialogue of others. The other level of 
metacommunication relates to verbal comments about the communication, when there is a 
need to further appraise the communication of another (Baltzersen, 2013). 
Metacommunication in humans, therefore, provides the same frame of others’ motives, as the 
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message ‘we are playing now’ is often implicit and thus, sometimes can lead to 
misunderstandings (Baltzersen, 2013), which is salient for gelotophobes.   
Human consciousness is believed to have evolved from reflectiveness and, as such, 
individuals have a degree of autonomy over communication with a possible disparity between 
what one communicates and what one thinks and feels. This becomes more difficult, 
however, when emotions are present, as our true belief or meaning can leak out via 
metacommunication (Motschnig & Nykl, 2014; Rennie, 1998). 
In counselling psychology, metacommunication has a salient place; its foundations 
are based in Rogers’ person-centred approach (Strawbridge et al., 2009). Within this 
approach, difficulties can arise when there is incongruence between an individual’s self-
representation and self-presence. A therapist can empathically seek to understand a client’s 
presentation by noticing their body language, tone of voice, and gestures and, in turn, reflect 
this back to facilitate further self-understanding and agency within the client (Rennie, 1998). 
The therapeutic process, however, is not just a one-way process as clients are also trying to 
make sense of a therapist’s metacommunication. Whilst a good therapist would seek to 
minimise any misunderstandings by using counselling skills such as paraphrasing, reflecting, 
and parroting, as well as being reflective and transparent in their own actions (McLeod, 
2007), miscommunications can still occur when decoding communication, as it is only an 
approximation of the encoder’s intention.  
Traditionally, further exploration in the appraisal of metacommunication has only 
been in the direction of the therapist to the client, such as classical psychoanalytical 
transference. Whilst countertransference is accounted for, it is still subjective in nature and 
tends to be held within the confines of clinical supervision. The early person-centred 
approach that had congruence of communication at the centre of the paradigm tended to be 
one way within its reflectivity. To quote Carl Rogers (1961), ‘the greater the congruence of 
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experience, awareness and communication on the part of one individual, the more the 
ensuring relationship will involve a tendency toward reciprocal communication with a quality 
of increasing congruence; a tendency towards more mutually accurate understanding of the 
communications; improved psychological adjustment and functioning in both parties; mutual 
satisfaction in the relationship’ (p. 365).  
Humour occurs frequently in therapy, albeit a lot of therapists are not conscious of its 
occurrence: one study has found on average laughter occurs every three minutes in therapy, 
with clients more likely to laugh than therapists (Marci et al., 2004). Humour can still, 
however, have a dual function within the therapeutic setting, conveying negative messages as 
well as pro social (Norcross, 2011). Contemporary person-centred therapists encourage 
transparency and congruency bilaterally and seek to facilitate checking between the intended 
and received communications (Motschnig & Nykl, 2014; Rennie, 1998). In counselling 
psychology, despite the salience of incongruent presentations, training in metacommunication 
does not go beyond noticing incongruence within the client’s presentation; as such, there is 
no specific training in recognising facial affect (Hutchison & Gerstein, 2017). For 
gelotophobes, metacommunication takes on greater importance, as their relational frame to 
humour and laughter, even a reassuring smile, would most likely be received as ridicule or 
scorn. Therefore, the link between empathy and ability to correctly identify facial affect 
(Bese &Yuille, 2010), would be of great importance for counselling psychologists working 
with gelotophobes.     
3.6 Facial Expressions and the Communication of Emotion  
The ability to communicate, both the encoding and decoding of facial expressions, is 
of salient importance within social interactions (Nachson, 1995). Facial expressions 
communicate an emotional state to others via an encoding face and decoding brain, which 
allows one to infer an emotional state and respond accordingly (Smith et al., 2005).  
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Typically, this is arranged into seven universal expressions of emotion, fear, joy, 
contempt, sadness, disgust, anger, and surprise, and has been observed cross-culturally 
(Ekman, 1973; Ekman 1999; Ekman & Friesen, 1986). Darwin (1872) was the first to 
examine facial expressions of humans and animals. He postulated that the expressions were 
innate across cultures and, as such, had evolved to communicate an inner emotional state to 
others. There have been over 30 studies that have found support for universal recognition of 
emotion in the face (Matsumoto, 2001), as well as a further 75 studies that have found the 
same facial expressions displayed when emotions are triggered spontaneously (Matsumoto et 
al., 2008). As such, there is strong evidence for the universal facial expressions of seven 
emotions: anger, contempt, disgust, fear, joy, sadness, and surprise (Matsumoto, 2011). 
3.6.1 Cultural Differences Within Facial Recognition of Emotion 
There have, however, been critics of the facial recognition of universal emotions with 
the belief that the methodology used in studies is impacting on the findings and, rather than 
innate emotions occurring cross-culturally, there is in fact a more subtle model of emotion 
perception which is impacted on by culture and language, which increases variation (Russell, 
1994). Gendron et al. (2014) compared American and the remote Himba culture participants 
by asking them to compile pictures by emotion type; the Himba participants did not show the 
normal universal emotional grouping, although when clues to emotional context were 
presented, the findings were closer to the universal groupings, albeit some variance persisted. 
A study by Jack et al. (2012) also found discrepancies when examining mental 
representations of emotion. Westerners represented each of the seven basic emotions with 
separate facial movements, whereas Easterners did not. Easterners also used a dynamic eye 
activity in displaying emotional intensity. These differences between cultures have been 
likened to a nonverbal ‘accent’, where some cultures exhibit subtle differences; moreover, it 
is suggested that static shots of emotion do not elicit the same cultural differences and these 
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tend to be exhibited through moving imagery (Marsh et al., 2003). Meta-analysis investigated 
emotion recognition within and across cultures and found emotions were recognised across 
cultures, although the accuracy levels were higher when the encoder and decoder were from 
the same national, ethnic, or regional group, suggesting an in-group advantage which is 
mediated by exposure to the respective culture (Elfenbein & Ambady, 2002). 
At the present time, however, although there is evidence of cross-cultural differences 
in basic emotions, a larger body of research encompassing neurophysiological, 
computational, and behavioural approaches suggests basic emotions can be reliably 
recognised (Calvo & Nummenmaa, 2015). For example, support for an individual’s ability to 
accurately recognise facial expressions of emotion across cultures has also been found by 
researchers using the Japanese and Caucasian Facial Expressions of Emotion (JACFEE) in 
photographs in numerous countries including China, Hungary, Japan, Poland, Sumatra, the 
United States, and Vietnam. These results have found significant high accuracies in respect of 
identifying anger, disgust, happiness, and sadness. Contempt, however, has tended to be 
lower in accuracy, albeit still significant, and fear and surprise have been mixed on occasion 
(Huang et al., 2009). Moreover, a review by Ekman (2016) carried out amongst 248 
researchers that had published eight or more times across five years on the subject of emotion 
found, however, that (88%) believed there was compelling evidence for universals in any 
aspect of emotion and (80%) supported the view that there are universal signals by either face 
or voice across cultures. There was less agreement regarding whether there is evidence of 
universal factors regarding what triggers emotion (66%), physiology (51%) or appraisal 
mechanisms (44%). When asked which emotional terms were empirically substantiated, the 
five emotions of anger, fear, disgust, sadness, and happiness had a significantly high 
agreement. Shame, surprise, and embarrassment were met with less approval (40–50%), 
however, and various others had considerably less agreement: guilt (37%), contempt (34%), 
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love (32%), awe (31%), pain (28%), envy (28%), compassion (20%), pride (9%), and 
gratitude (6%). The results overall, however, do lend weight to the fact that at present there is 
a consensus of support regarding universality of some facial expressions. 
3.6.2 Autonomy of Facial Expressions  
Facial expressions, however, cannot be considered merely innate expressions of 
emotion, as individuals have autonomy over expression and, as such, their expressions can be 
faked (Ekman et al., 1981). In assessing facial expressions there are specific facial 
configurations related to different emotions. For example, the emotion of joy tends to be 
accompanied by a facial configuration called the Duchenne display (Ekman et al., 1990). 
According to Platt et al. (2013), ‘the Duchenne display refers to the joint and symmetric 
contraction of the zygomatic major and orbicularis oculi muscles (pulling the lip corners back 
and upwards and raising the cheeks and compression of the eyelids causing eye wrinkles, 
respectively)’ (p. 776). Non-Duchenne smiles, however, do not include the activation of 
orbicularis oculi and tend to serve a social function such as concealment of a negative 
emotion (Surakka & Hietanen, 1998), whereas a contempt smile incorporates unilateral 
action of the buccinators muscle (Ruch et al., 2013). This is of relevance to gelotophobes, as 
they tend to respond to expressions of joy with higher incidents of contempt displays and 
they express less joy in response to expressions of joy (Hofmann et al., 2015). 
3.6.3 Facial Expressions of Emotion and Therapists    
A previous study that investigated whether there was a difference between 
counselling trainees’ and undergraduates’ abilities to recognise facially expressed emotions 
found there was no significant difference between the counselling trainees and the general 
undergraduates and no difference in gender. The study used a mix of trainees from different 
backgrounds and education status, which included master’s level clinical psychology trainees, 
counselling, counselling, and psychology (dual degree option), and doctorate level 
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counselling psychology trainees. The 108 participants were presented with Japanese and 
Caucasian Facial Expression of Emotion (JACFEE; Matsumoto & Ekman, 1988) which 
comprises 56 photos of American and Japanese individuals displaying anger, contempt, 
disgust, fear, happiness, sadness, and surprise (Hutchison & Gerstein, 2017). The therapeutic 
experience of the trainees in question that took part in the study was, however, limited. It 
would appear some trainees in the study had no therapeutic experience at all, and for others, 
although they may have had a trainee placement, it is not known how many hours they would 
have undertaken and thus their level of experience. Previous research by Machado et al. 
(1999) compared 36 experienced therapists to 36 psychology undergraduates and found 
experienced therapists were more accurate in their judgements and relied less on visual clues, 
and participants that were more aware of their own emotions were more accurate. 
Interestingly, however, there was no difference in ability to identify emotional intensity, this 
is in keeping with cultural differences of emotional perception. The study in general does 
have some difficulties, however, as the accuracy of participants was measured against the 
subjective scores of two judges who were deemed to be experienced. However, the judges 
were doctoral students and, as their level of expertise is questionable, the subjective nature of 
the study has implications for the efficacy of the study.    
Hutchison et al. (2017) compared the ability of non-Hispanic, white American 
counselling psychology trainees with Japanese clinical psychology trainees in their ability to 
recognise facially expressed emotions in exploring whether there would be an ‘in-group’ 
advantage and whether female participants had greater accuracy. There was a total of 120 
participants with 60 in each respective group, and they viewed photographs of non-Hispanic, 
white American and Japanese individuals expressing basic emotions and were asked to 
complete a survey assessing emotion-recognition and emotion-intensity. The findings 
indicated the non-Hispanic, white American counselling psychology trainees had a higher 
69 
 
accuracy rate than the Japanese clinical psychology trainees, there was no ‘in-group’ bias and 
there were no differences in ability related to gender. As yet there has been a paucity of 
research that has examined therapists’ ability to identify facial affect. The findings so far are 
mixed, and all the studies have had some level of methodological difficulties. For 
gelotophobes, were it to be the case that therapists are unable to detect their distress, it could 
offer a significant barrier to any form of recovery.   
3.7 Summary of the Literature Review  
The first part of the literature review focused on giving an overview of gelotophobia 
before looking at its definition, defined as a heightened fear of being the object of ridicule via 
the laughter of social partners. It saw how repeated traumatic experiences of being ridiculed, 
via laughter, is postulated to lead to a negative attribution bias of laughter that impacts 
negatively on interpersonal interactions. The focus then turned to understanding the 
development of gelotophobia and outlined salient factors such as bullying before highlighting 
areas in need of further research such as attachment, internal working models, and trauma. 
Moreover, it examined how the understanding of its development has changed from an 
original linear model of putative causes and consequences to a more holistic systemic 
understanding, incorporating feedback loops operating across many levels and etiological 
moderating factors. In doing this it saw how gelotophobes can react to expressions of joy in 
an atypical manner, as a defence, such as freezing and over-controlling their mannerisms, 
leading to further ridicule. Further to this, as gelotophobes perceive others as ridiculing them 
they respond by displaying greater incidents of contempt facial configurations and showing 
less joy, which further compounds and maintains their interpersonal difficulties.  
The literature review then explored the measurement of gelotophobia and how 
research in this area has supported the belief that gelotophobia exists on a continuum from no 
gelotophobia to extreme gelotophobia. Moreover, it saw that cross-cultural research has 
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found the presence of gelotophobia in 73 countries with substantial research involving 95 
researchers and 22,610 participants in 93 samples in clinical and non-clinical populations. 
The focus then moved to examine the use of the term gelotophobia and looked at some of the 
criticisms of diagnostic labels and how labels can locate the difficulty within the individual, 
which is not in keeping with the understanding of the development of gelotophobia, as it is 
currently believed to be a systemic issue. In the present research, the terms gelotophobia and 
gelotophobe are used, to enhance readability, rather than the more humanistic expression of 
‘an individual that experiences a heightened fear of being laughed at’. However, the present 
research is mindful of a need to counter the formation of new stereotypes by highlighting that 
gelotophobia occurs on a continuum and holding the stance that gelotophobia does not just 
occur within an individual but within a system and will seek to reflect on, and highlight, the 
role of the system in its conclusions. Also, the literature review saw how the use of diagnostic 
labels can also create tension with counselling psychology’s humanistic values, and the 
present research will seek to transverse the epistemological differences by taking a pluralistic 
approach by holding different positions simultaneously and countering biases by using 
reflective skills.     
The second part of the literature review brought together counselling psychology, the 
development of empathy and its relationship with facial affect recognition, and the 
importance of understanding the potential impact of gelotophobia on the success of therapy. 
In doing this it started by giving an overview of counselling psychology and how its 
foundations are based on Rogers’ person-centred approach, which postulates that 
psychologists should embody three core conditions, empathy, congruence, and unconditional 
positive regard, to facilitate therapeutic change. It also highlighted that the therapeutic 
relationship is a salient factor in the success of therapy.  
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It saw how metacommunication is bidirectional, with individuals inferring each 
other’s internal feelings through external facial expressions, which has implications for 
gelotophobes accessing therapy. The literature review outlined that even though a 
psychologist should be checking-in verbally with a client and undertaking a psychological 
formulation, the presence of gelotophobia has the potential to impact on the therapeutic 
relationship. This has led to researchers examining why gelotophobia is underrepresented 
within the therapeutic population to suggest gelotophobe clients may be disengaging from 
psychology early within the therapeutic process following misinterpreting reassuring smiles 
as scorn or ridicule. In examining these aspects and its implications for therapy via 
communication errors, the literature review gave an overview of metacommunication and 
facial affect and highlighted the evidence for seven universal expressions of emotion. 
The literature review also gave an overview of empathy and outlined that this study 
will be focusing on affective and cognitive empathy. It saw how empathy develops by 
genetics interacting with the environment and how there is some evidence of person-centred 
training increasing empathy levels. Empathy is of particular importance to this study as there 
is a relationship between empathy levels and the ability to recognise others’ facial affect. As 
such, should the humanistic foundations of counselling psychologists’ impact on empathy 
levels, it would then be expected that this would, in turn, afford greater ability in recognising 
facial affect, which would be advantageous in recognising gelotophobes’ incongruent 
presentations and would be beneficial in maintaining positive therapeutic relationships.  
3.8 Research Aims 
In keeping with the two sections of the literature review, this study aims to examine 
two parts. The first part relates to gelotophobia and investigating individuals’ perceptions of 
gelotophobes reacting to expressions of joy. Although previous research has found, via 
taxonomising facial muscles, that individuals with gelotophobia tend to show fewer 
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expressions of joy and more expressions of contempt responding to expressions of joy, to 
date no research has examined how social partners perceive gelotophobe emotions in a joyful 
context or whether social partners can correctly identify gelotophobes’ incongruent 
presentation. Should social partners perceive gelotophobes to respond differently to non-
gelotophobes responding to joy, it will further support the belief that gelotophobes’ 
incongruent responses to joy impacts on the success of interpersonal interactions and can also 
help inform psychological interventions. Moreover, it can help expand the systemic 
understandings of gelotophobia indicating facial affect encoding is a contributing factor in the 
development of gelotophobia.    
The second part of the study looks to examine whether the empathic underpinnings of 
counselling psychology afford greater empathy and, in turn, whether empathy is a predictive 
factor in the facial recognition of the emotions of gelotophobes and non-gelotophobes. As 
yet, there has been little research examining therapists’ ability to identify facial affect. 
Moreover, there has been no research examining counselling psychologists’ empathy levels 
in comparison to non-psychologists or psychology other groups, despite empathy being a 
core condition of therapy, and there has also been no research examining whether counselling 
psychologists’ empathy levels relate to correctly identifying facial affect. In undertaking the 
second part of this research, it will examine all aspects of the causal chain in terms of 
affective and cognitive levels of empathy, number of correct emotions identified and whether 
empathy levels predict the number of emotions identified via comparing counselling 
psychology (CP), non-psychology (NP), and psychology other (PO) groups. Finally, it will 
examine whether empathy mediates correctly identifying facial affect.       
As such, this study has relevance to practice as a therapist’s ability to communicate 
empathy and unconditional positive regard to the client is believed to predict successful 
outcomes in therapy. Therefore, the ability of counselling psychologists to differentiate 
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gelotophobes’ facial affect would be beneficial in predicating positive outcomes in therapy by 
reducing dropouts and helping to develop and maintain the therapeutic relationship. Also, as 
gelotophobia is still overlooked in clinical practice, should psychologists not be able to 
identity the facial affect of gelotophobes, it could further highlight a need to disseminate how 
gelotophobia presents. It could also highlight the need for training specifically in relation to 
recognising incongruent facial affect.   
3.9 Hypotheses 
3.9.1 Part 1 
H1a: Participants will perceive non-gelotophobes to have significantly higher frequency of 
happiness compared to gelotophobes. 
H1b: Participants will perceive gelotophobes to have significantly higher frequency of 
contempt compared to non-gelotophobes. 
 
Gelotophobes have been found to respond to expressions of joy with less facially 
displayed joy (Platt et al., 2013), and with greater frequencies of contempt than non-
gelotophobes (Hofmann et al., 2015; Ruch et al., 2015). It has been suggested by Ruch et al. 
(2015), that gelotophobes having incongruent responses to joy, displaying less joy, and more 
contempt, than non-gelotophobes, is a factor in the success of gelotophobes’ interpersonal 
interactions. Previous research, however, assessing gelotophobes facial affect responding to 
expressions of joy was undertaken by researchers using FACS. The present study looks to 
expand on this understanding by examining whether others do perceive gelotophobes and 
non-gelotophobes to be different across happiness and contempt when responding to 
expressions of joy, thus confirming the potential for these factors to be implicated in the 





H2: Participants will identify more non-gelotophobe emotional states being displayed 
correctly than gelotophobe emotional states when reacting to expressions of joy.  
  
Systemic understandings of the development of gelotophobia suggest a feedback loop 
consisting of gelotophobes having a negative attribution bias which affects their perception of 
expressions of joy, meaning they believe they are being the objects of ridicule, which leads 
them to react atypically to expressions of joy; this results in others perceiving them as acting 
funny and thus forms the basis of further ridicule (Ruch, Hofmann et al., 2014). A further 
factor in this feedback loop, however, may be encoding of facial affect. There is some 
evidence that deficits in facial displays of affect mean less empathy is felt by others and, as 
such, this contributes to the feedback loop (Cowie & Berdondini, 2002). This is in keeping 
with gelotophobes who not only show fewer facial displays of joy and incongruent emotions 
such as contempt but who also often try to mask negative emotions, resulting in further 
atypical presentations (Platt et al., 2013). As such, should participants identify fewer 
gelotophobe emotions, than non-gelotophobes, it could indicate a further factor in the 
development of gelotophobia.  
H3: There will be significantly more incorrect answers for gelotophobes compared to non-
gelotophobes, when asked if the individual in the emotional stimulus had gelotophobia. 
At present there is still a lack of awareness regarding gelotophobia, despite it being 
found across cultures, nationalities and in clinical and non-clinical populations (Proyer et al., 
2009). As such, despite the atypical presentations and incongruent facial displays reacting to 
expressions of joy, it is expected that participants will not be able to identify which 
individuals have the heightened fear of being laughed at, due to a lack of knowledge of how 
the difficulty presents. As two-thirds of the participants in this study have a psychology 
background, should participants not be able to correctly identify the gelotophobes reacting to 
joy, it would highlight the need to further propagate how gelotophobia presents to foster 
positive outcomes in therapy. Moreover, should participants not be able to recognise 
75 
 
gelotophobes responding to joy, it would also further support the belief that deficits in facial 
affect contributes to the development of gelotophobia.       
3.9.2 Part 2 
H4: Counselling psychology (CP) participants will identify more correct emotional states 
being displayed by gelotophobes than non-psychology (NP) and psychology other (PO) 
participants. 
The humanistic person-centred approach is fundamental to counselling psychology 
training (Orlans & Van Scoyoc, 2008). Previous research has found that relational person-
centred approach training can impact on empathy levels (Ruiz-Moral et al., 2017; Thompson 
et al., 2010). Further to this, previous research has found a positive correlation between level 
of cognitive and affective empathy and ability to identify emotions (Besel & Yuille, 2013; 
Gery et al., 2009). As such, this causal chain indicates that CP participants should be able to 
correctly identify more emotional states of gelotophobes compared to NP and PO participants 
should their empathy levels be increased by training.  
H5a: CP Participants will have a higher level of affective empathy than NP and PO 
participants. 
H5b: CP participants will have a higher level of cognitive empathy than NP and PO 
participants. 
Numerous studies have examined the development of empathy levels by incorporating 
person-centred practice (Batt-Rawden et al., 2013; Ivey et al., 2010). The training focuses on 
developing active listening skills (DePue & Lambie, 2014) and teaching students to 
understand patients’ concerns and feelings by not just focusing on verbal presentation of 
communication (Archer & Meyer, 2018; Ruiz-Moral et al., 2017). Research has indicated that 
cognitive empathy appears to be more susceptible to development (Epstein & Street, 2011; 
Platt & Keller, 1994). Overall, however, findings indicate cognitive and affective empathy 
can be developed via person-centred counselling training (Ruiz-Moral et al., 2017; Thompson 
et al., 2010). This is salient to counselling psychology as its foundations are built upon 
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humanistic values of the client-centred approach outlined by Carl Rogers (Orlans & Van 
Scoyoc, 2008); thus, should counselling skills training increase empathy, it would be 
expected CP participants would have higher empathy levels than NP and PO.     
H6a: Participants’ affective empathy will positively correlate with the correct number of 
emotions identified.  
H6b: Participants’ cognitive empathy will positively correlate with the correct number of 
emotions identified. 
H6c: Affective empathy will mediate the relationship between participant group and the 
correct number of emotions identified.  
H6d: Cognitive empathy will mediate the relationship between participant group and the 
correct number of emotions identified.  
 
Previous research has found evidence of a relationship between level of cognitive and 
affective empathy and ability to identify facial affect (Besel & Yuille, 2013; Gery et al., 
2009) and previous research has found that person-centred approach training can increase 
empathy levels (DePue & Lambie, 2014; Ruiz-Moral et al., 2017; Thompson et al., 2010). As 
such, as counselling psychologists’ training is based upon a humanistic person-centred 
approach, it would be expected CP participants would have higher levels of empathy than NP 
and PO and, in turn, levels of empathy would predict the number of correct emotions 
identified. Therefore, an empathy mediated relationship is proposed between participant 
























4.1 Methodological Rationale 
In understanding the philosophy of a system, consideration should be given to the 
fundamental assumptions augmenting perception of the individual’s place in the world and 
their relationships between the world and the researcher (Bohm, 1994). Crotty (2009) defined 
methodology as ‘The strategy, plan of action, process or design lying behind the choice and 
use of particular methods and linking the choice and use of methods to the desired outcomes’ 
(p. 3). The current research investigated whether the empathic underpinnings of counselling 
psychology afforded greater detection of gelotophobes’ facial affect when responding to 
expressions of joy, by comparing counselling psychology, non-psychology, and psychology 
other participants.  A fundamental aspect of the research was the assessment of participants’ 
ability to correctly identify facial affect and its relationship with empathy. As such, an 
objective measurement was required to assess the accuracy of the perceived emotion. The 
facial action coding system (FACS) facilitated the removal of subjective emotional 
evaluation by coding specific facial behaviours, and this method has been deemed to have 
good psychometric properties (Savetter et al., 2001). Using a quantitative approach, therefore, 
looked to eliminate bias and remain emotionally detached to afford reliable results (Nagel, 
1986), and afford the examination of the relationships between factors (Wilson et al., 2010). 
This approach is consistent with, and informed by, previous research on gelotophobia and 
facial recognition, and judged to be ontologically and epistemologically consistent with the 
present research aims (Slevitch, 2011). As such, a quantitative approach provided an 
examination between perceived emotions, presence of gelotophobia, and empathy, and it 
allowed for comparison between groups, which was in keeping with the research aims and 
scope.  
The philosophical position of the present research, therefore, sits within the positivist 
paradigm, which connects the assumptions adopted throughout this thesis. Specifically, it 
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regards knowledge as a true object that can be observed in the world (Symon et al., 2000) and 
allows the detection of general patterns of behaviour via constructing and testing hypotheses 
(Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 1992).  
The positivist position of reality existing independently has some difficulties, 
however, as individuals are not separate from their social context and even the very act of 
investigating their actions could influence their actions (Kasim et al., 2010). This research 
used stimuli that looked to minimise these confounds by clandestine filming of participants 
(Hofmann et al., 2015). The positivist stance has also been positioned as conflicting with the 
humanistic foundations of counselling psychology, with its core values aligning to respecting 
subjective experience and pursuing phenomenological methods for understanding human 
experience (Lane & Corrie, 2006).  
Counselling psychology from its outset has had to navigate philosophical tensions; in 
contemporary practice this is highlighted by counselling psychology training, which 
necessitates being both a scientist-practitioner and a reflective practitioner (Health Care 
Professions Council, 2012). A scientist-practitioner takes an integrated stance to 
psychological theory in clinical practice and research methodology and encourages 
practitioners to use empirical research to inform their practice (Jones & Mehr, 2007). This is 
juxtaposed to the reflective practitioner’s stance, which postulates practitioners should learn 
from experience to inform practice. The ability to manage these tensions and conflicting 
philosophies, however, is crucial to the role of a counselling psychologist.  
Once more, the pluralistic approach can help traverse these conflicts by holding 
multiple epistemological and ontological positions (Cooper & McLeod, 2007). In a practical 
sense, to counter the challenges of conflicting paradigms counselling psychologists should 
engage the core skill of reflective practice, to identify and maintain its humanistic values 
80 
 
(Strawbridge et al., 2009). As such, although this research used a quantitative approach, it 
undertook reflective practice throughout the process and considered the role of social context 
within its understanding and interpretations of findings.  
4.2 Design 
The study was a quasi-experimental design, which consisted of three groups, 
counselling psychology (CP), non-psychology (NP), and psychology other (PO) participants. 
Participants were asked to complete an online emotion recognition task, two empathy 
questionnaires, and a questionnaire that afforded the identification of gelotophobia. The 
independent variables were: 1) participant’s profession, i.e., ‘counselling psychologist’, ‘non-
psychologist’, and ‘psychology other’; 2) the empathy questionnaire scores, i.e., the 
Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI) and Empathy Quotient (EQ) questionnaires. The 
dependent variables were: 1) the emotions perceived, 2) the number of correct emotions 
identified, and 3) the number of gelotophobes identified. 
4.3 Participants 
Altogether 150 participants were recruited, 132 participants completed all aspects of 
the study, with 12 participants completing the demographics, IRI, EQ, and GELOPH <15> 
questionnaires, but not the emotional stimulus aspect of the study and there was one 
participant who completed all questionnaires, but only partially completed the emotional 
stimulus aspect of the study. There were a further six participants who withdrew from the 
study via the automatic withdraw button; therefore, these data were excluded and deleted.  
The occupation of the participants was 44 CP, 54 NP, and 46 PO. The CP sample 
consisted of 44 English-speaking adults (5 males, 39 females), and there were 8 fully 
qualified counselling psychologists and 36 trainees that had completed the humanistic aspect 
of the counselling psychology doctorate training. The ethnicity of CP participants was 26 
white British, 6 Asian British, 1 African Caribbean British, 7 white other, 1 Arabic, and 3 
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other. The NP sample consisted of 54 English-speaking adults (10 males, 44 females) and 
their ethnicity was 46 white British, 2 Asian British, 1 African Caribbean British, and 5 white 
other. The PO sample consisted of 46 English-speaking adults (5 males, 40 females, 1 non-
binary). The ethnicity of PO participants was 26 white British, 2 Asian British, 1 mixed-
heritage British, 1 African Caribbean British, 13 white other, and 3 other, and the specific job 
roles of the PO group are presented in Table 2.  
Table 2 
Displays the Count and Percentage of the Profession of the Participants in the Psychology 
Other (PO) Group 
Profession Count  Percentage 
Clinical Psychologist 5 10.86% 
Educational Psychologist 3  6.67% 
Forensic Psychologist 3  6.67% 
Occupational Psychologist 1  2.17% 
Psychology Lecturer 3  6.67% 
Psychology PhD 2  4.34% 
Psychology Researcher  3  6.67% 
CBT Therapist 1  2.17% 
Accredited Counsellor  1  2.17% 
Play Therapist 1  2.17% 
Trainee Clinical Psychologist 1  2.17% 
Trainee Forensic Psychologist 3  6.67% 
Trainee CBT Therapist 1  2.17% 
Trainee Counsellor 1  2.17% 
Assistant Psychologist  2  4.34% 
Research Assistant 1  2.17% 
Psychology Master’s degree 4  8.69% 
Psychology Undergraduate 5 10.86% 
Psychology Student 2  4.34% 
Pupil Wellbeing Mentor 1  2.17% 
Mental Health Support Worker 2  4.34% 





The age of participants was recorded via age range rather than specific age: This was 
to limit the impact of the demographic questions on participant anonymity. As such, no mean 
ages are available to present, but the breakdown of age ranges across groups is presented in 
Table 3 below.  
Table 3 
Displays Participant Age Range Across Groups 
  CP NP PO Total 
Age 18-24 2 1 8 11 
 25-34 18 13 19 50 
 35-44 17 16 9 42 
 45-54 5 20 5 30 
 55-64 2 4 4 10 
 65-74 0 0 1 1 
 
Note. CP = counselling psychology, NP = non-psychology, PO = psychology other. 
 
4.3.1 Sample Size 
To determine the minimal sample size required for this study, four G*Power analyses 
were computed and displayed in Table 4. For the linear regression and mediation analysis, the 
same G*Power analysis was deemed sufficient, as was the G*Power analysis for both 
ANOVA and Kruskal-Wallis. Overall, the G*Power analysis indicated this study had a 
sufficient sample size to have confidence of detecting true effect.  
Table 4 
Displays Findings from the Four G*Power Analyses Used to Determine Sample Size  
Analysis Effect Size α 1-β n 
ANOVA/ Kruskal-
Wallis 
F = .25 .05 .80 128 
Binary logistic 
regression 
z = 1.64 .05 .80 568 
χ2 Goodness-of-Fit w = .30 .05 .80 108 
Linear Regression/ 
Mediation  
f2 = .15 .05 .80 68 
 
Note. α = alpha level, 1-β = statistical power, n = sample size. 
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4.3.2 Recruitment  
The recruitment of participants was disseminated across a number of different 
platforms for CP participants and NP participants. Firstly, direct recruitment was utilised for 
CP participants, in contacting trainee counselling psychologists on the University of 
Wolverhampton (UOW) Professional Doctorate in Counselling Psychology course, as well as 
contacting six qualified counselling psychologists already known to the author. Herein, 
intermediate recruiting was requested from individuals contacted, as they were asked to 
snowball to relevant parties. Secondly, participants were recruited across social media via 
Facebook, Twitter, and WhatsApp, which was then ‘shared’ by several other individuals. 
Thirdly, a post was placed on the British Psychological Society’s (BPS) Facebook page that 
has an audience of 256,000 followers, as well as a post placed on The Division of 
Counselling Psychologists North West Facebook page that has 183 members consisting of 
qualified and trainee counselling psychologists. Fourthly, all university counselling 
psychology departments in the United Kingdom that offer the Professional Doctorate in 
Counselling Psychology were contacted via email asking them to distribute the research 
amongst their counselling psychologists and doctoral trainees, with the proviso that the 
trainees had completed a humanistic module. NP participants were recruited from the wider 
population, with an effort made to target age and gender demographics similar to those of the 
CP participants to account for differences in empathy levels found in previous research. As 
such, direct and intermediate recruiting was used again with friends who fitted the relevant 
demographics; they were not only asked to participate but subsequently asked to snowball the 
research to relevant potential participants. Also, CP participants were asked to snowball the 
study to NP individuals they knew within their demographic. Once more, social media 
platforms were used for the NP participants, with a post on Facebook requesting participants, 
though this post did not specify any demographics.  
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4.4 Materials  
The emotional stimuli used in this study was appropriated from a prior study 
(Hofmann et al., 2015), whereby the participants had consented for their image to be used in 
further studies. They clandestinely filmed individuals in a standard interview setting 
undertaking an emotion elicitation task, i.e., responding to expressions of joy. The video clips 
featured 17 Swiss-German speaking individuals who were pre-screened with the GELOPH 
<15> to establish the presence of gelotophobia. The GELOPH <15> is a reliable subjective 
assessment for gelotophobia that takes the form of a self-report questionnaire (Ruch & 
Proyer, 2008); this questionnaire is outlined in more detail in the measures section. Eight of 
the 17 individuals featuring in the video clips had gelotophobia ranging from Slight 
gelotophobia to Extreme gelotophobia and for nine individuals there was no presence of 
gelotophobia, thus allowing comparison between groups (Appendix A). To distinguish 
between the present study’s participants and the individuals in the video clips from the 
appropriated study, the appropriated study’s participants will be referred to as ‘the emotional 
stimulus’ herein to avoid confusion.  
4.4.1 Preparation of Materials 
An emotional stimulus photo was generated via a screenshot of the appropriated 
study’s video clips; this was used rather than full video clips as the timeframe required to 
code the videos was beyond the scope of the present study. The video clips were edited using 
Microsoft Movie Maker for Windows 10 and a photo (screenshot) of each video was taken at 
the apex of an Action Unit (AU) displayed: 30 seconds after the elicitation question. This 
period of time was chosen as it gave enough time for the AU to reach the apex and accounted 
for the variation of time needed for different emotional emblem displays. 
To operationalise the emotional stimulus, the screenshots were coded with facial 
action coding system (FACS). FACS is an anatomically based, comprehensive and objective 
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technique, for measuring all observable facial movement. It distinguishes 44 AUs, which are 
minimal units that are anatomically separate and visually distinguishable. FACS also allows 
for measurement of the timing of a facial movement, its symmetry and intensity, and its 
degree of irregularity of onset, apex, or offset (Ekman et al., 2002a). This technique afforded 
the coding of specific facial muscles to determine the facial expression being displayed, e.g., 
Duchenne smile/happiness contains AU 12 + AU 6 (Ekman et al., 2002b); thus, enabling a 
comparison between the emotion being displayed in the emotional stimulus and participants’ 
perception of the facial expression displayed.  
To complete the FACS coding, it was necessary to undertake FACS training, which 
incorporates a 527-page self-instructed manual and typically takes 100 hours of self-directed 
training prior to taking a test to become an accredited coder (Ekman et al., 2002a). A five-day 
workshop, in conjunction with undergraduate students at the University of Wolverhampton, 
was also undertaken to consolidate the training prior to taking the test for FACS certification. 
The FACS test evaluated the reliability of coding via a series of 34 video segments against 
experts’ coding. To pass the test, there must be a .70, or above, agreement with the criterion 
codes: the pass level achieved was .73. Passing the certification demonstrated proficiency in 
FACS coding; thus, the coding in this research is reliable and consistent with the coding of 
well-trained people (Ekman et al., 2002a). The FACS coding was initially undertaken by two 
certified FACS coders and then their answers were compared to each other, affording greater 
efficacy in the coding by ensuring the convergence between the intended and expressed 





Displays the GELOPH <15> Score and Coded AUs for Each Emotional Stimulus as Well as 
the Reliability Ratio Score Between Coders  
ES G SS Coder 1 AUs Coder 2 AUs r 
32 1.2  1 1d+6e+25d+12d 6d+7D+12d+25d 0.75 
 1.2  2 1b+2c+6d+25d+26d+12c 6e+7e+12e+25d+26c 0.73 
 1.2  3 1c+6c+25d+26c+12e 6d+7e+12d+25d+26c 0.80 
 1.2  4 6c+25b+26a+12c 6c+7c+12dc+25c+26c 0.88 
 1.2  5 1b+6e+25c+26b+12d 1b+2b+6d+7d+12d+25c+26c 0.83 
34 1.4  1 1b+2c+6c+12d+25e+26e 6c+7c+12c+25e+26e 0.73 
 1.4  2 2b+6b+12b+25b 2b+6b+7b+12b+14b+25b 0.80 
 1.4  3 2c+4b+7a+15b+20d 2c+15b+17b+20d+24b 0.60 
 1.4  4 10d+17c 10b+15d+17c+24b 0.67 
 1.4  5 4b+7e+17b+23d R2c+17b+23d+38b 0.5 
37 2.6  1 6e+12e+25d+26c 6e+12e+25d+26c 1 
 2.6  2 6c+7d 10a+12d+25c 6d+7d+12d+25c 0.88 
 2.6  3 4b+7b+17a+24c 4b+7b+15b+17a+24c 0.88 
 2.6  4 10d+17d 10c+15b+17d+24 b 0.67 
 2.6  5 12Rc+14Rc 14Rc+24b 0.5 
48 1.2  1 6e+25e+26b+12d+ 6d+7d+12d+25e+26b 0.88 
 1.2  2 6c+25c+12d 6c+7c+12c+25c 0.85 
 1.2  3 4b+7e+10b+25b+26c 6b+7b+12b+25b+26c+43e 0.73 
 1.2  4 4b+10c+25b+26c 6b+7c+12b+20b+25b+26c 0.40 
 1.2  5 6e+25c+26a+12c 6e+7e+12e+25c+26c 0.88 
63 3.0  1 12b+14Rb 12b+14Rb 1 
 3.0  2 12c+25c+26c 6Lc+12Rb+12Ld+ 25c+26c+43Ld 0.67 
 3.0  3 6b+12b+25c+26c 6b+12b+25c+26c 1 
 3.0  4 10b+17c 10b+15b+17c 0.80 
 3.0  5 6b+12c+25c 6b+12b+25b 1 
65 1.2  1 6e+25d+26b+12d 6e+7e+12d+25d+26b 0.88 
 1.2  2 6e+25d+26c+12d 6e+7e+12e+25d+26d 0.88 
 1.2  3 6d+25c+12c 6d+7d+12d+25c 0.85 
 1.2  4 6c+25c+12d 6c+7c+12d+25c 0.85 
 1.2  5 6d+25d+12e 6e+12e+25e 1 
73 1.2  1 6c+25b+12c 6c+12c+25b 1 
 1.2  2 6d+25b+12c 6d+12d+25b 1 
 1.2  3 6c+25c+26a+12d 6c+7c+12d+25c+26a 0.88 
 1.2  4 7b+25c+12c 2Lc+6b+7b+12b+25c 0.5 
 1.2  5 6e+25c+12d 6c+7c+12c+25c 0.85 
76 2.6  1 6d+25b+12c 6d+7d+12d+25b 0.85 
 2.6  2 7d+25c+12d 6b+7b+12b+25b 0.85 
 2.6  3 6a+12b+25b 6a+7b+12b+25b 0.85 
 2.6  4 7e+12ab+25a 12b+25a+43e 0.67 
 2.6  5 6d+25d+12d 6d+7d+12d+25d 0.85 
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ES G SS Coder 1 AUs Coder 2 AUs r 
83 2.5  1 10c 2Lb+10Lc 0.5 
 2.5  2 10c+17d 10c+15b+17d 0.80 
 2.5  3 6e+25d+26b+12e 6e+7e+12e+25d+26b 0.88 
 2.5  4 6b+25b+26b+12c 6c+12c+25b+26b 1 
 2.5  5 10c+25c 9b+10Rb+10Ld+12b+25c 0.57? 
98 3.0  1 6d+12d+25c 6d+7d+12d+25c 0.85 
 3.0  2 12c+14Rc 7Rd+7Lc+12c+24c 0.5 
 3.0  3 7c+10c+12c+25c 7c+10b+12c+25c 1 
 3.0  4 7d+25c+10b+12d+43e 12d+25b+43e 0.75 
 3.0  5 6d+25c+26b+12d 6d+7d+12d+25c+26b 0.88 
99 3.5  1 12bR+14bR 14bR 0.67 
 3.5  2 12cR+14bR 14cR 0.67 
 3.5  3 12cR+14bR 12b+14dR 1 
 3.5  4 12dR+14cR 14cR 0.66 
 3.5  5 12eR+14cR 2Lb+14dR 0.50 
108 3.7  1 7c+25b+10a+12c+43e 7c+9b+10a+12c+43e 0.80 
 3.7  2 7e+12Rc+14Rc+25b 7e+12Rc+14Rc+25b 1 
 3.7  3 6a+7e+9c+12b+25c 6a+7e+9c+12b+25c 1 
 3.7  4 6d+12d+25c 6d+7e+12d+25c 0.85 
 3.7  5 7e+25b+10b 7e+9Lc+12b+25b 0.57 
97 1.2  1 6b+12d+25b 6c+12c+25b 1 
 1.2  2 6e+12e+25c 6d+12d+25d 1 
 1.2  3 6e+12d+25c 6e+12e+25c 1 
 1.2  4 6c+12c+25b 6c+7c+12c+25b 0.85 
 1.2  5 6b+12c+25b 6b+12c+25b 1 
82 1.6  1 1c+2d+5b 1d+2d+28b 0.67 
 1.6  2 6b+12b 1b+2b 0 
 1.6  3 1c+2b+4a+5c+25b 1c+2b+25b 0.75 
 1.6  4 6b+12c+25b 6b+12b+25b 1 
 1.6  5 6b+12b+25b 6c+12c+25b 1 
84 1.2  1 6e+12d+25c 6d+7d+12d+25c 0.85 
 1.2  2 6c+12c+25b 6c+7c+12c+25b 0.85 
 1.2  3 6d+12d+25b 6d+7d+12d+25b 0.85 
 1.2  4 6b+12c+25c 6c+7b+12c+25c 0.85 
 1.2  5 7e+12b 6d+7d+12d+43e 0.67 
86 1.4  1 6c+12c+25c 12c+25c 0.8 
 1.4  2 6d+12d+25d 6d+7d+12d+25d 0.86 
 1.4  3 6d+12d+25c 6b+7d+12c+25c 0.86 
 1.4  4 12Rc+14Rb 14Rc 0.67 
 1.4  5 6d+12d+25d 6d+12d+25d 1 
90 3.5  1 12Rc+14Rb 10c+12b+14b 0.80 
 3.5  2 12c 12c+14b+24c 0.50 
 3.5  3 12b+14b 12b+15b 1 
 3.5  4 14b 14b+24b 0.67 
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 3.5  5 12Rc+14Rc 12Rc+14Rc 1 
 
Note. ES = emotional stimulus code, SS = screenshot, G = GELOPH <15> score, AU = 
Action Unit, r = reliability ratio.  
 
The overall KAPPA coefficient calculated between coders was (.64). Therefore, the 
reliability procedure outlined by Ekman et al. (2002b) was undertaken, whereby each 
individual screenshot that did not meet the .70 reliability index was revisited by both markers 
and compared to the FACS manual; in doing so the discrepancies of AUs were examined to 
establish whether there were errors made in coding. Through a process of mediation, all the 
codes that fell below the .70 were revisited until coding was agreed between the two coders. 
The adjusted codes are displayed below in Table 6.  
It should be noted that the reliability ratio for intensity was not calculated for all codes 
as it is not required for basic emotions; rather, intensity is required for specific prototypes and 
major variants that were not displayed by the emotional stimulus. As such, the presence of 
certain AUs established the presence of an emotion. Moreover, not all facial expressions in 
the emotional stimulus met the strict criteria of the FACS AUs needed to determine an 
emotion expression as defined by Ekman et al. (2002b), and as such these photos were 
considered distractor stimulus.  
Table 6 
Displays the Recoded AUs for Each Emotional Stimulus, the Reliability Ratio Score Between 
Coders and the Emotion Pertaining to the Configuration of AUs  
ES Coder 1 AUs Coder 2 AUs r Emotion 
32 1d+6e+25d+12d  6d+7D+12d+25d 0.75 Happy 
 1b+2c+6d+25d+26d+12c  6e+7e+12e+25d+26c 0.73 Happy 
 1c+6c+25d+26c+12e 6d+7e+12d+25d+26c 0.80 Duchenne 
 6c+25b+26a 12c  6c+7c+12dc+25c+26c 0.88 Duchenne 
 1b+6e+25c+26b+12d 1b+2b+6d+7d+12d+25c+26c 0.83 Duchenne 
34 1b+2c+6c+12d+25e+26e 6c+7c+12c+25e+26e 0.73 Happy 
 2b+6b+12b+25b 2b+6b+7b+12b+14b+25b 0.80 Happy 




ES Coder 1 AUs Coder 2 AUs r Emotion 
 10d+15d+17c 10b+15d+17c+24b 0.86 
 
 R2c+4b+17b+23d+38b R2c+17b+23d+38b 0.88 
 
37 6e+12e+25d+26c 6e+12e+25d+26c 1 Happy 
 6c+7d+10a+12d+25c 6d+7d+12d+25c 0.88 Happy 
 4b+7b+17a+24c 4b+7b+15b+17a+24c 0.88 
 
 10d+17d+24a 10c+15b+17d+24 b 0.86 
 
 14Rc+24b 14Rc+24b 1 
 
48  6e+25e+26b+12d+  6d+7d+12d+25e+26b  0.88 Happy 
  6c+25c+12d  6c+7c+ 12c+25c  0.85 Happy 
 4b+7e+10b+25b+26c 6b+7b+12b+25b+26c+43e 0.73 
 
 4b+10c+25b+26c 6b+7c+12b+20b+25b+26c 0.40 
 
  6e+25c+26a+12c  6e+7e+12e+25c+26c 0.88 Happy 
63 12b+14Rb 12b+14Rb 1 
 
 12Lc+25c+26c+43Lc 6Lc+12Rb+12Ld+25c+26c+43Ld 0.80 
 
 6b+12b+25c+26c 6b+12b+25c+26c 1 Happy 
 10b+17c 10b+15b+17c 0.8 
 
 6b+12c+25c 6b+12b+25b 1 Happy 
65 6e+25d+26b+12d 6e+7e+12d+25d+26b 0.88 Happy 
 6e+25d+26c+12d+ 6e+7e+12e+25d+26d  0.88 Happy 
 6d+25c+12c 6d+7d+12d+25c 0.85 Happy 
 6c+25c+12d 6c+7c+12d+25c 0.85 Happy 
 6d+25d+12e 6e+12e+25e 1 Happy 
73 6c+25b+12c 6c+12c+25b  1 Happy 
 6d+25b+12c 6d+12d+25b  1 Happy 
 6c+25c+26a+12d 6c+7c+12d+25c+26a 0.88 Happy 
 2Lc+7b+25c+12c 2Lc+6b+7b+12b+25c 0.88 Duchene 
 6e+25c+12d 6c+7c+12c+25c 0.85 Happy 
76 6d+25b+12c 6d+7d+12d+25b 0.85 Happy 
 7d+25c+ 12d+ 6b+7b+12b+25b 0.85 Duchene 
 6a+12b+25b  6a+7b+12b+25b  0.85 Happy 
 7e+12ab+25a 12b+25a+43e 0.67 Non-Duchene 
 6d+25d+12d 6d+7d+12d+25d 0.85 Happy 
83 2Lb+10Lb 2Lb+10Lc 1 
 
 10c+17d 10c+15b+17d 0.8 
 
 6e+25d+26b+12e 6e+7e+12e+25d+26b 0.88 Happy 
 6b+25b+26b+12c 6c+12c+25b+26b 1 Happy 
 9a+10Rc+10Ld+12b+25c 9b+10Rb+10Ld+12b+25c 1 
 
98 6d+12d+25c 6d+7d+12d+25c 0.85 Happy 
 7Rd+7Lb+12c+14Rc+24b 7Rd+7Lc+12c+24c 0.88 
 
 7c+10c+12c+25c 7c+10b+12c+25c 1  
 7d+25c+10b+12d+43e 12d+25b+43e 0.75  
 6d+25c+26b+12d  6d+7d+12d+25c+26b  0.88 Happy 
99 12Rb+14Rb 14bR 0.67 Contempt 
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ES Coder 1 AUs Coder 2 AUs r Emotion 
 14bR 14cR 0.67 Contempt 
 12cR+14bR 12b+14Rd 1 Contempt 
 14cR 14cR 1 Contempt 
 2La+14Rc 2Lb+14Rd 1 Contempt 
108 7c+25b+10a+12c+43e 7c+9b+10a+12c+43e 0.8 
 
 7e+12Rc+14Rc+25b 7e+12Rc+14Rc+25b 1 Contempt 
 6a+7e+9c+12b+25c  6a+7e+9c+12b+25c  1 
 
 6d+12d+25c  6d+7e+12d+25c  0.85 Happy 
 7e+9Lb+25b+10b 7e+9Lc+12b+25b 0.75 
 
97 6b+12d+25b 6c+12c+25b 1 Happy 
 6e+12e+25c 6d+12d+25d 1 Happy 
 6e+12d+25c 6e+12e+25c 1 Happy 
 6c+12c+25b 6c+7c+12c+25b 0.85 Happy 
 6b+12c+25b 6b+12c+25b 1 Happy 
82 1c+2d+28b 1d+2d+28b 1 
 
 1c+2b 1b+2b 1 
 
 1c+2b+4a+5c+25b 1c+2b+25b 0.75 
 
 6b+12c+25b 6b+12b+25b 1 Happy 
 6b+12b+25b 6c+12c+25b 1 Happy 
84 6e+12d+25c 6d+7d+12d+25c 0.85 Happy 
 6c+12c+25b 6c+7c+12c+25b 0.85 Happy 
 6d+12d+25b 6d+7d+12d+25b 0.85 Happy 
 6b+12c+25c 6c+7b+12c+25c 0.85 Happy 
 6d+7e+12b 6d+7d+12d+43e 0..86 Duchene 
86 6c+12c+25c 12c+25c 0.8 
 
 6d+12d+25d 6d+7d+12d+25d 0.86 Happy 
 6d+12d+25c 6b+7d+12c+25c 0.86 
 
 14Rc 14Rc 1 
 
 6d+12d+25d 6d+12d+25d 1 Happy 
90 12Rc+14Rc 10c+12b+14b 0.8 Contempt 
 12C+14a+24b 12c+14b+24c 1 
 
 12b+15b 12b+15b 1 
 
 14b+24a 14b+24b 1 
 
 12Rc+14Rc 12Rc+14Rc 1 Contempt 
 
Note. ES = emotional stimulus code, AU = Action Unit, r = reliability ratio.  
 
The recalculated overall KAPPA coefficient between coders displayed in Table 6 was 





4.4.2 Measures  
In order to assess for a possible confound of participants in the present study having 
gelotophobia, the GELOPH <15> questionnaire was presented to all participants (Ruch & 
Proyer, 2008b). This is a 15-item self-report questionnaire for the subjective assessment of 
gelotophobia (a sample item is: ‘I avoid showing myself in public because I fear that people 
could become aware of my insecurity and could make fun of me’). Answers are given on a 
four-point answer format (1 = ‘strongly disagree’ to 4 = ‘strongly agree’). Ruch & Proyer 
(2008b) report high reliability coefficients (α = .86). 
To measure for cognitive empathy, the Empathy Quotient (EQ) questionnaire was 
used (Lawrence et al., 2004). This questionnaire comprises of 40 items to assess cognitive 
and social sides of empathy (a sample item is: ‘People often tell me that I went too far in 
driving my point home in a discussion’). Answers are given on a four-point answer format (1 
= ‘strongly agree’ to 4 = ‘strongly disagree’). Lawrence et al. (2004) reported high reliability 
coefficients (α = .84). Lawrence et al. (2004) conducted components analysis of the EQ 
questionnaire and showed reasonable communalities with loadings onto three factors: 
cognitive empathy, emotional reactivity, and social skills. Five questions have been shown 
suitable for the cognitive empathy subscale (25, 26, 44, 52, and 54; Muncer & Ling, 2006). 
Only the cognitive empathy subscale was used in the present study. The Cronbach’s alpha for 
the cognitive empathy was 0.79. 
The Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI; Davis, 1983) is a 28-item, widely used 
measure that assesses an individual’s predilection towards empathy (a sample item is: ‘I often 
have tender, concerned feelings for people less fortunate than me’). Answers are given on a 
five-point answer format (1 = ‘Does not describe me well’ to 5 = ‘Does describe me well’). 
IRI contains four seven-item subscales, each addressing subtypes of empathy. The present 
92 
 
study, however, only used the Empathic Concern (EC) subtype in measuring affective 
empathy. Davis (1983) reported high reliability coefficients for this subtype (a = .80). 
4.5 Procedure 
The online platform Qualtrics was used to host the emotional stimulus and 
questionnaires. All questions were a forced choice response: on missing a question, 
participants were not able to proceed, with Qualtrics highlighting the missed question, at 
which point participants could choose to answer the missed question or proceed to the next 
question. A withdraw button was added on every page; thus, participants were able to 
withdraw their data at any point. If activated, the withdraw button displayed the end screen 
featuring the research author’s and supervisor’s email addresses (Burleig, 2018).  
The first part of the study provided the information necessary for informed consent to 
participate, which included a definition of gelotophobia, and asked the participants to confirm 
whether they understood the information. Participants were then presented with three 
demographic questions: age, gender, and ethnicity, as it is known that certain demographics 
such as age and gender can impact on levels of empathy (Baron-Cohen & Wheelright, 2004; 
Davis, 1980; Sun et al., 2017). Participants were also asked what their occupation was and 
given the options of: qualified counselling psychologist and trainee counselling psychologist 
(who has completed the humanistic module), non-psychology, and psychology other. The PO 
option was added to afford a control on a possible confounding variable, of individuals from 
other psychology backgrounds participating once the study was disseminated online. In doing 
this it gave PO participants an opportunity to provide a qualitative answer detailing their 
occupation, e.g., clinical psychologist, forensic psychologist, and assistant psychologist. 
Participants were then asked to complete the IRI and EQ questionnaires to gain a measure of 
participants’ affective and cognitive empathy. Following this, participants were presented 
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with the GELOPH <15> questionnaire, which acted as a control for gelotophobes 
participating in the study as this could possibly skew the findings.  
In the second part of the study, participants were asked to identify the emotion the 
person was displaying in the photo. In doing this, the emotional stimulus photo was presented 
(for emotional stimuli see Appendix B) and participants were given a choice of emotions to 
choose from: anger, sadness, joy, disgust, surprise, fear, or contempt. In conjunction with 
this, participants were asked whether they thought the person in the photo had gelotophobia 
and were given the choice of ‘yes or no’. There were eight gelotophobes and nine non-
gelotophobes, i.e., a total of 17 emotional stimuli. There were five screenshots from each 
emotional stimulus participant; thus, a total of 85 photos used when participants were asked 
to judge the perceived emotion and whether the emotional stimulus had gelotophobia. This 
was restricted to 56 photos when assessing the accuracy of identifying facial affect, as not all 
of the 85 emotional stimuli screenshots met the strict FACS criteria for a basic emotion; in 
these cases, the stimulus not meeting the FACS criteria was considered a distractor. The final 
part of the study consisted of a debrief section which once again gave participants the 
author’s and supervisor’s email addresses.  
4.6 Ethical Considerations  
Ethical approval was given by the University of Wolverhampton Ethics Committee 
for this study (Appendix B) following minor amendments (Appendix C). Participants were 
informed they were free to withdraw at any time and a withdraw button was available 
throughout the study. Prior to the onset of the study, informed consent was sought by 
informing participants of the nature and aims of the study. After completing the study, 
participants were given debrief information and, once again, an opportunity to withdraw as 
well as the contact details of the author and supervisor. No ethical issues arose in the study or 

















5.1 Data Cleaning  
Qualtrics software was used to collect all data online and verified all participants used 
an English language version of the software. All participant data collected in Qualtrics were 
exported to IBM Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) version 24. Following 
data exportation, all data were cleaned identifying, and adjusting values Qualtrics had 
denoted incorrectly. The only missing values in the dataset resulted from 12 participants not 
completing the emotional stimulus aspect of the study and one participant partially 
completing the emotional stimulus aspect of the study. These missing values were entered 
under -99 as a discrete missing value. Data were also checked for the confounding variables 




H1a Participants Will Perceive Non-gelotophobes to Have Significantly Higher Frequency 
of Happiness Compared to Gelotophobes 
 
H1b Participants Will Perceive Gelotophobes to Have Significantly Higher Frequency of 
Contempt Compared to Non-gelotophobes 
 
In examining whether participants will perceive non-gelotophobes to have 
significantly higher frequency of happiness compared to gelotophobes, and whether 
participants will perceive gelotophobes to have significantly higher counts of contempt 
compared to non-gelotophobes, a χ2 test was undertaken. The unit of analysis was individual 
case trials rather than participants. The independent variable was gelotophobe and non-
gelotophobe stimuli and the dependent variable was the frequency of happiness and contempt 
answers. This was an examination of perception, rather than if their perception was correct. 
The cross-tabulated frequencies of happiness and contempt for non-gelotophobes and 




Summary of Participants’ Frequency of Perceived Counts of Happiness, and Contempt for 
Gelotophobes and Non-Gelotophobes Responding to Expressions of Joy 
Emotion Gelotophobes  Non-
Gelotophobes 
 χ2 
Happy 2004  4083  710.00*** 
Contempt 673  278  164.06*** 
Note. n = 7038 total participant trials across both analyses, χ2 = Chi Square, *** = p < .001.  
 
Table 7 above shows that there were significantly higher frequencies of happiness for 
non-gelotophobes compared to gelotophobes, and there were larger frequencies of contempt 
perceived for gelotophobes than non-gelotophobes. These findings support the hypotheses 
H1a, and H1b.  
 
5.2.2 H2 Participants Will identify More Non-gelotophobe Emotional States Being 
Displayed Correctly than Gelotophobe Emotional States When Reacting to Expressions of 
Joy  
 
In examining whether participants were more able to correctly identify non-
gelotophobe emotional states compared to gelotophobes responding to expressions of joy, the 
GELOPH <15> score of the stimuli was used for analysis to also afford an investigation of 
difficulties across the GELOPH continuum. The unit of analysis was individual case trials 
rather than participants (n = 7334 participant trials). The independent variable was the 
GELOPH <15> score of the stimulus and the dependent variable was whether the stimulus 
was responded to incorrectly or correctly. As seen in Table 8, binary logistic regression 
indicates the GELOPH <15> score of the individuals in the emotional stimuli was a 
significant predictor of correctly identifying their emotion (χ² = 1062.02, df = 1, p < .001), 





Displays Binary Logistic Regression Analysis for the Relationship Between GELOPH <15> 
Score and the Number of Correct Emotions Identified 




-.879 .028 .415 [.393, 
.439] 
979.214*** 
Note. CI = confidence intervals for odds ratios (OR), *** = p < .001. Dichotomous variables 
as 0 = incorrect and 1 = correct. 
 
The findings from the binary logistic regression in Table 8 show the GELOPH <15> 
score of the individuals in the emotional stimuli was a significant predictor of correctly 
spotting their emotion. This indicates that as an individual’s level of gelotophobia increases 
the ability of others to identify their emotion decreases. Overall, these findings support the 
hypothesis that participants will correctly identify more non-gelotophobe emotional states 
being displayed than gelotophobe emotional states. 
 
5.2.3 H3 There Will be Significantly More Incorrect Responses for Gelotophobes 
Compared to Non-gelotophobes, When Asked if the Individual in the Emotional Stimulus 
Had Gelotophobia 
 
All participants were asked whether they thought the individual in each emotional 
stimulus had gelotophobia. The unit of analysis was individual case trials rather than 
participants. The independent variable was the presence of gelotophobia in the stimuli and the 
dependent variable was the frequency of correct and incorrect answers. As seen in Table 9, 
all answers were collated together and examined using a Chi square test of independence for 
overall answers and across incorrect and correct answers for gelotophobe and non-





Displays a Chi Square Test of Independence across Incorrect and Correct Answers for 
Gelotophobe and Non-Gelotophobe Emotional Stimuli  
 n Expected Incorrect Correct df χ2 
Overall 11162 5581.0 4482 6680 1   432.82*** 
Non-gelotophobes  5910 2955.0 1161 4749 1 2178.29*** 
Gelotophobes 5252 2626.0 3321 1931 1  367.88*** 
 
Note. n = number of participants trials, df = degrees of freedom, χ2 = Chi square score, *** = 
p < .001. 
The results in Table 9 show that overall, there were significantly more correct answers 
relating to whether the individuals in each emotional stimulus had gelotophobia. The number 
of correct and incorrect identifications for each gelotophobe and non-gelotophobe emotional 
stimulus was then examined separately. For non-gelotophobe emotional stimuli, the pattern 
held as there were significantly more correct identifications than incorrect. For the 
gelotophobe emotional stimuli, however, this pattern was reversed as there were significantly 
more incorrect identifications than correct. These findings show that, when asked whether an 
individual has gelotophobia, participants were able to identify when they did not, but they 
were unable to identify when they did. As such, the findings support the hypothesis that there 
will be significantly more incorrect responses for gelotophobes compared to non-
gelotophobes, indicating participants could not identify the presence of gelotophobia.  
5.2.4 H4 Counselling Psychology (CP) Participants Will Identify More Correct Emotional 
States Being Displayed by Gelotophobes than Non-psychology (NP) and Psychology Other 
(PO) Participants 
 
In examining whether CP participants will identify more correct emotional states 
being displayed by gelotophobes than NP and PO, the unit of analysis was participants (N 
=132), the independent variable was participant group, which had three levels: CP, NP, and 
PO, and the dependent variable was the number of emotional states identified correctly for 
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gelotophobes. A visual inspection of the correct emotional states for gelotophobes data 
(histogram, Appendix E) indicated the data were not normally distributed. A Shapiro-Wilk 
test of normality was computed, CP (p = .036), PO (p =.003), and NP (p =.126) and a 
skewness of CP -.826 (SE = .365), PO -1.235 (SE = .369), NP -.115 (SE = .340) and kurtosis 
of CP .943 (SE = .717), PO 2.517 (SE = .724), NP .423 (SE = .668). Skewness and kurtosis 
were then divided by its SE to identify how far the sample data are different from the normal 
distribution; ±1.96 limits were considered as normally distributed. Skewness of CP= -2.26, 
PO=-3.35, NP= -.33; kurtosis of CP= 1.31, PO= 3.47, NP=.633 confirmed the data were not 
normally distributed. Thus, a Kruskal-Wallis test was used instead of a parametric one-way 
ANOVA.  
A Kruskal-Wallis test showed there was a significant difference between groups (H 
(2) = 7.645, p= 0.22) in the number of correct gelotophobe emotional states identified. Post 
hoc pairwise comparisons were undertaken for 3 comparisons, thus the alpha threshold of .05 
was Bonferroni corrected by dividing this value by 3 = .0167. The analysis found CP group 
(Mdn =14, SD = 3.95) was significantly different (H = 21.156, SE = 7.993, p < .001) to NP 
group (Mdn = 13, SD = 2.85). There was a non-significant difference (H = 4.015, SE = 8.045, 
p = .615) between NP group (Md n = 13, SD = 2.85) and PO group (Mdn = 13, SD = 3.12) 
and non-significant difference (H = 17.106, SE = 8.345, p = .040) between PO group (Mdn 
=13, SD =3.12) and CP group (Mdn = 14, SD = 3.95). The results indicate that CP 
participants were significantly better at identifying the emotional states of gelotophobes than 
NP participants, but the differences between the CP and PO participant groups, and PO and 










In examining whether CP participants’ affective empathy was higher than NP and PO 
participants, the unit of analysis was participants (N =144), the independent variable was 
participant group, which had three levels: CP, NP, and PO, and the dependent variable was 
the participants’ affective empathy score (empathic concern). A visual inspection of the 
affective empathy data across occupation (histogram, Appendix F) indicated the data were 
not normally distributed. This was confirmed by a Shapiro-Wilk test of normality, CP (p = 
.002), PO (p = .007), and NP (p = .027), with a skewness of CP -1.088 (SE = .357), PO -
1.157 (SE = .350), NP .024 (SE = .325) and kurtosis of CP 1.836 (SE = .702), PO 2.850 (SE = 
.688), NP -.983 (SE = .639). Skewness and kurtosis were then divided by its SE to identify 
how far the sample data are different from the normal distribution; ±1.96 limits were 
considered as normally distributed. Skewness of CP = -3.04, PO = -3.30, NP = .07 and 
kurtosis of CP = 2.61, PO = 4.14, NP = -1.53 confirmed the data were not normally 
distributed. Thus, a Kruskal-Wallis test was used instead of a parametric one-way ANOVA.  
A Kruskal-Wallis test was calculated, which reported there was a non-significant 
(H(2) = .200, p = .948 ) difference in affective empathy scores across occupation: CP (Mdn = 
22.5, SD = 3.11), NP (Mdn = 22, SD = 3.43) and PO (Mdn = 23, SD = 3.40), indicating there 
was no difference in affective empathy levels between CP, NP, and PO groups.  
5.2.6 H5b CP Participants Will Have a Higher Level of Cognitive Empathy Than NP and 
PO Participants 
 
In examining whether CP Participants had a higher level of cognitive empathy than 
NP and PO Participants, the unit of analysis was participants (N = 144), the independent 
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variable was participant group, which had three levels: CP, NP, and PO, and the dependent 
variable was participants’ cognitive empathy score (EQ score). A Shapiro-Wilk test of 
normality was computed for cognitive empathy, CP (p = .042), PO (p = .001) and NP (p = 
.152), and a skewness of CP -.095 (SE = .357), PO -.744 (SE = .350), NP -.099 (SE = .325) 
and kurtosis of CP -.895 (SE = .702.), PO -.411 (SE = .688), NP -.076 (SE = .639). Skewness 
and kurtosis were then divided by its SE to identify how far the sample data are different 
from the normal distribution; ±1.96 limits were considered as normally distributed. Skewness 
of CP = -1.27, PO = -2.12, NP = -0.30 and kurtosis of CP = -1.27, PO = 0.60, NP = -.12 
confirmed the data were not normally distributed. Thus, a Kruskal-Wallis test was used 
instead of a parametric one-way ANOVA.  
A Kruskal-Wallis test for cognitive empathy found a significant (H(2) = 15.188, p = 
.001 ) difference between participant groups. Post hoc pairwise comparisons were undertaken 
for 3 comparisons, thus the alpha threshold of .05 was Bonferroni corrected by dividing this 
value by 3 = .0167. The analysis found the CP group (Mdn = 8, SD = 2.25) was significantly 
different (H = 32.009, SE = 8.300, p<.001) to the NP group (Mdn = 5, SD = 2.23). There was 
a non-significant difference (H = -13.080, SE = 8.723, p = .134) between the CP group (Mdn 
= 8, SD = 2.25) and the PO group (Mdn = 7, SD = 2.04), and a non-significant difference (H 
= 18.930, SE = 8.402, p = .024) between NP group (Mdn = 5, SD = 2.23) and PO group (Mdn 
= 7, SD = 2.04). These results indicate CP participants had a higher level of cognitive 
empathy compared to NP participants, whereas there was a non-significant difference in the 






5.2.7 H6a: Participants’ Affective Empathy Score Will Positively Correlate with The 
Correct Number of Emotions Identified 
 
In examining whether participants’ affective empathy score will positively correlate 
with the correct number of emotions identified, the unit of analysis was participants (N 
=132), the independent variable was participants’ affective empathy score, and the dependent 
variable was the number of correct emotions identified. Using the enter method, linear 
regression analysis was computed to explore whether participants’ affective empathy predicts 
the number of correct emotions identified. As seen in Table 10, A non-significant model 
emerged (F (1,130) = .106, p = .745).  
Table 10 
Displays Linear Regression Analysis for Affective Empathy and the Number of Correct 
Emotions Identified  
Variable B (SE) 95% CI β t 
(Constant) 39.175 (4.631) [30.013, 48.336]  8.460 
EC  .067 (.205) [-.338, .471] .029 .326 
 Note. R2 = .001, R2 adjusted = -.007. Confidence interval for B.    
 
Table 10 indicates greater affective empathy does not predict an increase in correct 
emotions identified.  
5.2.8 H6b Participants’ Cognitive Empathy Will Positively Correlate with the Correct 
Number of Emotions Identified  
 
In examining whether participants’ cognitive empathy score will positively correlate 
with the correct number of emotions identified, the unit of analysis was participants (N = 
132), the independent variable was participants’ cognitive empathy score, and the dependent 
variable was the number of correct emotions identified. Using the enter method, linear 
103 
 
regression analysis was computed to explore whether participants’ cognitive empathy 
predicted the number of correct emotions identified. Data met the assumptions of normally 
distributed residuals of the regression, homoscedasticity, and absence of multicollinearity. As 
seen in Table 11, a significant model emerged F(1,130) = 3.928, p = .050.  
Table 11 
Displays Linear Regression Analysis for Cognitive Empathy and the Number of Correct 
Emotions Identified  
Variable  B (SE) 95% CI β t 
(Constant) 34.459 (3.204) [28.120, 40.798]  10.755*** 
EQ  .126 (.063) [.000, .251] .171 1.982* 
 Note. R2 = .029, R2 adjusted = .022. Confidence interval for B. * = p=.05, *** = p < .001. 
 
Table 11 shows the model explains 2.9% of the variance in identifying the correct 
emotion. The number of correct emotions identified increased by .126 for each point increase 
in EQ score. These findings show there is a positive correlation between cognitive empathy 
and correct number of emotions recognised, where greater cognitive empathy predicts more 
correct emotions identified. 
5.2.9 H6c: Affective Empathy Will Mediate the Relationship Between Participant Group 
and the Correct Number of Emotions Identified. 
 
As H5a found the differences in affective empathy between CP, NP, and PO were non-
significant and H6a found affective empathy does not predict correctly identifying emotions, 
mediation analysis was not computed for whether affective empathy will mediate between 




5.2.10 H6d: Cognitive Empathy Will Mediate the Relationship Between Participant Group 
and the Correct Number of Emotions Identified.  
 
In examining whether cognitive empathy will mediate the relationship between 
participant group and the correct number of emotions identified, the unit of analysis was 
participants (N = 91), the independent variable was participant group, which had two levels: 
CP and NP, the dependent variable was the number of correct emotions identified, and the 
mediator was the participants’ cognitive empathy score. It should be noted the PO group was 
excluded from the mediation analysis as there was a non-significant difference between the PO 
and NP groups for cognitive empathy levels, as seen in H6a. As such, belonging to the CP and 
NP groups was used to predict the number of correct emotions identified with cognitive 
empathy expected to mediate this relationship. See Figure 2 for a visual diagram of mediated 
relationship. 
Using mediated procedures described by Hayes (2018), Model 4 PROCESS analysis 
was conducted This indicates that the a path of difference between groups (X) on emotional 
empathy (M) was significant (b = 5.17, t(89) = 2.51, p = .013). CP on average have greater 
levels of emotional empathy than NP. Additionally, the difference between groups (X) is 
significantly related to the number of correct emotions identified (Y), which is the c path b = 
4.75, t(88) = 2.91, p = .004. On average, CP correctly identified more emotions correctly than 
NP. This model indicates however the b path (M) to (Y) is non-significant (b = .042, t(89) = 
5.07, p = .613). The overall indirect effect was .222, 95% CI [-.554, 1.316] and the mediation 
proportion was 4.66%. These results indicate mediation has not occurred and as such 







Mediated Relationship Between CP and NP Group and the Number of Correct Emotions 









5.3 Summary of Key Findings 
The results found non-gelotophobes to have a significantly higher frequency of 
perceived happiness than gelotophobes, and gelotophobes to have a significantly higher 
frequency of perceived contempt than non-gelotophobes when responding to expressions of 
joy. There was a higher count of correct emotional states identified for non-gelotophobes than 
for gelotophobes, and the GELOPH <15> score of individuals in the relevant emotional 
stimulus was a significant predictor of correctly spotting their emotion, i.e., as the presence of 
gelotophobia increased, the number of correct emotions identified decreased. Participants 
were also unable to correctly identify the presence of gelotophobia when gelotophobia was 
present in the emotional stimulus; however, participants were correct when gelotophobia was 
not present in the emotional stimulus. 
CP participants identified significantly more emotional states of gelotophobes 
compared to NP participants, but the difference between CP and PO, and NP and PO 
Cognitive 
Empathy 
CP/NP Correct emotions 
identified 
a = 5.17 
c’ = 4.53 
b = .042 
 
 c = 4.75 
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participants was non-significant. CP participants also had a higher level of cognitive empathy 
compared to NP participants, although there was a non-significant difference in the cognitive 
empathy between CP and PO groups. Also, there was a non-significant difference between 
groups for affective empathy, with the PO group reporting the highest average score.  
Finally, there was a non-significant relationship between affective empathy and 
emotional states correctly identified. There was a significant relationship between 
participants’ cognitive empathy and correct number of emotions recognised, where greater 
cognitive empathy predicts more correct emotions identified. However, when this 
relationship was explored further via mediation analysis, although there was a significant 
relationship between participant group and cognitive empathy, and participant group and 
number of correct emotions recognised, there was a non-significant relationship between 
cognitive empathy and number of correct emotions recognised. Thus, the mediation analysis 
indicated cognitive empathy was not mediating between participant group and the number of 




























6.1 Summary and Integration of Findings 
 
This study used a quasi-experimental quantitative approach which structured its 
investigation into two parts. The first part related to gelotophobia and examined participants’ 
perceptions of gelotophobes’ and non-gelotophobes’ facial affect when reacting to 
expressions of joy, as well as investigating whether their perceptions were correct. 
Participants were also asked whether they could identify the gelotophobes reacting to joy. 
The second part of the study looked to examine whether the empathic underpinnings of 
counselling psychology afforded greater empathy and, in turn, is a predictive factor in the 
facial recognition of the emotions of gelotophobes. In undertaking the second part of the 
research, it examined all aspects of the causal chain in terms of affective and cognitive levels 
of empathy between participant groups, the number of correct emotions identified between 
participant groups, and whether empathy levels predict the number of correct emotions 
identified. Finally, it examined whether empathy mediated the relationship between 
participant group and the number of correct emotions identified. Participants were presented 
with emotional stimuli appropriated from a prior study of gelotophobes and non-
gelotophobes undertaking an emotional elicitation task responding to expressions of joy. 
Participants were asked to identify what emotion the individual in the screenshot was 
displaying, which had been coded prior using FACS to establish the correct emotion. 
Participants were also asked to complete three questionnaires measuring affective empathy, 
cognitive empathy, and their level of gelotophobia.  
The first hypothesis was split into two parts to investigate whether participants would 
perceive non-gelotophobes to have significantly higher counts of happiness compared to 
gelotophobes and whether they would perceive gelotophobes to have significantly higher 
counts of contempt compared to non-gelotophobes when responding to expressions of joy. 
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The frequency of perceived happiness and contempt was examined across all gelotophobe 
and non-gelotophobe emotional stimuli. The focus of this analysis was on participants’ 
perception of emotion, rather than whether they were correct in their perception. A significant 
relationship was found between emotional state perceived and the presence of gelotophobia. 
Overall, participants tended to perceive the emotional stimulus to be happy when responding 
to expressions of joy. When examined across groups, however, the non-gelotophobes were 
indeed perceived to be significantly happier, as the frequency of perceived happiness for 
gelotophobes dropped by 50% in comparison to the non-gelotophobes. There were also 
significantly larger frequencies of perceived contempt for the gelotophobes. As such, 
participants did perceive non-gelotophobes to have significantly higher counts of happiness 
compared to gelotophobes, and gelotophobes to have significantly higher counts of contempt 
compared to non-gelotophobes, when responding to expressions of joy. 
These findings are in keeping with Platt et al. (2013) who had previously found 
gelotophobes responded with less facially displayed joy (Duchenne display) compared to 
non-gelotophobes when responding to laughter-emitting, enjoyable emotions. Hofmann et al. 
(2015) used FACS when investigating smile misattribution and facial responses, as well as 
rating images for contempt and joy. They also found gelotophobes rated joy smiles as less 
joyful and more contemptuous. Moreover, gelotophobes showed less facial joy and more 
contempt markers. This was further supported by Ruch et al. (2015) who examined whether 
the lower levels of joy and higher levels of contempt were specifically related to joy or other 
aspects of joy associated with laughter. They investigated the verbal and facial responses of 
gelotophobes and non-gelotophobes reacting to people recalling memories of laughter-
eliciting, positive emotions. The participants were filmed clandestinely and coded with 
FACS. Once more, gelotophobe participants were found to have fewer joyful smiles and 
more expressions of contempt. 
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 Platt and Ruch (2009), examined German and English adults and found a relationship 
between level of gelotophobia and amount of joyful experience in their lives: Gelotophobes’ 
most joyful experiences were of a lower intensity than the ones for non-gelotophobes. Also, 
their most intense experiences of joy also happened in conjunction with a higher latency, thus 
taking longer to begin and not lasting as long, and their level of joy was less facially 
expressed. It is also in keeping with clinical observations that gelotophobes express less joy, 
are less animated, and can appear cold and detached (Titze, 2009). There is some evidence 
that gelotophobes tend to be less ‘lively’ or are humourless (Ruch, Beermann et al., 2009), 
although this has also been attributed to humour type as gelotophobes have been found to be 
introverts (Ruch et al., 2013). The present findings, therefore, are in keeping with previous 
findings of gelotophobes showing less facial joy and more contempt, although it should be 
noted there was more variability in responses overall, with greater incidence of disgust, fear, 
and sadness for gelotophobes. The slight divergence from previous research is unsurprising 
as previously findings were generated from FACS measurement of what emotions were being 
displayed, whereas current findings differ as they were generated from participants’ 
perceptions of gelotophobes and non-gelotophobes responding to expressions of joy. The 
present findings contribute to previous research by widening the understanding of how social 
partners perceive gelotophobes when responding to expressions of joy and can have 
implications for informing psychological interventions for gelotophobes with interpersonal 
relationships.  
The findings also have some crossover with trauma research, which has found that 
individuals with a PTSD diagnosis often experience some emotional numbing, which is a 
persistent inability to experience positive emotions (American Psychiatric Association, 
2013), and as such, show less positive affect to positive stimulus (Frewen et al., 2012). It has 
been suggested that emotional numbing results from the avoidance of trauma-related stimuli, 
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thus avoiding distressing emotions (Keane et al., 1985). Emotional numbing, therefore, is 
believed to be a defence from experiencing trauma and relates to dissociation (Litz & Gray, 
2002). As gelotophobia is believed to be precipitated by repeated experiences of trauma via 
ridicule, then some of the reduced perceptions of happiness may be resulting from emotional 
numbing rather than just a skewed perception of joy. Also, individuals that have experienced 
trauma tend to be sensitive to shame-related external and internal threats (Gilbert & Procter, 
2006). Defences from shame-related threats can include acting rude, aggressive, being 
unlikeable/unfriendly, and acting aloof (Lee & James, 2013). It could be argued that 
displaying contempt markers within interpersonal interactions is a defence to keep social 
partners at a distance. Trauma and gelotophobia, however, appear to diverge with difficulties 
decoding: Individuals who have experienced trauma have typically been found to have 
difficulties with decoding facial affect relating to fear and sadness (Poljac et al., 2011), unlike 
gelotophobes who have difficulties relating to joy. The crossover in the reduced experiences 
of positive affect, however, indicate that further investigation of the link between 
gelotophobia and trauma could be beneficial, especially as at present there is a dearth of 
research in this area.   
The second hypothesis examined whether participants would identify more non-
gelotophobe emotional states being displayed correctly than gelotophobe emotional states 
when responding to expressions of joy. Binary logistic regression supported this view as it 
found that the presence of gelotophobia in the emotional stimulus related to correctly 
identifying the emotional state. That is, as the person’s level of gelotophobia increased, the 
likelihood of others correctly identifying their emotional state decreased. Gelotophobes have 
previously been found to have difficulties decoding facial expressions due to a negative 
attribution bias affecting perception (Platt, 2008; Ruch, Altfreder et al., 2009), and this 
112 
 
negative attribution hinders gelotophobes’ interpersonal interactions (Platt & Forabosco, 
2014).  
The findings, however, that the level of gelotophobia inversely relates to participants’ 
ability to identify the correct emotion, indicates that gelotophobes also have difficulty 
encoding emotions. Metacommunication required for greater success in interpersonal 
interactions requires both encoding and decoding of facial expressions (Zuckerman et al., 
1975; Zuckerman et al., 1976). Thus, gelotophobes not only have difficulty interpreting 
signals of communication necessary for successful social interactions, but they also have 
difficulty encoding emotions, which leads to other individuals having difficulty decoding and 
inferring their emotional states and responding accordingly (Smith et al., 2005).  
The presence of gelotophobia predicting others’ inability to decode an individual’s 
emotional state could be an extra factor in the development of gelotophobia, as well as 
indicating a factor in understanding gelotophobes’ difficulties in maintaining relationships. 
The initial explanations of the development of gelotophobia were attributed to putative causes 
and consequences based on clinical interviews (Ruch, 2004; Titze, 2009). This was 
developed further, moving away from linear explanations towards a systemic approach 
moderated by micro, meso, and macro factors, as well as incorporating feedback loops (Ruch, 
Hofmann et al., 2014). Ordinarily, individuals look to manage their self-presentation to 
control social partners perceptions and, in turn, how they engage with them (Schlenker, 
2012). Gelotophobes, however, become hypervigilant of others, with self-observation 
inducing increased self-control, in their efforts to try to reduce the chance others will perceive 
them as ridiculous which, in turn, may induce further feelings of humiliation (Renner & 
Heydasch, 2011). This maladaptive behaviour makes gelotophobes appear to act atypically 
(oddly), resulting in others perceiving them as acting funny and thus forming the basis of 
further ridicule (Ruch, Hofmann et al., 2014). This aspect of gelotophobia, therefore, shares 
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traits of social phobia with a maladaptive behaviour cycle that has a primary aim to avoid 
derision by withdrawing and internalising, but gelotophobia differs from social phobia by 
having a specific precipitator of laughter (Platt et al., 2012).  
The findings of others not being able to identify gelotophobes’ emotions also indicate 
an additional factor within the developmental feedback loop, where social partners are unable 
to recognise gelotophobes’ discomfort when being ‘teased’ and, therefore, empathy is not 
induced which ordinarily inhibits social partners’ laugher. In this sense, social partners may 
not be able to identify what is just playful teasing (banter) to them, is inducing feelings of 
shame and humiliation in gelotophobes. This is consistent with research into bullying which 
has found that the victims tend to have deficits in displays of facial affect which could not 
only invoke protective responses from peers but might lead to the bullying lasting for 
extended periods (Cowie & Berdondini, 2002). The role of correct encoding and decoding of 
facial affect has also been witnessed in criminal offending behaviour, where research has 
found that sexual offenders are less able to recognise the correct facial emotions of others 
(Gery et al., 2009) and, as such, this may contribute to offending behaviour as they do not 
receive the correct facial signals inducing empathy.  
Typically, when responding to bullying, young people invoke strategies of fighting 
back, telling a teacher/caregiver, or telling a friend (Black et al., 2010). Gelotophobes, 
however, typically do not confront agents of laughter themselves (Platt et al., 2012); rather 
they have atypical presentation which Titze (1996) referred to as ‘Pinocchio Complex’ where 
they act wooden like mannequins. This defence is in keeping with the fight-flight-freeze 
response, which are behaviours occurring in the presence of a threat. Freezing, tonic 
immobility, is thought to be an evolved response to ‘play dead’ to avoid attack and 
incorporates both motor and vocal inhibition (Schmidt et al., 2008). Should this defence be 
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activated, however, to deal with the perceived shame induced by laughter, gelotophobes 
affect would not be communicated effectively.  
Wilton et al. (2000) found that displays of sadness and surprise were most common 
when children were experiencing bullying, and that when bullies were met with incongruent 
joyful expressions it had a propensity to continue the attack. When confronted with non-
aggressive bullying, Schwartz et al. (1993) found victims tended to respond with submissive 
facial features displaying fear and distress via crying. When victims responded with a blank 
face, however, it particularly affected their peers as they perceived the victim to be strange 
(Cowie & Berdondini, 2002). This is of particular salience to gelotophobes as bullying 
prevention programs which focus on empowering peers to intervene found that several 
factors influence whether a peer would intervene in bullying, including the perceived 
seriousness of the situation, the peer’s own experience of being bullied and if the bullying is 
aimed at a friend (Stives et al., 2018). As such, if peers are not able to assess the level of 
discomfort experienced by gelotophobes via facial affect, it could inhibit any intervention. In 
addition, should gelotophobes react with a defence of freezing and having a blank face, as 
referred to with the Pinocchio Complex, it could further alienate them from their peers, thus 
compounding and maintaining their interpersonal difficulties.  
A recent preliminary study which examined the association between arousal, self-
report of anxiety, and facial expressions among autistic adolescents supports the position that 
encoding deficits impacts on interpersonal interactions. They found autistic adolescents’ 
facial expressions did not coincide with their arousal. The authors suggested this has 
implications for understanding social communication difficulties among autistic adolescents 
(Jain et al., 2019). That is, autistic individuals are often aware they have a heightened arousal, 
but they are not showing it, leading to others not adjusting their behaviour and, in turn, 
leading to further dysregulated behaviour from ASD individuals and by others accordingly. 
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This study utilised a small sample and did have some methodological issues as the kappa 
coefficient between coders indicated a lack of consistency. However, given there is a large 
overlap between ASD and gelotophobia, it indicates a need for further research into the role 
of deficits in facial affect encoding. This could be beneficial in expanding the understanding 
of the aetiology, and perpetuating factors, of gelotophobia, and it also gives a further 
indication of the systemic nature of gelotophobia.   
It has previously been highlighted that there is a need to recognise how gelotophobia 
manifests in school settings resulting from bullying which has been found across all ages and 
from gelotophobes, peer reports, teacher ratings, and adults (Platt, Proyer et al., 2009; Proyer 
et al., 2010; Proyer, Meier et al., 2013). Resulting from these studies, there have been further 
suggestions of a need for targeted intervention programs in schools increasing the awareness 
of the potential harm and long-lasting impact of being the object of ridicule, as a preventative 
measure (Platt et al., 2016). This is something this research echoes, but the current findings 
also highlight that the potential benefits of teaching young people how to communicate, and 
manage, their emotions in a more helpful manner could help induce greater empathy in others 
and be a protective factor in bullying.  
Gelotophobes have been found to have a higher probability of being single than non-
gelotophobes, and this was consistent across all ages (Platt & Forabosco, 2012; Ruch & 
Proyer, 2008). This pattern has largely been attributed to gelotophobes disengaging from 
romantic relationships when they encounter a smile, or laughter, following misattributing its 
meaning (Platt et al., 2016). However, it would also be expected that internal working models 
(IWM) developed via experiences with attachment figures would form expectations regarding 
relationships, which can lead to internalising negative expectations of self and others 
(Bowlby, 1982). Individuals with an avoidant attachment style have been found to inhibit 
their emotional closeness by disengaging from partners and suppressing feelings to prevent 
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feeling vulnerable (Tan et al., 2012). Their attachment anxiety informs negatively biased 
perceptions that shape the activating of defences towards romantic partners (Overall et al., 
2015). The present findings indicate, however, that gelotophobes’ difficulties with 
relationships may not be due to them merely misinterpreting others’ emotions or having 
negative expectations, as with IWMs and attachment anxiety, but it can also relate to social 
partners not being able to recognise gelotophobes’ emotions and further points to 
gelotophobia being maintained by systemic feedback loops.  
Highlighting the role of system in the construction of gelotophobia not only has the 
benefit of offering an intervention in the system but it also helps externalise difficulties and, 
in turn, validates the difficult experiences of individuals with a heightened fear of being 
laughed at. If gelotophobia emerges and is maintained by an individual’s system and, their 
defences to a perceived hostile system, then the term gelotophobe, should it continued to be 
used, needs to be bracketed with an explanatory narrative highlighting that the problem is not 
merely within the individual; rather it is a difficulty/defence resulting from complex 
intersubjective interactions. Previous research in gelotophobia postulated that the 
development of gelotophobia happens across micro, meso, and macro levels and incorporates 
systemic feedback loops (Ruch et al., 2014); there is a danger, however, that should the term 
gelotophobia become a diagnostic label, it could locate any difficulty within the individual 
and navigate research, and interventions, away from the social system being the precipitating 
factors of unhappiness (Hare-Mustin & Marecek, 1997). This research has also seen that 
where an individual sits on the continuum of gelotophobia relates to the level of impact on 
interpersonal interpretations of facial affect. It is important to continue the propagation of 
gelotophobia occurring on a continuum and is an experience all people have to different 
degrees, in order to inhibit stigma. 
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Hypothesis 3 postulated that if gelotophobia was present it would not be identified. 
When this data was collated and analysed together, initially the results showed that, overall, 
participants were able to accurately state whether the individual in the emotional stimulus had 
gelotophobia, which seemed to support the null hypothesis. However, participants’ answers 
for the gelotophobe and non-gelotophobe emotional stimuli were examined separately and 
there was a stark difference. For the non-gelotophobe stimuli, participants displayed a 
significantly high level of accuracy in determining that the individual did not have 
gelotophobia. This pattern, however, was reversed for the gelotophobe emotional stimuli, as 
participants were significantly inaccurate in their assessment of when gelotophobia was 
present. As such, this study found that when gelotophobia was present, participants were not 
able to identify it, although it is interesting that participants were so accurate in their 
assessment when gelotophobia was not present.  
At present, there is still a lack of awareness regarding gelotophobia despite research 
finding its presence across cultures, nationalities, and in clinical and non-clinical populations 
(Proyer et al., 2009). In clinical practice, there is also a lack of awareness of gelotophobia as 
patients tend to underreport it and it is not included in any diagnostic manuals, further adding 
to a lack of awareness (Platt et al., 2016). Moreover, some clinical psychologists, 
psychotherapists, and psychiatrists doubt its existence (Platt, 2013). This lack of awareness, 
therefore, means the knowledge of how it presents within metacommunication when 
responding to expressions of joy has not been disseminated. The non-gelotophobes in the 
emotional stimuli tended to have typically happy facial configurations; given that participants 
were told the research was examining gelotophobia and it was explained that this was the 
heightened fear of being laughed at, it is logical they used happy configurations as a 
contextual clue that the individual was as a non-gelotophobe. Whereas, with the 
gelotophobes, their facial configurations were far more mixed; although happy expressions 
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were included, there were more incidents of contempt facial displays which participants were 
less accurate in assessing. As such, although participants could use the presence of being 
happy as an indicator of an individual not having gelotophobia, they did not have any 
reference point as to how someone with gelotophobia presents, which is fitting with the 
mixed results. This highlights a need to disseminate further the difficulties individuals face 
when experiencing the heightened fear of being laughed at and how it presents, which is not 
yet in the awareness of most clinicians working in a psychotherapeutic manner; furthermore, 
this has implications for therapeutic relationships. This also lends further support to the idea 
of there being an extra factor at a micro level, of the development of gelotophobia within the 
feedback loops, as not only were participants not able to correctly identify gelotophobes’ 
emotions, but they were also not able to identify the presence of gelotophobia.  
The second part of the study looked to examine whether the empathic underpinnings 
of counselling psychology afforded greater empathy and, in turn, is a predictive factor in the 
facial recognition of the emotions of gelotophobes. In doing this, it started by examining 
whether CP participants would identify more emotional states of gelotophobes being 
displayed correctly than NP and PO participants (hypothesis 4). The results found a 
significant difference between CP and NP groups, but there was a non-significant difference 
between NP and PO groups, and PO and CP groups. These findings showed that, on average, 
CP participants did indeed identify more correct emotional states of the gelotophobe 
emotional stimuli compared to NP, thus indicating that the empathic underpinning of CP 
participants may be enabling greater recognition of emotions. CP also identified more correct 
facial emotional states than the PO group, albeit the difference was non-significant; it is 
difficult to draw conclusions from this given there is an array of professions in the PO group 
including some from a therapeutic background.  
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It should be noted, however, the accuracy level for the CP participants in identifying 
the correct emotion of the gelotophobe stimuli was only 58.33%, and NP and PO had an 
accuracy of 54.16%. Given all stimuli used in this analysis met the FACS criteria for basic 
emotions, it is interesting that participants’ accuracy levels dropped dramatically for 
gelotophobe participants. It is known that gelotophobes tend to have an atypical presentation; 
as such, although the atypical presentations within the emotional stimuli that did not meet the 
FACS strict criteria for a basic emotion were excluded when analysing the correct emotions, 
their presence within the study may have primed participants’ perceptions of the gelotophobe 
emotional stimuli. Alternatively, the only emotion displayed for the non-gelotophobe 
emotional stimuli was the state of being happy which is what would be expected when 
responding to expressions of joy. However, within the gelotophobe participants there were 
more expressions of contempt and, as such, participants may have been experiencing greater 
difficulty recognising other emotions. This is in keeping with previous research which has 
found that individuals tend to decode happy face displays quicker and more accurately. The 
basic emotions have been compared to each other and recognition accuracy was at its highest 
for happy expressions, both for closed-mouth and open-mouth displays of happiness 
(Tottenham et al., 2009); this pattern increases linearly when the time in which the emotional 
stimulus is presented is decreased (Calvo & Lundqvist, 2008). This would still have 
implications for gelotophobes, however, as others would still be less likely to perceive their 
emotion correctly and thus, once again, empathy would not be induced.       
The findings of hypothesis 4 that CP participants identified more correct emotional 
states compared to NP initially appear to be contrary to the previous research of Hutchison 
and Gerstein (2012). They found that there was no significant difference between counselling 
trainees and other undergraduate students in rating the emotion of individuals. The difference 
in the level of clinical experience of participants may account for the difference in the current 
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findings. The participants in the study seemingly had limited or no training and limited or no 
clinical experience of working with patients in a therapeutic manner. In the present research, 
however, CP participants were either qualified counselling psychologists or were doctorate-
level trainees who at the very least had completed a humanistic module, which ordinarily 
means in the UK that they would have completed a year of training at doctorate level. A first-
year counselling psychology trainee at the University of Wolverhampton would be expected 
to have between 80–150 hours of one-to-one psychotherapeutic work with patients in their 
first year. In addition, they also would be expected to already have a level 2 certificate in 
counselling and at least six months’ experience or 100 hours of equivalent experience of one-
to-one therapeutic work with patients. By the end of the doctorate training, they are required 
to have achieved 450 hours of one-to-one psychotherapeutic work with patients.  
Hutchison and Gerstein (2012) also suggested a parsimonious reason for the non-
significant difference in their findings in terms of a ceiling affect, as both of their groups 
were reporting an accuracy rate above 80%. Interestingly, in the present study, overall 
participants averaged a 74.13% accuracy rate in identifying the correct emotions. Although 
this is above the 70% mark used for determining the accuracy of universality in emotion 
recognition (Wolfgang & Cohen, 1988), the accuracy level was affected by the presence of 
gelotophobia. When examined further, participants’ average accuracy rate for the non-
gelotophobe emotional stimuli was 86.76% when identifying the correct emotion, whereas 
participants’ average accuracy rate for gelotophobe emotional stimuli was only 54.16%. It 
may be that the presence of gelotophobia, and thus more incongruent presentations of 
responding to joy, may be providing more of an opportunity for clinical judgement to display 
its ability, whereas universal displays of emotion are more likely to induce ceiling effects by 
its very nature.  
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Decoding metacommunication from clients is helpful for active listening and building 
therapeutic relationships. This is not merely a one-way process of clients sending 
communication to the therapist to decode but also therapists sending messages to clients to 
decode (Del Giacco et al., 2020). These findings, therefore, have potential difficulties for 
therapy: although CP participants were able to identify more correct emotions, their accuracy 
was much lower for gelotophobes and, as such, there is an increased risk of therapists 
misidentifying gelotophobes’ emotions and the potential for miscommunication to fracture 
the therapeutic relationship.  
Active listening, a core skill of counselling, is necessary to build and maintain a 
positive therapeutic relationship and is linked to positive therapeutic outcomes (de Roten et 
al., 1999). In undertaking active listening, a therapist needs to be present in the moment and 
monitoring internal metacognition, whilst attending to the client’s communication. This 
requires not just parroting clients’ utterances but rather demonstrating listening by 
simultaneously attending to metacommunication, affective messages, and patterns of 
behaviour (Beck & Kulzer, 2018). Should therapists not be able to discern gelotophobe facial 
affect, therefore, it could have a direct impact on the success of therapy. Research has found 
therapist interventions relating to metacommunication facilitate positive therapeutic outcomes 
(Li et al., 2016) and, as such, not recognising any distress following a smile may lead not 
only to fracturing of the therapeutic relationship but also to a missed opportunity for an 
intervention. This finding then is in keeping with the assertion by Platt et al. (2016) that 
gelotophobes drop out of therapy early due to the therapeutic relationship being fractured by 
metacommunication issues. This is also in line with research which examined the factors 
leading to early psychotherapeutic dropouts, i.e., therapy having a negative impact on client 
self-esteem, therapeutic relationship issues, and therapists not clarifying experiences (Kegel 
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& Flückiger, 2014). In gelotophobes, a therapist’s reassuring smile or laugh could induce 
feelings of shame, thus affecting self-esteem and leading to a discontinuation of therapy.  
In combating the difficulties, it is important for therapists to be present in the moment, 
remain curious, reflect, and check in regularly with clients to inhibit any 
metacommunications issues and misunderstandings. Moreover, integrating a specific cross-
sectional formulation relating to interpersonal interactions and context would be beneficial, 
highlighting further areas of exploration and indicate a direction for interventions, when 
working on an individual level (Kuyken et al., 2011). This should not distract, however, from 
acknowledging that gelotophobia is constructed by the system and, as such, in therapeutic 
terms would ideally benefit from a systemic intervention involving all aspects of a system. 
Furthermore, preventative measures are much needed in respect of continued education 
within schools and with caregivers as to the potential harm of what others perceive as playful 
banter or teasing.  
Previous research has suggested that psychologists should be aware of incongruent 
affect as it is an indicator of a need for further investigation within therapeutic sessions 
(Foley& Gentile, 2010). Although the findings in the present research echo that suggestion, 
particularly for gelotophobes, they also draw attention to the issue of it being more difficult to 
identify atypical presentations: although CP participants were significantly more able to 
correctly identify emotions than NP, they had more difficulty correctly identifying 
gelotophobes’ atypical metacommunication, as did NP and PO groups. As such, the finding 
that accuracy rate in correctly identifying facial affect decreases for incongruent facial affect, 
has implications for therapy in general, with possible opportunities for interventions going 
unnoticed, and the potential to fracture the therapeutic relationship. Non-verbal 
communication in therapy, however, also includes other factors: paralanguage – voice tone, 
pacing, and volume; proximity – attending to the client’s body positioning; posture – body 
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orientation and angle, back posture, hand placement, leg placement, and position in a chair; 
and autonomic displays – sweat production, flushed face, blotchy skin, shallow breathing, 
stomach noises, and crying (Beck & Kulzer, 2018). None of these factors is assessed in the 
present research and, therefore, the diminished communication may be inhibiting correctly 
identifying the incongruent emotions.  
It is postulated that it is clinically important that therapists have an accurate awareness 
of clients’ experience of the therapeutic relationship, given it is a strong predictor of the 
outcome of therapy (Horvath et al., 2011). Therapists have been found to be inaccurate in 
assessing the level of therapeutic alliance with a client, with therapists consistently 
underestimating the level of alliance (Hartmann et al., 2015; Tryon et al., 2007). The 
evidence, however, suggested that this had minimal effect on the outcome of therapy 
(Fitzpatrick et al., 2005; Marmarosh & Kivlighan, 2012), as it was suggested to have resulted 
from therapists having a realistic perception of the therapeutic process, whereas clients’ 
perception incorporates more hope (Horvath et al., 2011). There is, however, a paucity of 
research examining the ability of therapists to accurately identify incongruent affect; given it 
is an important factor within therapy, it seems a much-needed area of research.     
An alternative explanation as to why the percentage of correct answers for 
gelotophobes was so low could be the lack of social context. That is, previous research has 
found that context can influence individuals’ perceptions of facial affect (Barrett & 
Kensinger, 2010). In this study, contextual confounds were controlled by the emotional 
stimulus being filmed through a peephole, thus reducing how much of the room was visible; 
the room also had a plain background and was filmed in a standard interview setting. It could 
be, however, that the lack of context, albeit with good intentions, inhibited participants from 
being able to utilise context to disambiguate the facial affect presented, as one would in a 
social interaction. This is especially true for perceptions of affect within the context of a 
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group, as research has shown greater cultural differences in affect decoding in groups, and 
that perceptions of facial affect can be magnified in intensity when witnessed in a group 
(Hess et al., 2015). It is also unknown whether the role of cultural nonverbal ‘accent’ plays a 
role in the present study; this is where cultures exhibit subtle differences in encoding and 
decoding emotions (Marsh et al., 2003). There is some evidence that accuracy levels are 
higher when the encoder and decoder are from the same national or ethnic group (Elfenbein 
& Ambady, 2002). In the present study, many participants identified their ethnicity as outside 
of the United Kingdom’; however, Qualtrics’ online platform recorded that all participants 
used the English version of the software. This is important as meta-analysis of emotion 
recognition, within and across cultures, has found that in-group advantages in recognition of 
emotions is mediated by exposure to the respective culture (Elfenbein & Ambady, 2002). As 
such, given that all participants were able to speak English, it would indicate some level of 
exposure to Western cultures, thus helping to inhibit any differences. It would be beneficial 
for future research, however, to examine this study with more contextual information as well 
as examining whether results are consistent across cultural backgrounds.   
The next part of the causal chain examined was the levels of empathy between CP, 
NP, and PO groups. In doing this, hypothesis 5 was split into two parts and cognitive and 
affective empathy were examined separately, as there is evidence that cognitive empathy is 
more susceptible to change from person-centred training than affective empathy (Platt & 
Keller, 1994). Hypothesis 5a was that the CP group would have higher levels of affective 
empathy than the NP and PO groups. This hypothesis was not upheld as there was a non-
significant difference between groups and, as such, the null hypothesis of there being no 
difference between CP and NP groups was accepted. The PO group on average reported the 
highest empathic concern scores measuring affective empathy, albeit only .50 greater than the 
CP group; the NP group reported the lowest empathic concern score on average. This 
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indicates that there was no significant difference in affective empathy between groups in the 
present study. It may be, however, that ceiling effects are impacting on this aspect of the 
study with all three groups scoring relatively high. Empathic concern measures an 
individual’s level of compassion and, as such, for an individual to be willing to participate in 
a study of this ilk, which necessitated taking some time out of their day, it may have self-
selected more compassionate individuals, especially as this data were collected online, thus 
participants would feel no other pressure to continue if they lost interest.  
These current findings relating to affective empathy are not in keeping with Hall et al. 
(2000) who examined dispositional empathy of clinical psychologist and psychotherapist 
practitioners registered with the American Psychological Association (APA) compared to 
experimental psychologists. They found practitioners engaging in therapy reported higher 
empathic concern (affective empathy) and higher levels of perspective taking when compared 
to their academic counterparts. It should be noted, however, the average score reported for 
each group in the present study was higher than any other groups in the Hall et al. (2000) 
study. Also, the experimental psychologists scored significantly higher in personal distress 
and Hall et al. suggested the higher personal distress found in the experimental psychologists 
related to individuals self-selecting into experimental psychology rather than the clinical 
division. Youniss et al. (1985) found that academics tended to be more theoretical, 
achievement focused, less altruistic, and less other-person-oriented as compared to clinical 
practitioners, and they suggested that lower affective empathy may be a defence strategy in 
dealing with the higher levels of personal distress. If this were the case, the different 
occupational samples within the Hall et al. (2000) study could account for differences with 
the present study.  
Secondly, hypothesis 5b examined the hypothesis that CP participants would have a 
higher level of cognitive empathy than NP and PO participants. CP participants did indeed 
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report significantly higher cognitive empathy compared to the NP participants. It should be 
noted that the PO group, however, had only a one-point difference from the CP group, but the 
difference between the PO participants and NP participants was not statistically significant. 
This is in keeping with research which has found a link between learning, and delivering, 
counselling skills, such as active listening, with increased empathy levels (Cutcliffe & 
Cassedy, 1999; DePue & Lambie, 2014; Eres et al., 2015; Ivey & Daniels, 2016; Ivey et al., 
2010; Lyons & Hazier 2002; Moreno-Poyato et al., 2017). Empathy in counselling 
psychology, defined as the ability to experience and understand clients’ feelings, is related to 
the core conditions of therapy and active listening skills (Horvath & Bedi, 2002). As such, 
although counselling psychologists’ teaching on non-verbal cues is limited, the present 
findings are in keeping with previous research which has found person-centred routes may be 
affording greater empathy levels and with research that has found a link between empathy 
and ability to identify emotions (Besel & Yuille, 2010).  
An alternative explanation to person-centred counselling training increasing cognitive 
empathy is that more empathic individuals are drawn into therapeutic professions. 
Motivational theory suggests that individuals with certain characteristics are drawn to 
professions consistent with these characteristics (Holland, 1996). Research focusing on the 
motivation of psychotherapists for entering the career found evidence that therapists have a 
greater than average need to understand others and human behaviour (Farber et al., 2005). 
The fact the PO participants also reported a higher level of empathy than the NP may support 
this, although the difference between the PO and NP was non-significant. It is difficult to 
draw conclusions regarding the PO group, given there was such an array of experience and 
expertise amongst its participants; although there were some qualified clinical, forensic, 




A further explanation could be seen in a study from Daw and Joseph (2009) which 
investigated the relationship between psychological mindedness and desirable therapist 
attributes. They found psychological mindedness is related to therapist self-understanding, 
clinician empathy, and therapeutic alliance. Psychological mindedness was also negatively 
related with self-understanding recognition scores, which indicates that positive therapist 
attributes are related to psychological mindedness. As such, reflective practice and personal 
development could be contributing to differences in cognitive empathy. In counselling 
psychology training, a salient focus is put on personal development. In the process of 
training, individuals undertake a personal development module spanning three academic 
years and are also expected to undertake 40 hours of personal therapy, as well as operating as 
reflective practitioners, which includes keeping ongoing process notes to reflect on one’s own 
feelings and actions. Clinical psychology also operates from a reflective practice stance 
(Fisher et al., 2015); however, with only five fully qualified clinical psychologists making up 
the PO group, it is not possible to ascertain whether these assumptions hold true for that 
population. 
Greater empathy levels in counselling psychologists could have implications for 
practice. Elliott et al. (2018) found from multiple meta-analyses that empathy is a moderately 
strong predictor of the success of therapy and, as such, greater empathy levels have the 
potential to facilitate better outcomes in therapy. Empathy on its own, however, they 
suggested is not enough for positive outcomes; rather, positive therapeutic outcomes 
incorporate therapists who are empathically attuned to clients’ experiences rather than just 
their words, and who pay attention to unspoken nuances. Empathic responses necessitate 
therapists to constantly monitor and adjust their perceptions, and understandings, by paying 
attention to the client’s experience and emerging feelings (Kennedy-Moore &Watson, 1999). 
Moreover, to convey empathy therapists need to understand their patient’s experience, 
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including their feelings and cognitive state, and should there be errors in this process it will 
inhibit therapists from conveying empathy, which once more will impact on the therapeutic 
relationship (Beck & Kulzer, 2018). This then links back to the need for accuracy in judging 
a client’s communication of affect. In conjunction with this, there is a need to adjust the level 
of empathic response depending on the client’s past experience, as some clients find too 
much empathy unsettling (Kennedy-Moore &Watson, 1999). These factors for incorporating 
empathy into therapy would also be beneficial for working with gelotophobes, with attention 
being paid to the client’s non-verbal experience, and constantly adjusting perception by 
paying attention to the client’s experience could help identify gelotophobes’ incongruent 
response to a reassuring smile.    
This study also examined the link between empathy and the ability to identify facial 
affect. This was done to substantiate the assumption within this research that there is a causal 
chain involving empathy and the ability to recognise facial affect. In doing this, the 
hypothesis was split into four parts, it firstly looked at the relationship between cognitive and 
affective empathy with the number of correct emotions identified, before examining whether 
cognitive and affective empathy mediated the groups’ ability to identify correct emotions. A 
significant relationship was found between cognitive empathy and correctly identified 
emotions; however, there was a non-significant relationship between affective empathy and 
the ability to identify facial affect. Cognitive empathy predicating the correct identification of 
facial affect was fitting with previous research (Besel & Yuille, 2013). The affective empathy 
findings, however, are at odds with the findings which found a significant link between 
empathic concern (affective empathy) and facial affect recognition (Gery et al., 2009). 
Different forms of facial affect are processed in different parts of the brain, e.g., recognition 
of fear is associated with the amygdala (Sato et al., 2002). Besel & Yuille (2013) suggested 
that, as affective empathy is defined by having compassion for facial markers of distress, 
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there is more of an association between fear recognition and affective empathy. The present 
study, however, has a large count of expressions of joy and, therefore, this might account for 
why cognitive empathy and affective empathy are differentially relating to ability to identify 
affect. These different findings may also reflect the amount of time participants spent looking 
at each picture. Within this study, no time limit was set; however, previous research has 
found affective empathy predicts affect recognition accuracy when exposed to stimuli briefly, 
whereas cognitive empathy has a greater efficacy when exposed to stimuli for longer (Besel 
& Yuille, 2013). It is not possible to know how long each participant spent examining each 
picture and, as such, should this study be repeated, controlling these elements would be 
beneficial.  
The results of this second part of the study have thus far shown support for the belief 
that the empathic foundations of counselling psychology afford greater detection of 
gelotophobe facial affect. It has examined the causal chain, finding CP participants identified 
significantly more correct facial emotions of gelotophobes, that they had a higher level of 
cognitive empathy and that there was a positive correlation between cognitive empathy and 
number of correct emotions identified; no such link was found for affective empathy. In 
examining this further mediation analysis was undertaken examining whether empathy 
mediated the groups’ ability to identify correct emotions. The PO group was excluded from 
this analysis as the previous findings had found the differences in cognitive empathy, and the 
correct number of emotions identified, between the PO group and the CP and NP groups were 
non-significant. Further to this, only cognitive empathy was examined, as explorations of 
affective empathy were also found as non-significant. The findings, however, were mixed 
and not in keeping with the linear regression. There was a significant relationship on path a 
between belonging to the CP or NP group and the level of cognitive empathy, and on path c 
there was a significant relationship between group membership and number of correct 
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emotions identified. However, on path b the relationship between cognitive empathy and 
correct number of emotions identified was non-significant. Thus, the mediation analysis 
indicated cognitive empathy did not mediate the relationship between group membership and 
the correct number of emotions being identified.  
The path b findings are at odds with the linear regression analysis of participants’ 
level of cognitive empathy relating to the number of correct emotions identified. The reason 
is not clear why there might be this divergence in results between the mediation and linear 
regression. The linear regression model, although significant, only explained 2.9% of the 
variance in identifying the correct emotion. As such, this indicates other factors were also 
contributing to the model, although expected for a complex intersubjective process like facial 
affect recognition, it could be the impact of participant group was also contributing, in 
conjunction with differences in sample size. In the linear regression the relationship between 
all participants’ cognitive empathy and number of correct emotions identified was examined, 
whereas the PO group was excluded from the mediation analysis. Moreover, as X was a 
dichotomous variable within the mediation consisting of the CP and NP groups, c was 
calculated by the difference between group means on Y (Hayes, 2018), thus impacting on the 
sample size. The sample size of the mediation was reduced to 91 by excluding the PO group, 
but this is still above the 68 participants required by the power analysis. It is, however, still a 
relatively small sample. At the present time the null hypothesis is accepted that cognitive 
empathy did not mediate the relationship between group membership and ability to identify 
correct emotions. It would be interesting, however, to see whether the same pattern persisted 
if this study were repeated with a larger sample, as CP participants identified significantly 
more correct facial affect, CP participants had a higher level of cognitive empathy, and there 
was a positive correlation between cognitive empathy and number of correct emotions when 
examined for all participants.   
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6.2 Limitations of the Present Study and Future Research 
The use of screenshots in this study meant the metacommunication was limited. 
Whilst this has the benefit of affording isolation to facial emotional recognition, it also has 
some shortcomings. Previous research has found that individuals with gelotophobia tend to 
have idiosyncratic body movements. Titze (1996) referred to these body movements as the 
‘Pinocchio Complex’:  
Pinocchio … was a marionette or puppet made of wood. In the physical sphere, many 
emotions manifest themselves in our muscles. We communicate by the way we carry 
and present ourselves. When fear is experienced, every being gets stiff and develops 
muscular tension. (p.1)   
As such, if this study were to be undertaken again, the use of full video clips of gelotophobes 
responding to expressions of joy, with richer metacommunication, may give participants 
more information on which to base their perceptions and, as such, more people with the fear 
of being laughed at could be identified, as well as it being more likely that there would be a 
correct identification of their emotional state.   
A forced choice method was used within this study in gaining participants’ 
perceptions of emotions in the emotional stimuli. This method has been criticised as it could 
possibly artificially force agreement (Russel, 1993). Frank and Stennett (2001), however, 
when examining this method with facial expressions and the six basic emotions, an option 
was added for ‘none of these terms are correct’ and found there was no significant impact on 
the number of correct answers.  
Undertaking the FACS coding in this study afforded identifying the emotional stimuli 
displaying universal emotions. As such, when examining whether participants were able to 
choose the correct emotion, it excluded the expressions that did not meet the FACS criteria of 
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universal emotions. However, the expressions that did not meet criteria were included when 
examining overall perception of gelotophobes’ and non-gelotophobes’ emotions, rather than 
whether it was correct. This was done to examine whether participants perceived non-
gelotophobe stimuli differently from the gelotophobe stimuli when responding to joy. 
Therefore, although the distributions give an indication there was something different 
happening between groups, the findings are limited for this aspect. For example, if someone 
were trying to mask socially unacceptable emotions, they may display non-Duchenne smiles 
or a ‘nervous smile’ and, as such, this information would not be picked up on in the present 
study. If this study was to be repeated, it would be useful to have an ‘other’ option which 
includes space for qualitative data, recording participants’ perceptions for this aspect in their 
own words which would give richer information for this aspect of the study.        
Moreover, the present study examined perceptions of outward displays of facial affect 
of individuals and, as such, a limitation of this study is that the complex individual internal 
subjective experiences, and understandings, have not been explored. In the research field of 
gelotophobia, the voice of individuals with the heightened fear of being laughed at is missing. 
Going forward there is a need for greater focus on qualitative research. An innovative 
research method would be to ask individuals with the heightened fear of being laughed at to 
keep a diary of their experiences, giving greater insight into their internal and external 
worlds. This could also be undertaken to compare different groups that have shown higher 
incidents of gelotophobia, such as individuals with EUPD or hfASD, thus affording an 
exploration as to whether their experience of having the heightened fear of being laughed at 
is more nuanced across groups. Furthermore, undertaking interviews with a focus on life span 
would allow a qualitative exploration of the themes present in the development of 





This was the first research to find gelotophobes are perceived by others to have 
significantly lower counts of happiness and significantly higher counts of contempt when 
responding to expressions of joy. This could have implications for successful interpersonal 
interactions, especially as others found it more difficult to correctly identify gelotophobes’ 
emotions reacting to joy and were unable to correctly identify gelotophobes even after being 
made aware some of the individuals in the emotional stimuli had gelotophobia.   
This study has also given, for the first time, an indication that there may be another 
factor within the micro level of the development of gelotophobia as participants were not able 
to correctly spot the emotion of gelotophobes. As such, if social partners cannot identify the 
correct emotion of gelotophobes in ‘teasing’ or ‘banter’ situations, social partners’ empathic 
responses would be inhibited not recognising gelotophobes’ discomfort, thus leading to more 
‘teasing’ and more unhelpful avoidant behaviour from gelotophobes. This, therefore, is an 
extra factor in the development and maintenance of gelotophobia. As such, it further 
highlights that gelotophobia does not just originate within an individual but rather in a 
system. This, then, also has implications for therapeutic interventions for gelotophobia in 
respect of teaching individuals how to communicate emotions. Moreover, there is a need to 
propagate further the systemic nature of gelotophobia, and that it exists on a continuum, that 
we all have a level of fear of being laughed at, to combat possible stigma.    
This research also found, for the first time, participants were not able to spot the 
presence of gelotophobia within individuals responding to expressions of joy, which further 
supports the belief there is another factor in the micro level of development of gelotophobia, 
of others not being able to identify gelotophobes’ discomfort. Moreover, it also has 
implications for clinical practice, given two-thirds of the participants were from a psychology 
background. If psychologists are unable to identify the presence of gelotophobia, a reassuring 
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smile or laugh in a therapy session can have unforeseen implications and fracture the 
therapeutic relationship. This highlights further the need for greater awareness, within 
psychology, of individuals with the heightened fear of being laughed at. If this were 
incorporated within the assessment stage, thus helping to inform psychological formulations, 
it could not only better inform the direction of therapy but also be beneficial to the building 
of the therapeutic relationship.  
Although CP participants were more able to spot the correct gelotophobe emotions in 
comparison to the NP participants, the ability to spot correct emotions for gelotophobes 
significantly dropped for all groups. This also has implications for clinical practice and 
highlights the greater need for exploration of patients’ metacommunication, especially for 
incongruent facial affect within therapeutic settings, rather than assuming an emotion is 
correctly being decoded, especially as all the emotions used within the analysis of correct 
emotions were universal emotions. It also raises the possibility that therapists struggle to 
identify incongruent affect and that there is a need for more research in this area.   
Finally, this was the first research to examine whether the empathic underpinning of 
counselling psychology may afford greater detection of correct emotions. This study found 
affective empathy was not a predictive factor in correct emotions and there were no 
differences in affective empathy between participant groups. At first glance, however, the 
findings for cognitive empathy appeared to support the belief that the empathic underpinning 
of counselling psychology may be affording greater detection of correct emotions. CP 
participants identified more correct emotions of gelotophobes than NP; in addition, CP 
participants had higher levels of cognitive empathy than NP, although the differences with 
PO were non-significant; and, moreover, there was also a positive correlation between 
cognitive empathy and number of emotions identified. The mediation analysis, however, 
casts doubt on this as it found cognitive empathy did not mediate the relationship between 
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group membership and the number of correct emotions identified. It is difficult to draw 
conclusions regarding the relationship between cognitive empathy and identifying emotions 
from the present study given its conflicting findings and this aspect of the study would 
benefit from being repeated with a larger sample. Were it to be the case that person-centred 
training was facilitating greater cognitive empathy and, in turn, greater ability to identify 
facial affect, it could have implications for the content of training for numerous caring 

















































The aim of this section is to undertake a critical appraisal of my development and 
research process. I will start with the initial point of developing a research area of interest 
before moving on to examine other salient aspects of the study and some of the conflicts I 
encountered along the way. Finally, I will reflect on myself as a researcher and my 
development across the training process. 
7.1 Development of research project  
The need to be flexible and adapt to change was evident from the outset of this 
research process. Initially, the university had lined up potential supervisors and suggestions 
of research projects. One of the research projects suggested at the time focused on 
perceptions of pain moving from acute to chronic pain. I started developing a research idea in 
this area and as someone who experiences chronic pain, it was very much an area of interest. 
After meeting with the potential supervisor, I developed an idea further and submitted my 
expression of interest form. The university, however, undertook a review of the supervisor’s 
capacity and unfortunately it was deemed that my supervisor was not able to continue. As 
such, it was necessary to develop another research project. This was a difficult and frustrating 
process after investing in the previous project. The following week, however, I was emailed 
another possible project which encompassed facial coding and gelotophobia. The prospect of 
using FACS, devised by Paul Ekman, was something that initially grabbed my interest as I 
was aware of his work from my MSc study. Further to this, metacommunication was of 
interest to me and I had previously read around this area in respects to its use and its impact 
on therapy. 
In the initial meeting with my supervisor, she outlined I would need to train and 
become qualified in FACS to be able to undertake the research project. This was something I 
was quite excited by as I thought it would be beneficial for my clinical practice and further 
my professional development. At the time, my supervisor did warn me that the training for 
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this coding method was quite involved and would require a lot of hard work and commitment 
on top of my university assignments, placement, and research workload.  
In starting to read around gelotophobia, I quickly realised that my supervisor had 
either carried out a large body of the research or her former colleagues had. Having someone 
with such a large knowledge in the area was beneficial but also came with some difficulties. 
That is, in terms of carrying out any critical analysis of previous research when undertaking 
the literature review, I was mindful of the need to take a neutral stance. This was made easier 
as the research undertaken had been robust and there had been a good amount of evidence 
found in clinical and non-clinical populations and in different countries and cultures. I soon 
realised there was a need for me to take ownership of my research and put my own stamp on 
it as well. The original title for the research was “utilising emotion specific ANS activity to 
understand the misperception of joy as contempt” with the suggestion of using a selection of 
videos clips of pre-screened gelotophobes and non-gelotophobes responding to joyful 
emotions that would be coded with the Facial Action Coding System. There would be two 
groups, counselling and non-counselling psychologists, who would be shown video clips 
along with rating scales relating to the perception of the emotion expression observed. The 
aim would be to investigate a) impact of the group; b) impact of gelotophobia on facial 
expression; c) impact of the group on the ability to recognise the facial expressions of 
emotion for gelotophobes and non-gelotophobes.  
This suggestion was made with the assumption that for counselling psychologists to 
be able to identify their patients’ emotions, it would facilitate a more empathic relationship. 
In taking the project further, I developed the idea around empathy. In doing this, I wanted to 
examine the causal chain further by examining the impact of group on empathy levels and 
testing the assumption regarding the link between empathy and the ability to identify facial 
expressions of affect. However, I did not appreciate how much work would be involved in 
139 
 
terms of adding another aspect of reading and literature searches into the study. Whilst 
gaining more knowledge in this area was interesting, in hindsight it did substantially increase 
the work involved.  
7.2 FACS Training  
The FACS training is a manualised self-instructional approach which necessitates 
reading the FACS manual and practicing coding various pictures and videos; the completion 
of FACS training is deemed by passing a test. The training process was a bigger challenge 
than I originally perceived. I tried to set some time aside each week to work on the FACS 
training, however at first, I found myself procrastinating and would often prioritise other 
university work. As such, I decided I needed to be far more proactive with the training and 
started breaking it down and setting myself small goals to hit each week. On the FACS 
training website they state that on average it takes a person up to 100 hours of training to pass 
the FACS exam. This was really challenging and at first, I did not appreciate what a big task 
it is to find an extra 100 hours within a busy training schedule. I feel my intermittent 
approach at first, due to other time demands, meant the time it took to pass the qualification 
increased.  
My research supervisor had procured some videos from a previous research project 
which featured gelotophobes and non-gelotophobes undertaking an emotional elicitation task. 
The participants in the previous study had consented for their videos to be used. These videos 
seemed ideal as they had been filmed in a standard interview setting across all participants 
and were filmed using a peephole camera thus, they were not aware of the camera’s presence 
at the time. It was planned for some undergraduate students to help with coding, as coding 
videos would not only be a large undertaking, but it would also increase the validity of my 
study. A training week was arranged with the undergraduates which consisted of them and 
myself working through the manual together which was facilitated by my supervisor. 
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However, by the end of the week, none of us were at a level needed to complete the FACS 
qualification and therefore we decided we would all have to carry on studying individually to 
work towards the qualification. By the time I had completed my FACS qualification 
however, none of the undergraduate students had completed their qualification and their 
focus had shifted on to their exams, thus they did not have the capacity to proceed. At this 
point, I had started to fully understand the complexity of being able to code all the videos and 
I reflected that a different approach may be needed. As such, after a discussion with my 
supervisor, I decided to tweak my method and take screenshots of the videos and code them 
myself with my supervisor acting as a second coder. Having to change my proposed approach 
was really frustrating at the time but what I learnt from this process is there is a need to be 
flexible and adapt when undertaking research and there can be different ways to achieve the 
same goal whilst being true to your research assumptions. Taking this approach afforded me 
the ability to carry out the same research, albeit with the one difference of it eliminating other 
aspects of metacommunication other than the facial expression. I was mindful that this would 
be partly a limitation of my study (no longer having the other aspects of 
metacommunication), however, I was also aware that it made it more focused in terms of 
what was being measured and furthermore, it was more in keeping with other research 
methods in facial affect. It also highlighted to me the need to be reflective of not only how 
these decisions impact on the study but also how it impacts on me. I realised it was important 
to practice what I preach to my patients when encountering an issue with the research and not 
to catastrophise and rather to take a more solution focused approach. This approach was more 
realistic, however I was still aware of what a large amount of work there would be involved, 
as there were 88 screenshots in total and coding each one tended to take me at least 1 hour. 
This again felt a little overwhelming, given the other pressures of the professional doctorate 
in terms of assignment deadlines and the need to gain clinical hours on placement too, let 
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alone all the other aspects of the research which I needed to do such as: setting up an online 
platform, recruiting, analysis and reading around the subject. I found that, often, I would 
prioritise other aspects of the course over the research as they had more pressing deadlines. In 
the second year of the professional doctorate, the number of hours that was needed to 
complete the year was substantially raised and as such, I doubled the number of days I was on 
placement. I was mindful that for each APR, I was setting timelines for myself which I was 
not hitting, and which was impacting on my anxiety levels and ironically making me avoidant 
in engaging with the research. This was something I needed to address and make more time 
for my research and as with the FACS training, I decided to break things down and set myself 
some goals for each week with the coding.  
After completing the coding, my research supervisor then undertook the second 
coding and following this I calculated the KAPPA coefficient for each screenshot, it was at 
this point that I realised there was some large discrepancies between some of our coding. This 
was something I could not be precious about and there was a need to be emotionally detached 
and see it from a research point of view. As such, we followed the protocols outlined by 
Ekman and we re-examined the coding and referred to the manual, it was difficult for me to 
accept on a few occasions regarding my perception of the coding but after referring to the 
manual, I realised some of my coding needed adjusting. In hindsight, this is to be expected as 
there is a large discrepancy in experience and knowledge between me and my supervisor and 
more importantly it was about creating a piece of reliable research.  
7.3 Researching Gelotophobia Heightened Fear of Being Laughed at  
In studying a relatively new aspect of psychology in respect of my clinical practice, I 
perceived myself as encountering some ‘unconscious incompetence’. I felt mental health 
professionals tended to be quite quick to be dismissive to tell me this is just Social Anxiety, 
ASD, or most often the reply was “don’t we all have the fear of being laughed at”. On 
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reflection, I feel this is natural for individuals to ask questions for an area of knowledge they 
might not have heard of before and to have a critical analysis approach is healthy. I feel in 
hindsight, that such comments may have triggered my own underlying beliefs of feeling not 
good enough. I found myself being quite self-depreciating and sometimes almost being 
dismissive at times of gelotophobia as a defence. This was something I became conscious of 
and was able to be reflective of my actions, thus I was able to adjust my thought process by 
being mindful of where these feelings were originating from and started having more 
confidence in my own research. This was reinforced with the more reading I did and I came 
to fully appreciate the amount of research that had already been undertaken. I also realised 
the need for me to be more confident in talking about gelotophobia as it will not be possible 
to persuade therapists to be more conscious of gelotophobia and to incorporate it into 
formulations when appropriate if I am not fully invested in it myself.          
As a counselling psychologist, I have found myself quite conflicted at times. There is 
a movement amongst some counselling psychologists to not use any diagnostic terms e.g., 
Bury and Stauss, (2006) …” At its core, counselling psychologists privileges respect for the 
personal subjective experience of the client over and above notions of diagnosis, assessments, 
and treatment” …(P113). However, as someone who works in secondary care in the NHS, I 
am also aware of the benefit of having a shared language with other mental health 
professionals. In terms of being a small part of increasing the knowledge and visibility of 
another possible ‘diagnosis’, or trait of a diagnosis, I am mindful this can have benefits for 
clients in terms of clinicians being more aware of their difficulties, especially as this appears 
to be an area that is under reported due to clients’ fears of it being trivial. Throughout writing 
my thesis, I often use the term ‘gelotophobe’ rather than writing ‘a person with a heightened 
fear of being laughed at or an individual with gelotophobia’. Although the use of the term 
’gelotophobe’ is common practice within the gelotophobia research, it did not sit well with 
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me. This was something I felt was quite incongruent for me as a counselling psychologist that 
works from a humanistic perspective. I was not only mindful that referring to someone as a 
“gelotophobe” could be stigmatising but also from a mental health recovery point of view, 
using such a label could lead to other valuable aspects of an individual’s presentation, 
including positive aspects, being overlooked should professionals be primed by such a label. 
In the present research, it was done to make the writing process more manageable/readable as 
there are two aspects of my study incorporating individuals with a heightened fear of being 
laughed at, i.e., the emotional stimulus from a previous study which incorporated people with 
a heightened fear of being laughed at, as well as assessing the participants in the present 
study for having a heightened fear of being laughed at. Thus, not using the term gelotophobia 
would have meant it would have lacked clarity. I do feel, however, upon publishing any work 
whilst it would be written in a similar fashion for clarity purposes, it needs to be framed by a 
caveat regarding the terminology.   
In this study, I refer to the possibility of gelotophobia being incorporated into the 
DSM as traits of other conditions. Once again, this is in conflict with the philosophy of 
counselling psychology. In fact, Carl Rogers himself questioned the value of diagnosis as it 
puts the locus of control outside of the client and it is the client that has the greater potential 
to fully understand their own feelings, thoughts, and behaviours and furthermore, diagnosis 
really happens in therapy by the client themselves being able to recognise the inadequacies of 
the old ways of perceiving, experiencing and behaving (Rogers, 1951).  The issue of labels 
and gelotophobia was highlighted to me by a prominent counselling psychologist whilst 
displaying my research poster at the BPS DCoP conference. She approached me and said, “I 
don't believe in labels, I don’t think any client should be given a label, just work with the 
presenting difficulties.” However, she then went on to tell me she was working with someone 
at that point in time that had “this type of issue”. This highlighted for me the need to strike a 
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balance between not wanting to stigmatise individuals, with the need for professionals to 
have a shared language that can be shared quickly and succinctly. In the NHS, I see the daily 
value of a shared language, but I also see at times that some clients’ issues can become 
needlessly medicalised. I was able to square this with my own philosophy in my way of 
working by understanding that a good psychologist would undertake a formulation and even 
if a client were to receive a diagnosis, in the future, of gelotophobia would just be the starting 
point. In conjunction with this, by using the term gelotophobia it tends to raise awareness as it 
will often invite people to ask what it is.      
7.4 Developing Online Platform 
The need to be accepting and adapt to new circumstances was once again highlighted 
to me when I downloaded the data from Qualtrics, as the numeric values given to the 
questionnaires were wrong within Qualtrics e.g., when it should have been giving something 
a value such as 1, it would have been giving it 5. I knew logically at the time this should be a 
‘fixable’ issue and I would need to recode the data whilst recording this procedure within my 
thesis. At the time, however, this was stressful and added a lot more work than I planned for 
at the beginning.  Reflecting on this, I felt that maybe I moved to disseminate the research a 
little too quickly and maybe, if I had checked Qualtrics a little closer beforehand it may have 
been a case of clicking a couple of boxes rather than a long-drawn-out process of recoding 
the data in SPSS. Factoring in time to resolve unexpected issues is something that I became 
mindful of when planning my research as there seemed to some issues that crop up along the 
way and so I became mindful of making time in case these issues that need to be managed 
along the way. Moreover, prior to starting the research, I did not think about all the different 
skills that I needed to gain e.g., using Qualtrics software for the purposes of hosting the 
research online. I attended a training lecture at university regarding this software, however, I 
underestimated the time it would take to get to know the software. As not only did I need to 
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be able to navigate the software, I also needed to be able to construct my research within it 
and most importantly, extract the data from it too, whilst at the same time keeping in-line 
with ethical standards. In doing this, I decided to add a withdraw button on every page of 
Qualtrics, this was something I did not realise would turn out to such a large piece of work. I 
used some computer code which enabled me to code Qualtrics to add this feature which 
required me to learn some new skills. On reflection, I should have utilised more resources 
available at the university, such as the technicians which would have been more time 
efficient. I tend to be quite autonomous when working and this may have slowed me down at 
times, whereas my supervisor or others could have pointed me in the right direction at times. 
I think it probably comes from a position of not feeling good enough and not wanting to feel 
like I am bothering people when I am asking questions, thus I tend to be avoidant. As such, I 
need to be more mindful of what is driving my decision making and behaviour, so I 
undertake research in a more efficient manner.  
7.5 Development as a Researcher 
Heading into the first year, I think I underestimated the demands of the research 
element of the course. To start with, I was relatively confident in this area as I had previously 
completed an MSc in Evolutionary Psychology at the University of Liverpool which included 
a taught module on statistics and had given me experience of undertaking, what I had 
previously thought of, as a relatively large quantitative thesis. It had given me some insight in 
terms of managing my time between the taught side of a course and research demands. Also, 
following finishing my MSc course, I was employed in assistant psychologist roles that 
included undertaking some quite extensive service evaluations which included quantitative 
and qualitative approaches and meant I managed to retain a lot of the skills and knowledge 
from my master’s course. It also gave me experience in designing and presenting research, 
and in turn, presenting a research poster for the first time at the British and Irish Group for 
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the Study of Personality Disorder (BIGSPD) conference as well as being published for the 
first time, albeit in a journal with a low impact factor. Once starting the research module, 
however, I soon realised what is expected at doctorate level was far more demanding. What 
was useful however, was being able to reflect on what had helped previously when the 
workload had felt overwhelming, in terms of breaking down the tasks needed, scheduling 
time for each task and compartmentalising what was needed to avoid snowballing. I feel that 
as I have worked my way through doctorate training, I have become more aware of things I 
still need to learn and develop, as much as the areas in which I have gained new skills. I feel 
that becoming aware of areas I need to develop is just as important as the new skills and 
knowledge I have gained and moreover, being a reflective scientific practitioner has helped 
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This study aimed to investigate counselling psychologists’ (CP), non-psychologists’ (NP), 
and psychology other (PO) participants’ accuracy in decoding emotional states being 
signalled by gelotophobes responding to expressions of joy and whether empathy is a 
predictive factor in the facial recognition. A quasi-experimental design, employing a 
quantitative method. Participants were shown emotional stimulus depicting gelotophobes and 
non-gelotophobes in a standardised interview setting and asked to identify seven basic 
emotions. The emotional stimulus participants were pre-screened, utilising the GELOPH 
<15> to establish the presence of gelotophobia and pre-coded using facial action coding 
system (FACS). Participants completed the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI) and The 
Empathy Quotient (EQ) questionnaires to discern affective and cognitive empathy. CP 
participants identified significantly more correct gelotophobe emotions than NP participants 
although there was a non-significant difference between CP and PO, and NP and PO 
participants. CP participants had significantly higher cognitive empathy than NP participants 
and there was a non-significant difference between CP and PO participants. There was a non-
significant difference between all groups for affective empathy. The findings indicate the 
humanistic foundations of counselling psychology may be facilitating the development of 
cognitive empathy. The presence of gelotophobia, however, significantly impacted on the 
accuracy levels of identifying facial affect for all groups.   
Key words: gelotophobia, counselling psychology, cognitive empathy, affective 







In a typical population, it tends to be assumed that a smile or the vocalisation of 
laughter will be positively inferred. Laughter and smiling, however, can be incorporated in 
ridicule and shame (Ruch et al., 2013). It is postulated that repeated traumatic experiences of 
being ridiculed via laughter leads to the heightened fear of being the object of laughter (Ruch 
& Proyer, 2008). This phenomenon, known as gelotophobia, the fear of being laughed at 
(Titze, 2009), exists on a spectrum between no, to extreme gelotophobia (Ruch, & Proyer, 
2008). Gelotophobes have a negative attribution bias skewing appraisal of laughter, thus the 
dichotomous nature of laughter is problematic (Platt, 2008; Ruch, 2009). This negatively 
affects interpersonal interactions for gelotophobes, hindering them from forming and 
maintaining relationships (Platt & Forabosco, 2014). 
In understanding the precipitating factors of gelotophobia, originally a theoretical 
causal chain model of putative causes and consequences throughout lifespan was developed. 
The original linear model was developed into a more systemic model operating across many 
levels incorporating etiological moderating factors. A salient addition to the developmental 
model of gelotophobia was systemic feedback loops (Ruch, Hofmann et al., 2014). Henri 
Bergson (1900) first suggested individuals who are the object of ridicule and scorn via 
laughter take on the appearance of wooden puppets or marionettes. Individuals in these 
situations tend to emit nonverbal clues that indicate their affective state of feeling uneasy. In 
these situations, it is suggested that emotional panic leads to muscular tension and stiffness 
and presents as individuals appearing not to move in a typical manner as they try deliberately 
to control their body movements. This “wooden appearance” has been referred to as the 
“Pinocchio-Complex” (Titze, 1995). As such, individuals expecting to be the recipient of 
ridicule adjust their mannerisms accordingly in a maladaptive effort to cope however this 
manner is perceived as atypical by others leading to further ridicule, thus consequences and 
elicitors become looped (Ruch, Hofmann et al., 2014).  
Gelotophobia operates at a personal, interpersonal, and social level and as such, 
should be incorporated into psychological interventions (Platt et al., 2014). 
Metacommunication within interpersonal interactions incorporates encoding and decoding of 
facial expressions (Zuckerman et al., 1975), thus, the ability to interpret signals of 
communication is of salient importance for successful social and therapeutic interactions. 
Facial expressions communicate an emotional state to others via an encoding face and 
decoding brain which affords individuals the ability to infer emotional states and respond 
accordingly (Smith, Cottrell et al., 2005). Typically, this is arranged into seven universal 
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expressions of emotion: fear, joy, contempt, sadness, disgust, anger, and surprise (Ekman, 
1992; Ekman & Friesen, 1975). Individuals have autonomy over facial expressions, however, 
allowing emotions to be masked or faked thus facial expressions cannot merely be considered 
innate expressions of emotion (Ekman et al., 1981). 
It is postulated that facial expressions of emotion have specific facial configurations 
related to different emotions. For example, the emotion of joy tends to be accompanied by a 
facial configuration called the Duchenne display (Ekman et al., 1990) which incorporates the 
joint and symmetric contraction of the zygomatic major and orbicularis oculi muscles, pulling 
the lip corners back and upwards, raising the cheeks and compressing the eyelids resulting in 
eye wrinkles (Ekman et al., 1987). Whereas non-Duchenne smiles do not activate the 
orbicularis oculi muscle and tend to serve a social function such as concealment of a negative 
emotion (Surakka & Hietanen, 1998).  A contempt smile incorporates unilateral action of the 
buccinators muscle (Ruch et al., 2013). This is of relevance to gelotophobes as they tend to 
have higher incidents of contempt displays and express less joy when responding to 
expressions of joy (Hofmann et al., 2015). 
The Role of Empathy 
Understanding the role of empathy across health professions has gained in popularity 
since the 1950s when Carl Rogers postulated it was necessary for successful outcomes in 
psychotherapy (Gladstein, 1983). A plethora of research regarding the concept of empathy 
has been undertaken in many disciplines with conflicting definitions (Gery et al., 2009). 
There is consensus within empathy research, however, that empathy is multifaceted 
encompassing subjective experience, perspective taking and affective cues invoking 
emotional states; be it for others or self-orientated (Davis, 1983; Gery et al., 2009).  
The two aspects of empathy this study will concern itself with are that of cognitive 
and affective empathy. Affective empathy is associated with feeling the emotion of another 
but with compassion (Besel & Yuille, 2010): this is postulated to be an automated process 
where someone catches feelings from another, in this sense emotions can be seen as 
contagious. Cognitive empathy relates to the ability to imaginatively understand another’s 
feelings, thoughts, and actions but does not have to feel the emotion of the other, in this sense 
understanding another’s emotions is likened to mindreading. These factors can operate 
independently (Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright, 2004) and differentially relate to facial 
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expression recognition (Besel & Yuille, 2010) although they can also operate together as 
posited in the dual action model of empathy (Heyes, 2018).  
An association between the recognition of facial affect ability and empathy has been found 
across numerous studies whereby the higher levels of empathy correlated with greater facial 
affect recognition ability (Carr & Lutjemeier, 2005; Besel & Yuille, 2010).  
Implications for Counselling Psychology 
The foundations of counselling psychology in the United Kingdom are built upon 
American humanistic values (Orlans & Van Scoyoc, 2008) of the client centred approach 
outlined by Carl Rogers (1951). Rogers postulated there are three core conditions necessary 
for therapeutic change: Empathy, congruence, and unconditional positive regard. Thus, 
therapists need to be able to communicate empathic understanding and unconditional positive 
regard to the client, for therapy to be successful. One of the most important ways of 
communicating is by facial expression (Bekkering et al., 2000) and interpreting these 
emotional expressions is salient too in communication (Ricciardi et al., 2017). At present, 
there is still a lack of awareness regarding gelotophobia despite research finding its presence 
across cultures, nationalities and in clinical and non-clinical populations (Proyer et al., 2009). 
In clinical practice, there is also a lack of awareness of gelotophobia as patients tend to under 
report it and it is not included in any diagnostic manuals (Platt et al., 2016). The presence of 
gelotophobia therefore could have a significant impact on the success of therapy, as 
metacommunication issues can fracture the therapeutic relationship.  
Research Aims 
As the ability of the therapist to communicate empathic understanding and 
unconditional positive regard to the client is believed to predict successful outcomes in 
counselling psychology, the ability of counselling psychologists to differentiate 
gelotophobes’ from non-gelotophobes’ responses to joyful emotions are of salient 
importance. As such, this study will investigate counselling psychologists’ and non-
counselling psychologists’ perceptions of emotional states being signalled by gelotophobes’ 
and non-gelotophobes’ responding expressions of joy and their empathy levels.  
Hypotheses  
H1: CP participants will correctly identify more gelotophobe emotional states being displayed 
correctly than NP and PO participants. 
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H2: CP participants will have a higher level of cognitive empathy than NP and PO 
participants. 





Altogether 150 participants were recruited. 132 participants completed all aspects of 
the study, with 12 participants completing the demographics IRI and EQ questionnaires, but 
not the emotional stimuli aspect of the study. There were a further 6 participants who 
withdrew from the study.  
The occupation of the participants was (44 CP, 54 NP, and 46 PO). The CP sample 
consisted of 44 English-speaking adults (5 Males, 39 Females), there were 8 fully qualified 
CP’s and 36 trainees that had completed the humanistic aspect of the CP doctorate training. 
The ethnicity of CP participants was (26 white British, 6 Asian British, 1 African Caribbean 
British, 7 white other, 1 Arabic, 3 other). The NP sample consisted of 54 English-speaking 
adults (10 males, 44 females). The ethnicity of NP participants was (46 white British, 2 Asian 
British, 1 African Caribbean British, 5 white other). The psychology other (PO) sample 
consisted of 46 English-speaking adults (5 males, 40 females, 1 non-binary). There was a 
myriad of occupations and qualifications levels for the PO group although it did include 5 
Clinical Psychologists, 3 Forensic Psychologists, 3 Education psychologists, 3 Research 
psychologists and 2 PhD psychologists but also included CBT therapists, trainees, 
psychology students. The ethnicity of PO participants was (26 white British, 2 Asian British, 
1 mixed heritage British, 13 white other, 3 other). The age of participants was recorded via 
age range rather than specific age; this was to limit the impact of the demographic questions 
on participant anonymity. As such, no mean ages are available to present, the breakdown of 
age ranges across groups is presented in Table 1.  
Table 1 
Displays Participant Age Range Across Groups 
  CP NP PO Total 
Age 18-24 2 1 8 11 
 25-34 18 13 19 50 
 35-44 17 16 9 42 
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 45-44 5 20 5 30 
 55-64 2 4 4 10 
 65-74 0 0 1 1 
 
Note. CP = counselling psychology, NP = non-psychology, PO = psychology other.  
 
Recruitment 
The recruitment of participants was disseminated across a number of different 
platforms. Firstly, direct, and intermediate recruitment was utilised for CP participants, in 
contacting trainee counselling psychologists on the University of Wolverhampton 
Professional Doctorate in Counselling Psychology course, as well as contacting six qualified 
Counselling Psychologists already known to the author. Secondly, participants were recruited 
across social media. Thirdly, all university Counselling Psychology departments in the 
United Kingdom, that offer the Professional Doctorate in Counselling Psychology, were 
contacted via email, asking them to distribute the research amongst their Counselling 
Psychologists and doctoral trainees, with the provision of the trainees having completed a 
humanistic module. NP and PO participants were recruited from the wider population, with 
an effort made to target similar age and gender demographics to the CP participants. 
Intermediate recruiting was used and subsequently asked to snowball the research to relevant 
potential participants. Once more, social media platforms were used for the NP participants.   
Materials 
The emotional stimulus used in this study was appropriated from a prior study 
(Hofmann et al., 2015) where participants were clandestinely filmed in a standard interview 
setting undertaking an emotion elicitation. The video clips featured 17 participants pre-
screened with the GELOPH <15> to establish the presence of gelotophobia. 10 of the 17 
individuals featuring in the video clips had gelotophobia ranging from slight gelotophobia to 
extreme gelotophobia and for 9 individuals there was no presence of gelotophobia.  
An emotional stimuli photo was generated via a screenshot of the appropriated study’s 
video clips. The video clips were edited using Microsoft Movie Maker for Windows 10 and a 
photo (screenshot) of each video was taken at the apex of an Action Unit (AU) displayed post 
30 seconds of the elicitation question. This period of time was chosen as it gave enough time 
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for the AU to reach the apex and accounted for the variation of time needed for different 
emotional emblem displays. 
To operationalise the emotional stimulus, the screenshots were coded with facial 
action coding system (FACS). FACS is an anatomically based, comprehensive and objective 
technique for measuring all observable facial movement. FACS allows for measurement of 
the timing of a facial movement, its symmetry and intensity and its degree of irregularity of 
onset, apex or offset (Ekman et al., 2002). This technique afforded the coding of specific 
facial muscles to determine the facial expression being displayed (Ekman & Friesen et al., 
2002), thus enabling a comparison between the emotion being displayed in the emotional 
stimuli and participants’ perception of the facial expression displayed. The FACS coding of 
the emotional stimulus screenshots was undertaken by two certified coders. The overall 
KAPPA coefficient between coders was (.88). As such, this is above the .70 reliability index 
suggested by Ekman & Friesen et al. (2002). 
Measures  
The EQ (Lawrence et al., 2004) comprises 40 items to assess cognitive and social 
sides of empathy (a sample item is “People often tell me that I went too far in driving my 
point home in a discussion”). Answers are given on a four-point answer format (1 = 
‘‘strongly agree’’ to 4 = ‘‘strongly disagree’’). Lawrence (et al., 2004) report high reliability 
coefficients (a = .84). Lawrence et al. (2004) conducted components analysis of the EQ 
questionnaire and showed reasonable communalities with loadings onto three factors: 
cognitive empathy, emotional reactivity, and social skills. Five questions have been shown 
suitable for the cognitive empathy subscale (25, 26, 44, 52, and 54) (Muncer & Ling, 2006). 
Only the cognitive empathy subscale was used in the present study. The Cronbach’s alpha for 
the cognitive empathy was 0.79. 
The IRI (Davis, 1983) is a 28 item widely used measure that assesses an individual’s 
predilection towards empathy (a sample item is “I often have tender, concerned feelings for 
people less fortunate than me”). Answers are given on five-point answer format (1 = “Does 
not describe me well” to 5 = “Does describe me well”). IRI contains four, seven-item 
subscales each addressing subtypes of empathy. The present study, however, only used the 
Empathic Concern (EC) subtype as a measure of affective empathy; Davis (1983) reports 




The study was a quasi-experimental design which consisted of three groups, 
Counselling Psychology (CP), non-psychology (NP), and psychology other (PO) participants. 
Participants were asked to complete an online emotion recognition task and two empathy 
questionnaires. The independent variables were: 1) participant’s profession i.e., “Counselling 
Psychologist”, “non-psychologist”, and “psychology other” 2) the empathy questionnaire 
score i.e., the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI) and Empathy Quotient (EQ) 
questionnaires. The dependent variable was the number of correct emotions identified.  
Procedure  
The online platform Qualtrics was used to host the emotional stimulus. All 
participants were given a definition of gelotophobia before starting. Following this 
participants were presented with the Empathy Quotient (EQ) and Interpersonal Reactivity 
Index (IRI) questionnaires. From here the emotional stimulus was presented and participants 
were given a forced choice of emotions: anger, sadness, joy, disgust, surprise, fear, or 
contempt. There were 5 photos from each of the 17 emotional stimuli, thus there was a total 
of 85 photos where participants were asked to judge the emotion.   
Ethical considerations   
Ethical approval was given by the University of Wolverhampton Ethics committee.  
Results 
H1: Counselling Psychology (CP) Participants Will Identify More Gelotophobe Emotional 
States Being Displayed Correctly Than Non-Psychology (NP) Participants and Psychology 
Other Participants (PO). 
In examining whether CP participants will identify more correct emotional states 
being displayed by gelotophobes than NP and PO, the unit of analysis was participants (N 
=132), the independent variable was participant group, which had three levels: CP, NP, and 
PO, and the dependent variable was the number of emotional states identified correctly for 
gelotophobes. A visual inspection of the correct emotional states for gelotophobes data 
(histogram, Appendix E) indicated the data were not normally distributed. A Shapiro-Wilk 
test of normality was computed, CP (p = .036), PO (p =.003), and NP (p =.126) and a 
skewness of CP -.826 (SE = .365), PO -1.235 (SE = .369), NP -.115 (SE = .340) and kurtosis 
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of CP .943 (SE = .717), PO 2.517 (SE = .724), NP .423 (SE = .668). Skewness and kurtosis 
were then divided by its SE to identify how far the sample data are different from the normal 
distribution; ±1.96 limits were considered as normally distributed. Skewness of CP= -2.26, 
PO=-3.35, NP= -.33; kurtosis of CP= 1.31, PO= 3.47, NP=.633 confirmed the data were not 
normally distributed. Thus, a Kruskal-Wallis test was used instead of a parametric one-way 
ANOVA.  
A Kruskal-Wallis test showed there was a significant difference between groups (H 
(2) = 7.645, p= 0.22) in the number of correct gelotophobe emotional states identified. Post 
hoc pairwise comparisons were undertaken for 3 comparisons, thus the alpha threshold of .05 
was Bonferroni corrected by dividing this value by 3 = .0167. The analysis found CP group 
(Mdn =14, SD = 3.95) was significantly different (H = 21.156, SE = 7.993, p < .001) to NP 
group (Mdn = 13, SD = 2.85). There was a non-significant difference (H = 4.015, SE = 8.045, 
p = .615) between NP group (Md n = 13, SD = 2.85) and PO group (Mdn = 13, SD = 3.12) 
and non-significant difference (H = 17.106, SE = 8.345, p = .040) between PO group (Mdn 
=13, SD =3.12) and CP group (Mdn = 14, SD = 3.95). The results indicate that CP 
participants were significantly better at identifying the emotional states of gelotophobes than 
NP participants, but the differences between the CP and PO participant groups, and PO and 
NP participants groups were non-significant.  
H2: CP Participants Will Have a Higher Level of Cognitive Empathy Than NP and PO 
Participants. 
In examining whether CP Participants had a higher level of cognitive empathy than 
NP and PO Participants, the unit of analysis was participants (N = 144), the independent 
variable was participant group, which had three levels: CP, NP, and PO, and the dependent 
variable was participants’ cognitive empathy score (EQ score). A Shapiro-Wilk test of 
normality was computed for cognitive empathy, CP (p = .042), PO (p = .001) and NP (p = 
.152), and a skewness of CP -.095 (SE = .357), PO -.744 (SE = .350), NP -.099 (SE = .325) 
and kurtosis of CP -.895 (SE = .702.), PO -.411 (SE = .688), NP -.076 (SE = .639). Skewness 
and kurtosis were then divided by its SE to identify how far the sample data are different 
from the normal distribution; ±1.96 limits were considered as normally distributed. Skewness 
of CP = -1.27, PO = -2.12, NP = -0.30 and kurtosis of CP = -1.27, PO = 0.60, NP = -.12 
confirmed the data were not normally distributed. Thus, a Kruskal-Wallis test was used 
instead of a parametric one-way ANOVA.  
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A Kruskal-Wallis test for cognitive empathy found a significant (H(2) = 15.188, p = 
.001 ) difference between participant groups. Post hoc pairwise comparisons were undertaken 
for 3 comparisons, thus the alpha threshold of .05 was Bonferroni corrected by dividing this 
value by 3 = .0167. The analysis found the CP group (Mdn = 8, SD = 2.25) was significantly 
different (H = 32.009, SE = 8.300, p<.001) to the NP group (Mdn = 5, SD = 2.23). There was 
a non-significant difference (H = -13.080, SE = 8.723, p = .134) between the CP group (Mdn 
= 8, SD = 2.25) and the PO group (Mdn = 7, SD = 2.04), and a non-significant difference (H 
= 18.930, SE = 8.402, p = .024) between NP group (Mdn = 5, SD = 2.23) and PO group (Mdn 
= 7, SD = 2.04). These results indicate CP participants had a higher level of cognitive 
empathy compared to NP participants, whereas there was a non-significant difference in the 
ability between the CP and PO groups and no difference in ability between the PO and NP 
groups.  
H3: CP Participants’ Affective Empathy Will Be Higher Than NP and PO Participants. 
In examining whether CP participants’ affective empathy was higher than NP and PO 
participants, the unit of analysis was participants (N =144), the independent variable was 
participant group, which had three levels: CP, NP, and PO, and the dependent variable was 
the participants’ affective empathy score (empathic concern). A visual inspection of the 
affective empathy data across occupation (histogram, Appendix F) indicated the data were 
not normally distributed. This was confirmed by a Shapiro-Wilk test of normality, CP (p = 
.002), PO (p = .007), and NP (p = .027), with a skewness of CP -1.088 (SE = .357), PO -
1.157 (SE = .350), NP .024 (SE = .325) and kurtosis of CP 1.836 (SE = .702), PO 2.850 (SE = 
.688), NP -.983 (SE = .639). Skewness and kurtosis were then divided by its SE to identify 
how far the sample data are different from the normal distribution; ±1.96 limits were 
considered as normally distributed. Skewness of CP = -3.04, PO = -3.30, NP = .07 and 
kurtosis of CP = 2.61, PO = 4.14, NP = -1.53 confirmed the data were not normally 
distributed. Thus, a Kruskal-Wallis test was used instead of a parametric one-way ANOVA.  
A Kruskal-Wallis test was calculated, which reported there was a non-significant 
(H(2) = .200, p = .948 ) difference in affective empathy scores across occupation: CP (Mdn = 
22.5, SD = 3.11), NP (Mdn = 22, SD = 3.43) and PO (Mdn = 23, SD = 3.40), indicating there 





This study used a quasi-experimental quantitative approach which investigated 
whether the empathic underpinnings of counselling psychology afforded greater ability, in 
comparison to non-psychologists, to identify the correct emotions of gelotophobes 
responding to expressions of joy. These findings showed on average CP participants did 
indeed identify more correct emotional states of the gelotophobes (in the emotional stimuli) 
compared to the NP, and CP participants had significantly higher levels of cognitive empathy 
than NP participants, but there were differences between NP and PO, and CP and PO were 
non-significant. There was no significant difference in affective empathy between groups. 
Previous research has found that cognitive empathy is susceptible to development 
(Platt & Keller, 1994). Previous research with medical students has found empathy levels can 
be increased by teaching students to understand patients’ concerns and feelings by 
incorporating metacommunication and Rogerian counselling skills into their practice (Ruiz-
Moral et al., 2017). One study went further with physicians and investigated their ability to 
correctly identify facial affect before and after person centred training. They found an 
increase in empathy as well as an increase in ability to spot facial affect although they did 
also undertake some training in spotting facial expressions on emotion which may also be 
accounting for the change (Riess et al., 2012). It should be noted, however, there was no 
significant difference between groups for affective empathy. This is in keeping with some 
previous research which found affective empathy showed more limited development (Epstein 
& Street, 2011). It might also be ceiling effects are impacting on this aspect of the study, with 
all three groups scoring relatively high empathic concern. 
These findings indicate counselling psychologists’ person-centred routes may be 
affording greater cognitive empathy levels and in turn, affording greater ability in identifying 
the correct emotions. These findings initially appear to be contrary to previous research of 
Hutchison and Gerstein (2012). They found there was no significant difference between 
Counselling trainees and other undergraduate students in rating the emotion of individuals. 
The level of clinical experience of participants, however, may account for the difference in 
findings. This would be in keeping with cognitive empathy developing through person-
centred experience rather than individuals with higher empathy self-selecting into empathic 
professions. Hutchison & Gerstein suggested their findings may be experiencing ceiling 
effect. Interestingly, in the present study, participants’ average accuracy rate for the non-
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gelotophobe emotional stimuli was at 86.76% when identifying the correct emotion, whereas 
participants’ average accuracy rate for gelotophobe emotional stimuli was only 54.16%. If 
ceiling effects did impact previously, the presence of gelotophobes in the present study may 
be affording more opportunity for CP participants to demonstrate greater ability.   
Although CP participants were more able to identify the correct facial emotions than 
the NP, when gelotophobia was present all groups were still way below what is expected of a 
typical population. This indicates the presence of gelotophobia has great potential to fracture 
the therapeutic relationship and thus there is a need to disseminate how gelotophobia 
presents. At present, there is still a lack of awareness regarding gelotophobia despite research 
across numerous populations (Proyer et al., 2009). Gelotophobes tend to have higher 
incidents of contempt displays and express less joy when responding to expressions of joy 
(Hofmann et al., 2015). This was witnessed within the emotional stimuli in the current study, 
with gelotophobes expressing more displays of contempt whereas, all the displays from non-
gelotophobes were of being happy. Previous research has found that when basic emotions are 
compared, recognition accuracy was at its highest for happy expressions, both for closed-
mouth and open-mouth displays of happiness (Tottenham et al., 2009). Although training in 
Counselling Psychology focuses upon the emotional process and encourages therapists to be 
reflective and attend to metacommunication, it pays little attention to understanding facial 
expressions (Hutchison & Gerstein, 2017). This research also witnessed that although 
operating from an empathic stance may be beneficial in respect of decoding emotions, when 
confronted with an atypical response to expressions of joy, it impacted on accuracy. As such, 
this indicates that in conjunction with humanistic training, further training in recognising 
facial affect would be beneficial for therapeutic relationships.      
Conclusion 
This research has found that CP participants did indeed have higher levels of 
cognitive empathy and greater accuracy in recognising facial affect of gelotophobes than NP 
although it should be noted there was no difference in affective empathy across groups. This 
indicates that humanistic foundations may be facilitating the development of cognitive 
empathy. Although the CP group were able to identify more correct emotions than NP, the 
presence of gelotophobia, and thus more atypical responses to expressions of joy, however, 
significantly impacted on the accuracy levels with accuracy levels way below a typical 
population for all groups. As such, this has indicated the need to further disseminate how 
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gelotophobia impacts on metacommunication, as well as the need for more focus on facial 
affect training to afford better therapeutic relationships.       
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Appendix A  
Emotional stimuli: Detailed below are the participant codes, GELOPH <15> scores, 
followed by the GELOPH <15> classification for each individual.   
1. Participant 32. G score = 1.2 (No gelotophobia) 
2. Participant 34. G score = 1.4 (No gelotophobia) 
3. Participant 37. G score = 2.6 (Slight gelotophobia)  
4. Participant 48. G score = 1.2 (No gelotophobia) 
5. Participant 63. G score = 3.0 (Marked gelotophobia)  
6. Participant 65. G score = 1.2 (No gelotophobia) 
7. Participant 73. G score = 1.2 (No gelotophobia) 
8. Participant 76. G score = 2.6 (Slight gelotophobia)  
9. Participant 83. G score = 2.5 (Slight gelotophobe)  
10. Participant 98. G score = 3.0 (Marked gelotophobia)  
11. Participant 99. G score = 3.5 (Extreme gelotophobia)  
12. Participant 108. G score = 3.7 (Extreme gelotophobia)  
13. Participant 97. G score = 1.2 (No gelotophobia) 
14. Participant 82. G score = 1.6 (No gelotophobia) 
15. Participant 84. G score = 1.2 (No gelotophobia) 
16. Participant 86. G score = 1.4 (No gelotophobia) 





















































































Histograms for H4 Counselling Psychology (CP) participants will identify more 
gelotophobe correct emotional states being displayed than Non-Psychology (NP) and 
Psychology Other (PO) participants are displayed below in Figures 1, 2, and 3.  
Figure 1 
Histogram Displays the Distribution of Correct Answers for the Identification of 








Histogram Displays the Distribution of Correct Answers for the Identification of 













Histogram Displays the Distribution of Correct Answers for the Identification of 













The histograms for H5a CP participants’ affective empathy will be higher than NP and 
PO participants are displayed below in Figures 1, 2, and 3.  
Figure 1 
























Histogram Displays the Distribution of Affective Empathy for CP Participants  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
